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INTRODUCTION 
I have long had a predilection for the thought of the 
Cambridge Platonists. It was several years ago as a lectur­
er in English Literature that I first made their acquain­
tance mainly through the writings of the Cambridge Profes­
sor of English and self-confessed "inveterate tresspasser" 
-i 
in other fields, Basil Willey. Therefore it was no coinci­
dence that I chose to do a study of Whichcote's theology for 
my doctorate. Moreover, having noted that the subject of 
my "doctoraal" paper, Gotthold Lessing, showed a good deal 
of spiritual kinship with the founder of Cambridge Platonism, 
it was quite consciously that upon completion of the Lessing 
project I journeyed to England to pursue the Enlightenment 
in its English roots. 
It is difficult to know exactly why one finds a par­
ticular theology attractive but I must say something by way 
of justification of a rather esoteric topic. I recall lis­
tening to a Salvation Army speaker on the streets of London 
and what he said affords perhaps a clue to my choice of topic. 
He said that he had not come to talk about a God who would 
dramatically change a man's life, who would suddenly replace 
fear and loneliness with security and joy but rather of a-
God who—if allowed to enter into ones life—would make ones 
sorrows a little less sorrowful and ones joys a little more 
joyful. Sorrow would not be banished nor would joy be unting-
ed with sadness but the whole spectrum of human experience 
would be raised a few tones to a new pitch of intensity and 
awareness. This unexpectedly modest claim struck a respon­
sive chord not only in myself but, judging from the still­
ness- with which they listened, in телу among that street-
corner audience. Some perhaps found that such a sermon 
glossed over sin and diminished God in an effort to make 
religion attractive to sceptical audiences. Others, includ­
ing myself, would rather think that to bring God thus close 
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to human life is to locate Him where He ie and wille to be. 
Whichcote, who realized that an exaggerated claim for the God 
of salvation only detracts from the goodness of the God of 
creation, might well have preached that sermon. 
Certainly there is such a reality as sin but a magni-
fied consciousness of ones failings cannot constitute a solid 
foundation for the love of God. In personal relationship in-
sight into failure and inadequacy comes only in the measure 
on the experience of love. I can only begin to grasp the 
magnitude of my sinfulness in and through my knowledge of 
the perfectly selfless way in which God loves me· A theology 
which numbers sin among its first principles therefore is 
building on a basis which cannot support the weight of the 
interpersonal character of the divine-human relationship of 
the Christian revelation. 
Furthermore, a theology which places sin very near the 
center of its speculations is a theology which tends to cast 
a shadow of suspicion over human nature· In such systems, 
the purely religious nature of sin is easily forgotten and 
sin mingled with the ontological structure of man· "Spiri-
tual progress" thus comes to have the connotation of somehow 
rising above that tainted human nature by aspiring to an 
anatural supernaturality· 
But Catholicism has undergone an incredible metamor-
phosis in the past decade and such recollections are as dated 
as an "ex cathedra" pronouncement from Rome. Tet while a 
new mentality has dawned theology's task of theoretically 
grounding and clarifying the emergent outlook is far from 
complete. Much remains to be done before a properly posi-
tive evaluation of human desires and deeds will have been 
accorded and the reality of sin will have been fitted into 
its proper perspective. It is in the cause of a theology 
that would bring to the fore the long obscured doctrine of 
creation in an attempt to clarify the goodness that belongs 
to man and the universe in virtue of their created being, 
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that this study is enlisted· 
But before proceeding any further it is time to intro­
duce Benjamin Whiohcote and his followers since it is by no 
means to be taken for granted that these obscure Cambridge 
theologians of the seventeenth century are well known to the 
reader. 
Very little is known of Benjamin Whichcote, born in 
1609 of an "ancient and honorable family" until he entered 
Emmanuel College, the "seminary of Puritans", at the age of 
seventeen in 1626· The young student made a good impression 
on at least one of his teachers, viz., his tutor Anthony 
Tuckney, who disclosed to Whichcote later in their famous 
exchange of letters that "from your first coming to Cambridge 
I loved you: as finding you studious and pious, and very lov­
ing and observant of me." He completed his studies in due 
course, receiving his В .A. in 163О and his M.A. in ібЗЗ, 
and was shortly thereafter elected a Fellow of Emmanuel Col­
lege. As a tutor, Whichcote was known as "a candid hearer 
of sermons" whose "judgment was highly reverenced, though 
there was no fear of his censure." Judging from the number 
of distinguished students whom he instructed among whom were 
John Smith, John Worthington and Samuel Cradock, his repu­
tation as an excellent tutor was probably well deserved. On 
March 3th, 1636 Whichcote was ordained both deacon and priest 
"which irregularity" remarked Salter, the eighteenth century 
editor of his aphorisms, "I know not how to account for in 
a prelate so obnoxious to the ruling power both in Church 
and State." That same year he was given the appointment which 
became the vehicle par excellence of his widespread influence, 
viz., the Sunday Afternoon Lectureship at Trinity Church, 
Cambridge. 
Besides his care of the college, he had a very great influ­
ence upon the University in general. Every Lord's day in 
the afternoon, for almost twenty years together, he preached 
at Trinity Church, where he had a great number not only of 
the young scholars, but those of great standing and best re­
pute for learning in the University his constant and attentive 
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auditors. And in those wild ала unsettled times contributed 
more on the forming of the Students of the University to a 
sober sense of Religion than any man in the Age." 
In 16^ +0 Whichcote gained his В achelor of Divinity degree and 
in 1643 became the pastor of a small parish in Somersetshire 
where he married Rebecca, the widow of Matthew Cradock, for­
mer governor of Massachusetts. About the marriage little is 
known except that they had no children. Then, amid the tur­
moil of civil war Whichcote was recalled to Cambridge where 
he was made Provost of King*s College, from which post his 
friend Dr. Samuel Collins had been dismissed for political 
reasons. It is typical of the new Provost that he provided 
the needy Dr. Collins with a portion of his stipend all the 
while he retained the Provostship. That he was able to re­
tain it for so long and that he rose to become the Vioe-
Chancellor of the University is remarkable considering his 
independent attitude with regard to the Puritan authorities 
and is perhaps the best indication we have of the esteem in 
which the man was held. Whichcote refused to take the Co­
venant imposed on all adult Englishmen by the powerful West­
minister Assembly with its purpose of banishing popery, pre­
lacy, superstition, heresy and schism from English soil« 
In those intolerant times Whichcote walked apart from the 
crowd,, as we read in one of the most important contemporary 
accounts of the man, from the pen of Bishop Burnet. 
Whichcote was a man of rare temper, very mild and obliging, 
and a great friend to liberty of conscience; for the credit 
he had with some who had been eminent in the late times he 
made no other use of than to protect good men of all persua­
sions·? 
Elected Vice-Ghancellor of the University in November of I65O 
Whichcote appears to have capably combined his pastoral work 
with that of administration. But in 166O his long and fruit­
ful career at the University came to a sudden end when he was 
replaced as Provost of King's by order of Charles II· 
The last chapter of his long life took place in London 
in the active paridi ministry, first at St. Anne's Blackfriars 
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and then at St. Lawrence Jewry. At St· Lawrence he preached 
twice a week and enjoyed "the general love and respect of his 
Parish; and тегу considerable sind judicious Auditory, though 
not very numerous, by reason of the weakness of his voice in 
g 
his declining age." As Whichcote would have been only in hie 
late fifties that "weakness of voice" was probably due more to 
recurrent ill health than old age. From the correspondence 
of one of his former students, John Worthington, we- learn that 
Whichcote was afflicted over a prolonged period in the 1б50в 
with a "quartan-ague", or in more modern terms a malarial con-
Q 
dition« But he remained an active minister of the Church of 
England until his death in 1683 on the occasion of a visit to 
Ralph Cudworth's home in Cambridge. 
As to the question why such an apparently important fi­
gure has received so little recognition the answer probably 
lies in the fact that the power of his personality was chan­
neled chiefly into a life of action and spititual leadership 
which left him little opportunity for literary expression· 
All the writings that he left behind besides some important 
letters are the sermons given in the course of discharging 
his considerable pastoral responsibilities· Even the sermons 
were not written out in full but delivered from notes which 
were afterward expanded and edited by those with more leisure. 
In the past decade something of the recognition due Whichcote 
has been rendered but much remains to be done before the full 
stature of the man is known and duly appreciated« The great 
seventeenth century cholar John Tulloch, writing in 187^, 
would be pleased to know that his call for a re-evaluation of 
Whichcote has at least begun. 
It is strange that he should hate been so little known 
and studied; but the obscurity which has overtaken him is not 
without some relation to his very greatness, and the silent 
way in which he passed out of sight after the Restoration 
after he had done his work at Cambridge·.·. He was careless 
of his own name.·.. He possessed the highest magnanimity of 
all—a magnanimity extremely rare—of forgetting himself in 
the cause which he loved, and rejoicing that others entered 
into the results for which he laboured. It is all the more 
І^ 
пес ввагу, therefore« that we should endeavour to do eome 
degree of justice to his name and opinions—to bring before 
us as complete an image as ve can of the man and his 
academic and theological activity. Standing as he does at 
the fountainhead of our school of thinkers, it is especially 
important to catch the spirit of his teaching, and to
 1 0 
present it in its historical and intellectual relations. 
The meager information we have about Whicheote seems 
like a great deal when compared with the little that is known 
of his disciple, John Smith. This lack of information 1m 
partly due no doubt to the premature death which cut Smith's 
career short just as it was approaching the beginning of a 
brilliant rise if the quality of the few discourses that he 
left behind axe any guage of the man's potential. Bom in 
1618 of a humble family (his father was a "small farmer" in 
Northamptonshire) Smith nevertheless managed, with the help 
of financial support from Whicheote, his tutor, to complete 
his studies at Cambridge. He received the B.A. degree in 
1640 and the M.A. in l6Mt and shortly afterward wets appoint­
ed a Fellow of Queen's College. It was at Queen's where he 
was made responsible for a course of religious instruction 
that he composed the discourses which constitute his only 
writings and chief claim to fame. Through the funeral ora­
li 
tion delivered by his friend John Worthington, himself 
sometimes considered a Cambridge Platonist, one gains the 
impression that Smith, like Whicheote, was an extraordinary 
religious personality universally admired both for his 
intellectual ability and his personal piety. Of the Dis­
courses Willey has written that "this volume is likely, I 
think, to outlive many of the more formal treatises by these 
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authors (the other Cambridge Platonists)·" The power and 
remarkable beauty of Smith's writings with their fusion of 
word and meaning has impressed almost every student of Cam­
bridge Platonism, including the famous Matthew Arnold who 
singled out one of the discourses for this tribute; 
I have often thought that if candidates for Holy Orders 
were simply, in preparing for their examination, to read 
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and digest Smith·в great Discourse on the Excellency and Noble­
ness of True Religion...and nothing further except the Bible, 
we might have, perhaps, a hope of at last getting, as our na­
tional guides in religion, a clergy which could tell its 
bearings and steer its way·...13 
Dean Inge, himself a noted Platonist, has described Smith's 
Discourses as "the best University Sermons that I know··· 
One does not always find agreement with regard to the 
remaining members of the Cambridge Platonist school. Generally 
included are Henry More (161^-1687), Nathanael Culverwel (1618-
1651) and Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688). Sometimes the list i*. 
lengthened to include such figures as Joseph Qlanvill (1638-
168O), Peter Sterry (1613-1672) and John Norrie (1657-1711) 
but there are elements in the writings of these latter which 
situate their thought somewhat beside the main thrust of Cam­
bridge Platonism. 
Tuckney, who figures prominently in this study, should 
also be briefly introduced. Born in 1599 in Lincolnshire 
this precocious youngster entered the University of Cambridge 
at the age of fourteen, took his B.A. three years later, and 
at the ripe old age of twenty-one became an M.A., in 1620. 
Thereafter he tutored at Emmanuel until 1627, the year after 
Whichcote began his studies there, and then left Cambridge 
after receiving his B.D. to engage in the active ministry. 
Upon the convening of the Westminister Assembly Tuckney was 
named one of its members and left the country parish he was 
serving and with his family moved to London where he obtained 
a parish. In l6Vj he was appointed Master of Emmanuel Col­
lege and three years later moved to Cambridge when he became 
the Vice-Chancellor of the University. Until he was dismiss­
ed at the Restoration for his nonconformity Tuckney served 
the University with distinction and was conferred the degree 
of Doctor of Divinity along with Whichcote in 1646· Besides 
his term as Vice-Chancellor he served as Master of St. John's 
and Regius Professor of Divinity. Tuckney was known as a 
theologian of strict and undeviating adherence to Calvinist 
orthodoxy but as a mem of understanding and kindness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE DENIGRATION AND REHABILITATION OF NATURE 
I. NATURE UNDER FIRE 
The opening attack: Luther vs. Erasmus 
At the root of the life of "religious reason" depicted 
in Whichcote's sermons is found his novel image of the divine-
human relationship. In his fundamental concepts of God and 
man are found Whichcote's answer to a debate whose outcome 
signals the beginnings of the modern religious outlook. The 
basic question to which Whichcote's theology addresses itself 
and to the solution of which in a modern sense his thought 
and personal example constituted a significant contribution 
is the question about which Luther and Erasmus had clashed, 
viz., the matter of human freedom. 
From the one side came the call of the Reformation, in-
spired by the deeply-rooted conviction of its leaders that 
man must be abased that God get the glory; from the other 
echoed the gentle voice of humanism and the Renaissance 
speaking of the goodness of human nature and the nobility of 
man as the glory of God. While there were many forces at 
play in the process of the evolution of the mentality which 
became the "answer" to that "question" not the least impor-
tant factor was the theological theorizing which accompan-
ied that evolution. Much more than a matter of merely aca-
demic interest, these two vastly different visions of God 
and man were part of a complex of factors contesting for men's 
minds and hearts and a place in the sun in the shape which 
human freedom would impart to the future. 
Near the source of this theological and theoretical 
side of the "debate" was Luther's stand against the Church. 
That his break with Catholicism had to do with deeper mat-
ters than current ecclesiastical practices is clearly stated 
in De Servo Arbitrio, his massively effective reply to Eras-
mus's Diatribe seu Collatio de Libero Arbitrio in which he 
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congratulated "the Diatribe" for having at least aimed at 
the relevant issue by attempting to rebut Luther's denial 
of free will. 
I give you hearty praise and commendation on this further 
account--that you alone, in contrast with all others, have 
attacked the real thing, that is, the essential issue. You 
have not wearied me with those extraneous issues about the 
Ьарасу, purgatory, indulgences and such like—trifles, rather 
than issues—in respect of which all to date have sought my 
blood (though without success); you, and you alone, have seen 
the hinge on which all turns, and aimed for the vital spot.2 
Touching as it does on the two strains of feeling that 
have ever been part of man's relationship with the gods or 
with God, viz., a "sense of virtue" and a "sense of sin", it 
is little wonder that free will became the "essential issue." 
The Church had lonrj managed to accomodate both these "senses" 
but the Reformation brought that inconsistent comprehension 
under fire and around the rock-like figure of Luther these 
two basic strains of religious experience were polarized into 
Faith and Works. 
What is the relationship betv/een the grace of God and 
human nature? Can man as man make an approach to God or has 
sin so blinded him that his every step is bound to lead away 
from rather than nearer to his maker? And, an interconnected 
question: When grace is granted does it then come as a power 
which enhances human nature's innate dynamism, or rather as 
a force which curbs or even suppresses that inner mechanism 
while creating beside it a quasi independent structure of 
"supernatural" virtue? Sometimes in peaceful exchange, more 
often in bitter polemic, this question has been debated down 
through the centuries of Western Christendom. Already in the 
New Testament a negative and a positive position in regard to 
man's aptitude for grace appear to confront one another. On 
the one hand the central messag of Jesus' preaching, i.e., 
his call to "repent for the kingdom of heaven is close at 
hand" contains the implicit premise that man is capable of 
moving away from sin and toward God. On the other hand, St. 
Paul appears to deny this ability and to condemn human 
19 
efforts after righteousness as the height of hypocrisy. Con-
cerned with combatting the pride of the Jews in their reli-
gious priveleges and desireous too of correcting what he con-
sidered to be the undue importance the Hellenists attached 
to reason and philosophy Paul made much of the imperfection 
of these prized prerogatives, often polemically exaggerating 
their negative aspects in order the stronger to state his 
k 
case. 
Yet what Paul is opposing in his sustained polemic 
against human effort is not every will and work of man but 
only that kind of activity which would appropriate to itself 
the forgiveness and approval which only God himself can bes-
tow. Thus what is involved here is not an absolute opposition 
between human activity and divine grace but rather a contrast 
of a relative order, viz., between a certain kind of conduct 
and grace—that kind of conduct into which the Galat i ans laps-
ed once they had tasted of Paul's brand of religion with its 
hard demands, viz., their former ways of trying to justify 
themselves by means of meticulous conformity to the obsér-
veme es of the Law. It is man's age-old tendency to clutch 
after home-made security that Paul was aiming at in his as-
sault upon human efforts after righteousness. 
That Paul tended to identify that self-sufficient pos-
ture with the whole regime of the Law as such is understand-
able in view of the circumstances of his apoetolate. "Ju-
daizers" dogged Paul's missionary trail seeking to undo his 
every evangelizing effort by insisting upon the irreplace-
able importance of the Law. Under such pressure the infant 
Christian church was constantly threatening to re-enter the 
Judaic womb which had given it birth. 
That judaizing spirit was again very much in evidence 
in the Church of Martin Luther's Germany of the first de-
cades of the sixteenth century, where the mentality of "works" 
was being busily fostered by zealous salesmen of indulgences. 
What proved a panacea for the multitude failed to procure the 
peace for which the sincere and conscientious monk, Martin 
20 
Luther, so ardently sought. The mechanism of that "works** 
mentality was for him a treadmill leading to emptiness and 
exhaustion. But it was not long before the study of the 
Bible led Luther to an understanding of the gospel which re­
leased him from that treadmill and armed him with the cour­
age to oppose the whole established Church in the вате of his 
new-found freedom. 
Just as Paul*β assault on human endeavour was directed 
against a special kind of human activity so did Luther's 
polemic against man*s pretensions to righteousness have a 
particular and well-defined target in view, viz., the Church's 
doctrine of congrous merit with its claim that unaided human 
7 
effort could favorably dispose God to the granting of grace. 
Luther did not tarry however at the level of particular doc­
trines; what concerned him primarily were the broad princi­
ples implicit in the Chruch's teachings. Reflecting upon his 
own painful striving after God's approbation Luther had ar­
rived at certain conclusions about the basis of the divine-
human relationship. De Servo Arbitrio, the fruit of that re­
flection, states that the human will of itself cannot move 
one step toward goodness but is bound either to God, to do 
His will, or to the devil, to perform the works of Satan. 
In thus denying the liberty of man's will Luther un­
knowingly departed from the thought of his beloved Paul. 
Unlike the Apostle he generalized the object of scorn, viz., 
the "works" of those who would justify themselves into the 
level of human endeavour as such. Paul on the other hand 
consistently acknowledged human freedom wherever man has not 
purposely placed an obstacle to God's will. Paul's ultimate 
theological classification of mankind was not into Jew, Gen­
tile, Greek and Christian or not even into elect and non-elect 
in a predestinary sense but rather simply into the two cate­
gories of those who really and inwardly respond to God and 
those who willfully refuse the divine call. "God has no 
favorites", Paul liked to say, but "He will repay each one 
8 
as his works deserve." Paul condemned the abuse of freedom; 
21 
Luther denied the very existence of human freedom. Opposing 
the concept of free will as the fundamental source of the 
degenerate state into which he considered the Church had 
fallen Luther propounded a vision of God and man which tem­
porarily triumphed over the emergent Renaissance point of 
view and quickly penetrated into the very roots of the life 
and culture of Europe. 
By his own admission one of the finest pieces of theo­
logy he ever penned, De Servo Arbitrio is Luther's most near­
ly systematic statement of his thought and "the finest and 
most powerful Soli Deo Gloria to be sung in the whole period 
9 
of the Keformation." The bulk of the book, a text by text 
analysis and criticism of Erasmus's Diatribe reflects Lu­
ther's determination to track down and destroy the elusive 
standpoint of his opponant. For his part, the eloquent 
Erasmus has taken advantage of the exposed flank of a thinker 
who dwells on the heights of the majesty of God by referring 
to the thorny matter of the relation of that sovereign will 
to evil. Luther's sure reply to such queries is to refer 
Erasmus to a mysterious hidden counsel of God that тал must 
not question. If the Diatribe presses his objection as when 
he points to the futility of Christ's lament over Jerusalem: 
"If all comes to pass by necessity.... Why dost thou weary 
thyself with useless teareï^Luther's retort is simply to in-
tensify the aspect of the danger of prying into that "dread-
ful hidden will of God." To reverence that will, writes Luther 
Is not my invention, but a command grounded on the Divine 
Scriptures. In Rom 11, Paul says: 'Why then does God find 
fault? Who shall resist Hie will? 0 man, who art thou that 
contendest with God? Hath not the potter power?' and so on 
(Rom.9.19|21). And before him Isaiah said, in chapter 58: 
'Yet they seek me daily, and desire to know my ways, as a 
nation that did righteousness: they ask of me the ordinances 
of justice, ала desire to approach unto God', (v.2). I think 
these words make it clear enough that it is not lawful for 
men to search into the will of Majesty. Furthermore, the sub­
ject is of such a kind that perverse men are most strongly 
provoked to seek after that dreadful will; here most of all, 
therefore, is the place to urge upon them silence and rever­
ence. In other subjects, of which we can and are commanded 
to give an account, we do not do this. If, however, any do 
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not yield to our admonition here, but persist in searching 
out the procedure of that will, we let him go on and, like 
the giants, fight with God; we watch to see what triumph he 
will gain, sure that he will in no way hinder our cause nor 
advance his own· 10 
Clearly the desire to understand is not a fitting attitude 
before the Holy of Holies of that Will. 
Thus does Luther's ultimate "explanation" of man's 
lack of freedom trail off into the sphere of "mystery." On 
the other hand Luther was convinced that his insight into 
the necessitating will of God covered the facts of everyday 
11 
experience perfectly. Take the case of the sinful man. See 
how he delights in his sin. Notice that if he is blocked on 
his path of evil that his will only becomes all the more 
bent on doing evil and that once the obstacle is removed 
this man will resume his way of life even more enthusiasti­
cally than before. See too the good man. Block his path to 
virtue and you have only succeeded in stirring up his desire 
for the good to greater heights. The sinner is thus "free." 
The regenerate soul is "free." Both are doing just what they 
desire, "spontaneously and voluntarily." Do not imagine that 
either is the unwilling instrument of a tyrannical God. There 
is no trace of compulsion here. To be sure God is the ulti­
mate source of these divergent kinds of deeds. But while 
God is to be praised for the goodness of the virtuous He is 
not to be blamed for the evil of the unrepextent. At fault 
are the "defective instruments" which the natures of the re­
bellious angels and fallen man have become. It is these per­
verted natures which distort God's power into patterns of 
sin. Because divine omnipotence is all-inclusive and divine 
mercy is not there will necessarily be evil. 
Since God moves and works all in all, He moves and works of 
necessity even in Satan and the ungodly. But He works accord­
ing to what they are, and what He finds them to be: which 
means, since they are evil ajad perverted themselves, that when 
they are impelled to action by this movement of Divine omni­
potence they do only that which is perverted and evil. It is 
like а теш riding a horse with only three, or two, good feet; 
his riding corresponds with what the horse is, which means 
that the horse goes badly. But what can the rider do? lie 
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is riding this horse in company with sound horses} this one 
goes badly, though the rest go well; and so it is bound to 
be, unless the horse is healed. 12 
Grant Luther his classification of mankind into two 
all-embracing categories of Spirit-led and Devil-driven and 
he could speak easily of free will but try to place man out-
side those categories in a quasi neutral zone as Erasmus did 
13 
and the reformer was up in arms. For Luther as for Calvin 
there can be no basic decision for a good or an evil way of 
life. That decision has already been taken outside and in-
dependently of the human will. Only the result of that de-
cision concerns the will of man which must engage in a kind 
of ratification process. Luther modified a traditional image 
of human nature to sum up his position on free will: The 
beast (will) stands dumbly between two riders (God and Sa-
tan) with no freedom to turn to the one or the other» 
So man's will is like a beast standing between two riders. 
If God rides, it wills and ^oes where God wills: as the Psalm 
says, 'I am become as a beast before thee, and I am ever with 
thee' (Ps. 73.22-23). If Satan rides, it wills and goes where 
Satan wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, 
or which it will seek; but the riders themselves fight to de-
cide who shall have and hold it. 15 
The war escalated: Calvin 
Luther's declaration of war on human nature was carried 
forward with renewed vigour by John Calvin. Calvin appears 
to have relished the sense of sin which marked Luther's vision. 
In the "prefatory address to the King of France" of his Insti-
tutes Calvin is up to his usual tactic of "giving God the 
glory" by removing every ground for glory in man, in this case 
in himself. 
We indeed, are perfectly conscious how poor and abject we 
are: in the presence of God we are miserable sinners, and in 
the sight of men most despised—we are (if you will) the mere 
dregs and off-scourings of the world, or worse, if worse 
can be named: so that before God there remains nothing of 
which we can glory save only his mercy, by which, without 
any merit of our own, we are admitted to the hope of eternal 
salvation: and before men not even this much remains, since 
we can glory only in our infirmity, a thing which, in the 
2k 
estimytion of men, it is the greatest ignominy even tacitly 
to confess. l6 
/hile Calvin presents his concept of total perversity as a 
theological notion it seems too much to say that this cen-
17 trai concept is purely a "corollary of grace'· in his system. 
One suspects that his tendency to dwell on a picture of hu­
man weakness and folly is more than a derivation from theo­
logical first principles. 
To inculcate a suitably lowly state of mind Calvin 
made extensive and intensive use of the Augustinian version 
of the Fall and its consequences. But dissatisfied with the 
orthodox view of Original Sin as the lack of original right­
eousness because it did not "significantly en< ugh express its 
power and energy" Calvin described the effects of that uni­
versal curse as an ever-active power producing the "works of 
the flesh" in the same way that "a lighted furnace sends 
forth sparks and flames, or a fountain without ceasing pours 
out water." Trent had anathematized Luther's view of con­
cupiscence; Calvin would reinstate that vision with even more 
than its original vigour. 
For our nature is not only utterly devoid of goodness, but 
so prolific in all kinds of evil, that it can never be idle. 
Those who term it concupiscence use a word not very inappro­
priate, provided it were added (this, however, many will by 
no means concede), that everything which is in man, from the 
intellect to the will, from the soul even to the flesh, is 
defiled and pervaded with this concupiscence; or to express 
it more briefly, that the whole man is in himself nothing else 
than concupiscence. 19 
The doctrine of Original Sin is the instrument Calvin 
used to undermine the ρ ssibility of free will. Having es­
tablished the universal and radically corrupting power of that 
Sin there remains nothing but to go through the motions of 
considering "whether, from the period of being thus enslaved, 
we have been deprived of all liberty; and if any portion still 
20 
remains, how far its power extends." If Original Sin is the 
instrument in this exercise it is Calvin's fundamental abase 
man-glorify God dialectic which remains the controlling in­
sight. "Man cannot arrogate anything, however minute, to 
25 
himself, without robbing God of his honour, and through rash 
confidence subjecting himself to a fall" is the reminder Cal-
vin prefaces to his investigation of possible remaining free 
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will, thus suggesting in advance the solution to his query. 
To ask whether anything of free will remains after the 
Fall is to ask to what extent Original Sin penetrates human 
nature. Following Luther Calvin magnified the proportions 
of the Fall beyond the orthodox concept of the diminishment 
of man to that of a descent all the way to a sub-human state 
of depravity. While Luther propounded this view in terms of 
a kind of universal demonic possession Calvin tended to trans-
late it into the tamer and more philosophic categories of tra-
dition. "I feel pleased," Calvin wrote, "with the well-known 
saying which has been borrowed from the writings of Augustine, 
that man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his su-
22 pernatural gifts withdrawn..·." Working more closely with 
tradition than the iconoclastic Luther Calvin will patiently 
seek its complicity in his effort to overcome from within the 
objections to his Lutheran vision of free will. 
While subscribing to the Augustinian version of the Fall 
the Council of Trent had somewhat inconsistently condemned the 
idea of the total corruption of human nature. It is this last 
vestige of human goodness on which Calvin will train his power-
ful theological guns. That fallen man no longer enjoys the 
prerogative of special supernatural gifts is certain; Calvin's 
assault will concentrate itself on the natural endowment of 
human nature, the intellect and will. Though the question of 
that remaining free will was traditionally considered with re-
gard to the zone of man's relationship with God Calvin thinks 
it important to begin with the realm of what he calls "infer-
ior objects,"which he carefully distinguishes from that of the 
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"superior objects" of the divine realm. 
Even though he has sharply divided "earthly things" 
from the proper sphere of free will it is nevertheless sur-
prising that Calvin appears to freely acknowledge man's abili-
ties and achievements even in that lowly sphere. An almost 
26 
schizoid tug-of-war seems to take place between the reformer's 
apparent admiration for the capabilities of the "natural man" 
and his preoccupation with removing any and every possible 
source of competition to the divine sovereignty. 
But when he goes on to consider the capacity of reason 
in the realm of "heavenly things" Calvin holds a tighter rein 
2k 
on his tendency to admire the "homo naturalis." This latter 
sphere he divides into three parts, viz.« the knowledge of 
God, the knowledge of his paternal favour towards us, and the 
method of regulating our conduct in accordance with the Di­
vine Law. With regard to the first two categories which have 
to do with man's ability to know God Calvin states that "men 
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otherwise the most ingenious are blinder than moles." As 
to шал'Б moral knowledge, Calvin admits the existence of a 
law naturally engraven on mens' minds providing a guide to 
what is right but judges that the raison d'etre of this law 
is to render sinful men inexcusable. Though Calvin therefore 
does not agree with Plato's contention that ignorance is the 
root of sin neither is he prepared to grant man sound ethi­
cal insight. His conclusion is that even in this most pro­
mising sphere of natural knowledge "our reason is exposed to 
so many forms of delusion, is liable to so many errors, stum­
bles on so many obstacles, is entangled by so many snares, 
26 
that it is ever wandering from the right direction." 
Having established the intellect's inadequacy in the 
spiritual realm Calvin turned his attention to the faculty 
"on which the question of freedom principally turns,"viz., 
the will. His first concern here is to refute the notion 
that man's natural desire for happiness proves that human 
nature retains free will. "Even the Schoolmen", Calvin 
writes condescendingly, know that "there is no act of free 
will, unless when reason looks at opposites." Acting on 
natural instinct is merely following the bent of ones nature 
like a brute animal and does not attain to the level of ra­
tional deliberation. This "natural desire" for happiness 
is nothing more than a natural inclination. The good at 
27 
which such a desire aims is a purely physical good, viz., 
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creature comfort. 
As for the Scholastic doctrine which would grant a 
subtle freedom to the will while pretending to uphold the 
primacy of grace Calvin like Luther set himself resolutely 
against it. St. Bernard, cited as an exponent of this view, 
wrote that though "good-will is the work of God" yet man 
"of his own nature... longs for such a good-will·" Support 
for this view the Schoolmen generally found in St. Paul's 
"For that which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do 
I not; but what I hate, that do I", which they interpreted 
as ал account of the natural man's desire for the good. 
But this, according to Calvin, is a false exegesis. Paul's 
reference to the combatant as taking "delight in the law of 
God after the inward man" makes abundantly clear that he has 
in mind one who knows the power of the Spirit, viz., regener­
ate man. Even Augustine himself applied this passage mis­
takenly to man without grace but later retracted his inter­
pretation as erroneous. 
Having denied any competence to intellect or will in 
the domain of the spiritual Calvin carried his polemic against 
free will one final step.. Too aware of the classical tradi­
tion (his first book had been a translation of Seneca's De 
Clementia) to pretend that there was no case for natural vir­
tue Calvin found a way of both admitting that evidence and 
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emptying it of possible harmful implications. His tactic 
was simply to shunt the train of natural goodness off onto 
a side-rail of "mere nature." In this fashion natural vir­
tues, skills and achievements were duly acknowledged but 
their goodness was ascribed solely to God. On the part of 
their human agents, all of these magnificent attainments and 
attributes are nothing more than vain and self-seeking orna­
ments. The picture Calvin paints of the natural sphere is 
that of a fallen world standing in sharp contrast over against 
the world of the Spirit of regeneration. That Spirit is al­
so present in the unregenerate world but only in its common 
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"energizing" capacity which works not by leading men to God 
but rather by curbing corrupted appetites lest the confusion 
of that sinful state degenerate into total chaos. 
Having shown that the goodness found in the natural 
sphere is to be attributed exclusively to God Calvin is ready 
to pronounce his final judgment concerning the scope of free 
will. If the goodness of the lowly natural world is nothing 
but selfishness in disguise what then can be said for the 
remnant of man's natural endowment in the sphere of "heaven-
ly things?" What man needs for that sphere is Ezechiel's 
"new heart", Calvin understanding the prophet quite literal-
ly in the sense of a kind of spiritual heart transplanta-
tion. While a crude biological dualism is not in question 
here, Calvin is saying that in conversion everything comes 
from the side of God including the "will", i.e., the desire 
itself to be converted said conversely, that nothing is brought 
to this movement from the side of man. 
How can it be said that the weakness of the human will is 
aided so as to enable it to aspire effectually to the choice 
of good, when the fact is, that it must be wholly transform-
ed and renovated? If there is any softness in a stone; if 
you can make it tender, and flexible into any shape, then it 
may be said, that the humem heart may be shaped for recti-
tude, provided that which is imperfect in it is supplemented 
by divine grace· But if the Spirit, by the above similitude, 
meant to show that no good can ever be extracted from our 
heart until it is made altogether new, let us not attempt 
to share with Him what He claims for himself alone. If it 
is like turning a stone into flesh when God turns us to the 
study of rectitude, everything proper to our own will is 
abolished, and that which succeeds in its place is wholly 
of God. 31 
While Calvin's basic viewpoint on free will was that 
of Luther and though he even appears to intensify Luther's 
denial of any natural "potentia" for God, in an indirect and 
curious way he was moving in the direction of the Cambridge 
Platonists with their image of a human nature capable of free-
ly moving toward God. While Luther was content to explain 
man's perversity in terms which tended to externalize the 
source of sin Calvin moves the cause of sin inward, iden-
32 tifying man himself as the prime responsible agent. Like 
29 
Luther Calvin can find no link between human nature and the 
operation of the Spirit. Aquinas held that grace builds on 
nature but Calvin followed Luther in asserting that no con-
tinuity exists between a corrupted first creation and the 
new creation of the Spirit. But in spite of such negativity 
about man's natural goodness Calvin's picture of human nature 
as an active source of evil is in a real sense a step in the 
rehabilitation of that nature. His interiorization and per-
sonalization of sin is a curious but real advance beyond Lu-
ther's vision of the devil-driven sinner. 
Moreover, just as the Genevan reformer interiorized 
the source of evil so too did he make a beginning in that 
direction in his theology of the Spirit. Calvin, like Lu-
ther before him, recognized the need of an interior and af-
fective aspect in the Christian life· To know Christ cannot 
be a matter of mere intellectual comprehension; beyond ration-
al knowledge inward illumination is necessary. The Spirit 
of truth will provide that inner illumination. A facile 
critique of reformation theology tends to contrast the foren-
sic character of its doctrine of justification with the Tri-
dentine teaching about a real interior holiness, thus gloss-
ing over the considerable emphasis the reformers placed on 
a theology of the Spirit. While Calvin's conception of the 
Spirit like that of Luther's remains that of a heteronomous 
entity (to use the language of Tillich) yet the thrust of 
his thought means to bring the Spirit into close contact with 
35 the human spirit. 
While both Luther and Calvin thought of the divine re-
velation primarily as verbal—the Word of God being closely 
identified with the words of the Scriptures—yet combined 
with their insistence on the study and preaching of the Bible 
was their awareness that true knowledge of that scriptural 
truth was impossible without the interior teaching of the Spir-
it. It is that inward mystical strand of their thought that 
emerges in striking fashion in the theology of Cambridge Pla-
tonism. As Calvin interiorized the work of Satan so will 
30 
Whichcote and Smith interiorize the work of the Spirit. 
An ineffectual counter-attack: Trent 
In its reaction against the theology of the Reformation 
Trent came to the defense of a human nature so rudely dealt 
with by the reformers. The Council's concentration on the 
question of free will can be easily adduced from the Decree 
on Justification. Kiing, reservedly conceding to Barth'β 
objections, has written that the Council over-reacted on 
this point though not without cause: "The Reformers actual­
ly provoked a certain anthropocentrioity in the decree on 
justification through their own deficient interpretation of 
Christian revelation." 
To ascertain the Council's doctrine one can take the 
act of justification itself as the focal point of the decree 
and review the role of man in the three moments before, dur­
ing and after that decisive act. Before justification, though 
"unclean" and "by nature children of wrath" the descendente 
of Adam nonetheless retain free will which "though weakened 
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and unsteady, was by no means destroyed." Within the act 
of justification itself the Council carefully carved out a 
place for man's active participation. The justifying pro­
cess begins with "God's prevenient grace through Jesus Christ" 
but cannot be perfected unless man is "freely assenting to and 
•zg 
cooperating with that grace." In the detailed phenomeno­
logy of the justification process which follows, man is de­
picted as moving gradually from an initial faith through an 
39 
awareness of sin to the love of God. y Finally, the Council 
devoted the seven final chapters of the decree to the ex­
position of the responsible role of man in the third moment 
of his freedom, i.e., after justification. Against the re­
formation view of justification the Council proclaimed the 
necessity and possibility of constant growth in holiness. 
Catechumens, "as soon as they are baptized" are charged with 
keeping "brilliant and spotless the true Christian justice 
kO they have received." 
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At this point semantic confusion has obscured an area 
of considerable agreement between Trent and the reformers; 
"The Council was satisfied to affirm in regard to justifica­
tion a series of things which the Reformation refused to ad­
mit, preferring to attribute them instead to sanctification." 
The growth in justification about which the Council wrote so 
much is paralleled to a large extent by Calvin's affirmations 
about the increase in virute under the rubric of sanctifica­
tion· 
For all the anthropocentricity of the decree and its 
apparent repudiation of the theology of the reformers it is 
the similarity of outlook rather than the differences which 
strike one who looks back from the vantage point of our post-
polemical , ecumenically-minded age· What the Council affirm­
ed about an indispensable human freedom under grace appears 
as mere notations in the margin of a statement substantially 
in line with the vision of the reformers. It is, after all, 
a Decree on Justification in which justification is depicted 
in terms of an act and that of a decisive nature. While man 
is assigned a certain measure of freedom in and around this 
all-important act this free will is dwarfed by the massive 
unfreedom implicit in the perspective common to the Council 
and its opponants. Stepping back from the details of the do­
cument to take in the big picture of its sweep and direction 
what one beholds is an image of radical transformation—less 
abrupt and therefore more credible than that of the reform­
er's vision but nonetheless sharing the discontinuity in-
herent m that vision. 
ЛііІе the points of emphasis of the decree derive main­
ly from scholastic theology the framework which the Council 
Fathers shared with the reformers remained Augustinian. That 
framework is that of Augustine's stark contrast between a 
fallen and sinful man and the richly endowed soul of the jus-
tified Christian. For an "honest, unprejudiced understand­
ing of the doctrine of justification" the Council declared, 
It is necessary to admit that all men had lost innocence 
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in the sin of Adam. They became unclean. And (according to 
the word of the Apostle) they 'were by nature children of 
wrath', as the council taught in its decree on original ein. 
So completely were they slaves of sin and under the power of 
the devil and of death, that neither the power of nature for 
the Gentiles nor the very letter of the Law of Moses for the 
Jews could bring liberation from that condition. And yet 
their free will, though weakened and unsteady, was by no 
means destroyed, kk 
The affirmation of a damaged yet integral free will 
appears as an awkward after-thought which blends badly with 
the image of man which precedes it. The traditional Adam-
Christ parallel of that Augustinian tradition emerges ex­
plicitly in chapter three: "Truly, men would not have been 
born without justice except that they were born children of 
Adam's seed....So likewise they would never have been justi-
fied except through rebirth in Christ." Thxs parallelism 
is taken up again in chapter four in which justification is 
defined as a "passing from the state in which a man is born 
a son of the first Adam, to the state of grace and adoption 
as eons of Qod through the second Adam, Jesus Christ our Sa-
,Λ6 
viour." 
The point at which the Council appears to most drama­
tically diverge from the reformers' view, viz., that of the 
"preparation" for justification, in which the freedom of an 
active role is assigned to man, hardly constitutes a substan­
tial departure· The decree talks about the "neceaeity for 
adults to prepare themselves for justification" and depicts 
man's active role in connection with a special "prevenient 
grace". Human cooperation is thereby joined to the penin­
sula of justification rather than to the mainland of man's 
life. The unjustified man is allowed the "freedom" of being 
able to reject God's gratuitous call but any positive move-
ment toward grace is precluded. 
Because it shares in the abrupt character of justifi­
cation which marks the reformers' vision the Council's image 
of God's prevenient grace takes on the aspect of a trans­
cendent intervention in the darkness of man's sinfvl help­
lessness. But by at least affirming a remnant of free will 
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and especially by emphasizing an active and responsible hu­
man role as a constitutive element of justification itself 
the Council Fathers testified however imperfectly to an au­
thentic Catholic tradition of тал*s freedom for God. As 
Kling pointed out, it is this tradition which distinguishes 
the Church's mind from that of the reformers in a fundamen-
tal way. For that to which their imperfect affirmation of 
free will points in an all too Augustinian synthesis is a 
whole dimension of grace and freedom which the reformers had 
denied, viz., the grace and freedom of God's mercy. If 
things were as badly off as the reformers would have them 
then there could be no justification at all: There would be 
no one to justify since man would have long since extinguish­
ed the race. But the Old Testament is not only nor primarily 
the story of human faithlessness and divine wrath; it con­
cerns above all the merciful God who places a staying hand 
in the way of man's mad race to chaos, and with infinite 
patience leads his people into ways of life and peace. Hoot­
ed in the biblical witness to God's loving-kindness (hasid) 
this tradition testifies that the pre-regenerate sinner is 
not the depraved creature depicted by the reformers but a 
being sustained in the hands of divine mercy and already ex­
periencing the knowledge and love of God though not yet in 
the perfect "Abba, Father" relationship inaugurated by Jesus. 
This deeply biblical and patristic which proclaims that all 
of creation has ever been bathed in the light of God's re­
demptive purpose has recently been receiving a long overdue 
re-examination.^9 
Summing up the significance of the Council's state­
ment about man's freedom one would not be unjust in judging 
that although a blow for freedom was struck it failed to reach 
the root of the problem. The emergence of the powerful Jan­
senist movement is an indication of that failure. Meanwhile, 
in their apologetic push to win England back to the Church 
post-Tridentine Catholic theologians were outdoing the re­
formers' polemic against "reason" with their claim that the 
з^ 
proliferation of secta in Protestant England proves that the 
"carnal reason" of fallen man needs the guidance of an in-
fallible teaching authority. 
II. NATUKE ON THE REBOUND: THE OPPOSITION OVERREACHES 
ITSELF 
A Chaplain is Persecuted 
Switching the scene to the England of the period short­
ly before Whichcote's birth and to the very University where 
he laboured so fruitfully one can take the measure of that 
ongoing free will debate in the particular form in which it 
confronted Whichcote. First we will look at the unattrac­
tive phenomena of the smugness of the "saints", an outlook 
which Puritanism tended to foster and one which reveals the 
other side of the coin of the unfreedom of the natural man 
of that creed's theology. In making this brief study of the 
English scene, it will be useful to provide a sketch of the 
lines which the English Reformation followed in its break 
from Rome. 
The Church of England had come a long way since Henry 
VIII won the title "Defender of the Faith" from a grateful 
Leo X in 1521. By way of the prolonged series of negotia­
tions which Henry carried on with the German reformers and 
despite the King's motivation—for political rather than 
theological gain—considerable draughts of Lutheran thought 
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found their way into the Church of England. Shortly there­
after Calvin's star began to rise in England, boosted by his 
growing international reputation and especially by returning 
Marian exiles, many of whom had sojourned in Geneva. Though 
by no means looked upon with royal favor the exiles were to­
lerated by Elizabeth. Supplemented by emigrant Dutch and 
French Calvinists these zealous churchmen founded strong and 
flourishing congregations in the London area. At the theo­
retical level, the thought patterns of Calvin gained in cir­
culation and acceptance with the help of such mediators as 
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Bullinger and Beza· It ia generally acknowledged that, in 
the words of Schaff, "the ruling theology of the Church of 
England in the latter half of the l6th and the beginning of 
52 the 17th century was Calvinistic." 
rfhile a form of Calvinism came to be the common theology 
of the English Church in the Elizabethan era the temper of 
its adherents varied greatly. While the majority of the 
Church's Bishops and divines saw no mandate in Calvinism's mes-
sage to alter the "status quo", a growing segment of the Church 
wielded their Calvinism like a hammer with which they would 
destroy and then rebuild the Church according to what they 
considered the only valid norms. To these zealots the com-
promise Elizabethan settlement was not satisfactory: The re-
form of the Church along Calvinist lines must continue to the 
very end. To one of the moderate Calviniste and contempo-
rary members of the "establishment" thè gradual advance of 
that aggressive form of Calvinism looked like this: 
At the beginning, some learned and godly preachers, for pri-
vate respects in themselves, made strange to wear the sur-
plice, cap, or tippet: but yet so that they declared them-
selves to think the thing indifferent, and not to judge evil 
of such as did use, them. (He seems to mean Grindal, Sandys, 
Parkhurst, Nowel, and others, 1562.) Shortly after rose up 
other, (Sampson, Humfrey, Lever, Whittingham, &c.) defending 
that they were not things indifferent, but distained with an-
tichristian idolatry, and therefore not to be suffered in 
the Church. Not long after came another sort, (Cartwright, 
Travers, Field, &c.) affirming that those matters touching 
apparel were but trifles, and not worthy contention in the 
Church, but that there were greater things far of more weight 
and importance, and indeed touching faith and religion, and 
therefore meet to be altered in a church rightly reformed. 
As the Book of Common Prayer, the administration of the Sacra-
ments, the government of the Church, the election of minis-
ters, and a number of other like. Fourthly, now break out 
another sort, (the Brownists,) earnestly affirming, and 
teaching, that we have no church, no bishops, no ministers, 
no sacraments; and therefore that all that love Jesus Christ 
ought with all speed to separate themselves from our congre-
gations, because our assemblies are profane, wicked, and 
antichristian. Thus have you heard of four degrees for the 
overthrow of the state of the Church of England. Now lastly 
of all come in these men, that make their whole direction 
against the living of bishops and other ecclesiastical min-
isters:: that they should have no temporal lands or jurisdic-
tion. 5^ 
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Such a build-up of tensions which the temporising po-
licies of Elizabeth contained but hardly cured could no long-
er be suppressed. In the controversy centering around Will-
iam Barrett at Cambridge University in the last years of the 
century that escalation of opposition reached a dramatic cli-
max, the divergent viewpoints polarizing around the head of 
the unfortunate young chaplain of Gonville and Caius Col-
leges. Barrett preached a sermon on April 29t 1595» at Great 
St. Marys which dealt with the "dogma" of assurance, a doc-
trine dear to the hearts of many an anxious Calvinist. Since 
158O the prominent Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity Peter 
Baro had led a fight against the rigid Calvinism of Whitaker 
and Perkins. Now the uncompromising utterances of his dis-
ciple Barrett brought that debate to the climatic point which, 
according to Porter, formed the watershed "between the fall 
of Calvinism and the rise to dominance of Arminianism.1' 
The brunt of Barrett's sermon was an attack upon as-
surance, the idea that once regenerated one can never fall 
away from grace, a notion Barrett labelled a "desperate pre-
sumption." The sermon contained the following points: That 
no one may be so bolstered up "by certainty of faith" that 
"he can of necessity be assured of his salvation"; that Christ 
in praying "for thee, that thy faith fail not" was praying 
not for all the elect but only for Peter; that the gift of 
perseverance is not certainly given but is rather dependent 
upon our individual behaviour; that true justifying faith is 
not to be rigidly differentiated from other forms of faith; 
that no one can know with certainty that his sins have been 
forgiven him; and "against Calvin, Peter Martyr and the rest", 
that the decree of reprobation is due to God's foreknowledge 
of sin. Finally, the shocked auditory were treated to a per-
sonal attack on Calvin himself as a man whose pride exalted 
him above God, 
In the storm of protest that ensued sixty Cambridge dons 
signed a petition denouncing not only the sermon but also the 
unrepentant manner in which Barrett delivered the Recantation. 
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In the Hecantation Barrett had been made to acknowledge 
a distinction between a temporary, and therefore feigned, 
faith and "that saving faith whereby sinners apprehending 
57 Christ are justified before God forever."^ Further he was 
mude to affirm that those who are justified by that immutable 
faith ought to be "certain and assured of their own salva-
58 tion, even by the certainty of faith itself." Moreover the 
young chaplain was forced to confess that he believed "con-
cerning the doctrine oi" election, and reprobation, as the 
Church of England believeth and teacheth in the book of the 
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articles of faith, in the article of predestination." Fi-
nally Barrett had to retract his bold words against Calvin. 
The last Court of Appeal to whom both parties applied 
was John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury. Though at the 
outset Whitgift showed preference for the theological posi-
tion of Barrett the persuasive personality of Whitaker, the 
Calvinist Professor of Divinity, combined with the Archbish-
op's own desire for peace at the University resulted in a 
settlement favorable to the anti-Barrett camp. The rigidly 
Calvinistic tenor of their thought is reflected in Whitgift's 
Lambeth Articles which Tulloch has characterized as "the most 
memorable exception" to the "fair and conciliatory doctrin-
ism of the Church of England in the century of the Reforraa-
tion." 
The hapless Barrett was summoned to submit to a second 
recantation. Whether he ever did is not recoreded. It is 
known that he soon after left Cambridge for foreign lands and 
became a Roman Catholic, thereby doubtlessly vindicating the 
worst suspicions of his erstwhile opponants. 
dhile Barrett undoubtedly shared the Calvinist first 
principles of his opponants as did his mentor Baro yet within 
the kingdom of that theology there were obviously many man-
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sions. In his assault on the notion of assurance Barrett 
exposed the diversity of rooms the rambling house of Calvin-
ism contained. 
The matter of assurance had been in the air ever since 
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Luther's relocation of the theological center of gravity of 
the Christian's confidence from Romish "works" to "faith 
alone." But Luther and Calvin were more пиалеed on the 
matter of the assurance this justifying faith brings than 
were many of their disciples. Breward rightly cautions 
against equating the Calvinism of Elizabethan Puritanism 
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with the theology of John Calvin. It was a cheap version 
of Calvin that our Cambridge dons were defending. The only 
assurance Calvin would allow was that of those crushed in 
spirit and looking steadfastly to God. Calvin's acute aware­
ness of man's tendency to pride prevented him from granting 
any other but this assurance as consolation to those who im­
itate Christ's perfect submission to the Father. Here was 
a distorted view of the doctrine of election that Calvin 
would have undoubtedly rejected. It belonged to the French 
reformer's basic theological perspective to keep men from 
the twin dangers of the pride that inflates and the sloth 
that renders irresponsible, both of which extremes appear 
to be implicated in this Puritan idea of assurance. There 
is moreover a dimension of Calvin's thought which absolutely 
precludes the kind of clairvoyance this notion of assurance 
implies. But as that "attentive Calvinist" Thomas Hobbes 
noted, Calvin's idea of the divine inscrutability was often 
forgotten by English Puritans. 
Having indicated that the Puritan concept of assurance 
was untrue to Calvin's thought one can understand nonethe­
less the possibility of such a distortion. Had not the mas­
ter at least implied that once man was regenerated he was 
saved forever? Granted faults and failings would dog his 
tracks but such things bear the character of a salutary spi­
ritual exercise rather than a life or death struggle. Even 
Whichcote will at one point uphold a distinction between real 
sinners ала the just who may falter but who cannot truly sin. 
The thrust of his thought however is an implicit denial of 
such cast-iron categories. Whichcote had laid aside the con­
cepts of Puritan Calvinism and taken up the more open model 
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of man implied in his often repeated saying "man has himself 
as he uses himself." But a half century earlier theological 
thought was still bound to the conceptual patterns of the 
hardened Calvinism of Beza, Bullinger and others. 
Things were not yet ripe for major reconstruction. 
Barrett was working within the system against one of its main 
tendencies, viz., the domination of the divine will and the 
corresponding derogation of human endeavour in the spiritual 
sphere. His contention that regenerate man is not so bound 
by that Will that he is unable to fall from grace constitutes 
a call for more freedom within a theology whose preoccupa-
tion with divine power leaves man little breathing space. 
The pendulum had started its swing away from Luther's "let 
God be Godi" to the more anthropocentric theology of Cam-
bridge Platonism. 
A Country is Persecuted 
The next and last scene in this brief sketch of the Eng-
land of Whichcote's time may appear quite unconnected with 
the foregoing but is in reality only another manifestation of 
the same untìerlying spirit of the reigning religious outlook. 
The Barrett affair revealed something of the lack of free-
dom implicit in that outlook; the events surrounding the Puri-
tan Revolution will also show that lack of freedom, i.e., that 
domination of the divine will, this time in the zeal and impo-
sition of religion which characterized the whole period. 
Haller has done well to point out the difference between 
the still deep waters which constitute the soul of Puritanism 
and the unruly currents which are popularly identified with 
the essence of that movement. In fact, the more spectacular 
phenomena of the militant crusader or the holy separatist be-
long more to the periphery of Puritanism and manifest the de-
cay rather than the strength of the movement. At the heart of 
Puritanism and the source of its incredible power was a small 
band of dedicated men who in spite of the turbulency of the 
times stuck sin ;le-mindedly to their consuming goal of simply 
ko 
preachinc the (Vord of God. In word and deed these men pro­
claimed the ideal of godly living among a morally confused 
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and dispirited populace. 
The ideal of godliness they embodied was the Pauline 
figure of the man armed with the breastplate of faith and 
65 fighting valiantly againot the forces of evil. One can 
readily see how their favorite images of warfaring and way­
faring, while intended primarily for application to the spi­
ritual life of the individual, could easily lend themselves 
to broader meanings at a time when the gains of the Heforma-
tion were being menaced by a reinvigorated Catholicism. But 
these itinerant preachers were crusaders only in a figura­
tive sense, and while broader meanings tended to creep into 
their message, their first aim was the religious one of con­
version. 
Though Puritanism was ал activist, politically and even 
militarily involved religion, at its center—the eye of the 
storm—was a deeply religious vision. Sartre has described 
the human condition as absurd; Puritanism, sensing the same 
incongruity in things, but thinking in Christian categories, 
interpreted man's situation in terms of sin and salvation. 
To the Puritan, this incongruity was a source of anguish. 
In an otherwise beautiful and smoothly running universe, man 
was the one creature "out of joint", a foul stain on the other­
wise spotless robe of God's creation. 
But coupled with this acute sense of sin was an even 
stronger awareness of God's grace--a fact which gives the 
lie to the popular image of Puritanism as a gloomy and ne­
gative creed. Peering into the depths of its vision, one 
can discern saints Paul and Augustine on their knees, struck 
down by the force of a divine illumination. Above the note 
of anguish sounds the chord of joy in hearts which have ex-
66 penenced the uplifting power of the divine presence. 
The contrast-experience of conversion is the central 
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reality of Puritanism. The depths of sinfulness and heights 
of grace known in that experience is the source and explana­
tion of the energy and power of the Puritan movement. The 
Ή 
soul which had been granted that vision of the depths of 
human depravity and the gratuity of the divine rescue could 
never be the same again. Armed with that penetrating insight 
into the corruption which lay just beneath the apparently 
innocent surface of life the Puritan knew himself to be a 
man with a mission. His clear-cut task was to make war upon 
the sin which he saw all around him and to lead others to 
the all-important conversion experience. And if, as happen­
ed in English Puritanism, that conversion insight was forti­
fied by the vivid images of the Book of Revelation then the 
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world had better be on its guardi 
All of the violence which surfaced at the tail end of 
the Puritan movement can be seen in latent form in that vio­
lent act of conversion. All of the tension implicit in the 
theology of the Reformation comes to expression ita..the dra­
matic character of that event. In the conversion experience 
the Puritan soul was granted an insight into the heart of 
reality as preached by two generations of reformation divines. 
Conversion is an act rather than a process because from 
bad nature to good nature there can be no gradual transition. 
Moreover conversion is decidedly a divine act since even the 
best actions of a corrupt nature are nothing more than dis­
guised self—seeking. The dramatic character of conversion 
is a result of the resistence of souls in the grip of Sa­
tan. Its once-for-all decisiveness is a result of the di­
vine power which effects the removal of the sinful soul from 
Satan and into the realm of grace. 
While the human subject of conversion is more object 
than subject in the act itself, once converted an amazing 
change takes place. Passivity is replaced by restless acti­
vity. After the well-known Pauline-Augustine pattern, a 
life of sin is suddenly transformed into a life of inspired 
activity. The Puritan Thomas Goodwin is a typical case. 
Goodwin had sought peace of mind by way of "works" but like 
Luther found that all was not well within. He fell into 
such despair that he was on the point of abandoning altogether 
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his spiritual Odyssey. But God had other designs on Thomas 
Goodwin and in the typical setting of a Puritan sermon the 
young student was suddenly seized in the grip of that power­
ful Will and not released until he had glimpsed the complete 
corruption of his soul and heard the words of divine forgive­
ness. After that we see Goodwin preaching throughout Eng­
land, opposing Laud, leading a congregation in Holland, and 
then back in England leading the Puritan Independents at 
the time of the Westminister Assembly and finally seeking 
to institutionalize his Puritan convictions as the strict 
69 president of Magdalen College at Oxford. 
As in the case of Goodwin, it was the conversion ex­
perience that gave the Puritan the conviction that he was 
raised above the mire of the reprobate multitude to join 
the ranks of a breed apart. To the converted "saint" there 
could be no turning back: From now on his consuming concern 
was to cleave to that merciful God. But while his eyes were 
fixed on heaven there remained the matter of suitable deport­
ment during the brief interval of his earthly pilgrimage. 
Both Haller and Miller have pointed out the aspects of Puri­
tan theology which kept the convert's spiritual battle from 
becoming a merely indivualistic affair. Doctrines like that 
of providentially given "talents" were the means by which 
Τ uritan preachers "drove their flocks out into the world" 
with the purpose of being "useful" to the community at large. 
Millenarianism would specify and intensify that general this-
worldly orientation. 
In the hotted-up atmosphere of that widespread mil-
lenarian perspective, the loßic of the Puritan's conversion 
experience led him into one of two paths. He would either 
remain in the "world" in order to combat and overcome its 
evil or he would separate himself from the "world" to form 
segregated communities of "saints." Either way he would be 
ratifying that sovereign divine will which had raised him 
above the darkness of the common herd into the light of God's 
select company. While both reactions are basically alike 
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in their attitude toward the non-elect it is the path of 
power followed by a faction of English Puritans which is 
the more relevant to our purpose. 
It was in the Puritan quest of power that the Lutheran-
C .Ivinist polemic against the natural man came to its clear­
est and most tragic expression. While one has to take many 
factors into consideration in trying to explain how loyal 
englishmen could raise the sword against their fellow country­
men and engage themselves in the unprecedented act of kill­
ing their King, (English monarchs had been murdered before 
but never as monarchs), explanations of that Revolution in 
purely socio-economic terms have failed to discern the very 
soul of the 1uritan movement. At bottom, it was a case of 
the "saints" seeking to realize in political and ecclesias­
tic; 1 structures what they knew in their regenerate hearts, 
i.e., that they alone were the predestined leaders of the 
nation. 
Recent scholarship of high quality has advanced the 
thesis that not just the fanatical fringe but the raain-
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stream of Puritanism was possessed of a millenarian dream. 
y/illiam Lamont has brilliantly argued that throughout the 
first half of the seventeenth century the untiring Puritan 
machinations for power operated under the rubric of the es-
chatological images of the Book of Kevelation. Lamont dis­
tinguishes between a first and centripetal phase in which 
71 the theology of history of Foxe's Book of Martyrs balanced 
the revolutionary potential of its promise of "godly rule" .. 
by designating the monarchy and hierarchy as providential * ν 
agents to establish that rule, and a second centrifugal stage 
in which the dream was retained but the Foxean agent desig­
nate dropped. 
Thus when by і64і the King and hierarchy had been dis­
credited, the Puritans turned increasingly to the prophecy 
of Thomas Brightman rather than to Foxe for their inspira­
tion. Though vague Brightman's designation of a "godly 
people" as the agent divinely intended to bring about the 
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raillenarían Kingdom appeared to apply clearly enough to 
the Puritan leaders themselves, and provide a convenient 
biblically warranted rationale for the "root and branch" 
campaign by which they would extirpate the hated hierarchy 
and completely reorganize the Church. 
Another factor contributing to make zeal and the im-
posing of religion fashionable was the opposition of the 
establishment. Thwarted by those in authority, the Puritan 
poured his reforming energies into a propagandizing campaign 
by which he would gain support for his political-religious 
aspirations. Puritans took their message to the people with 
an eye to "organizing the opposition" for the day when they 
would be strong enough to freely refashion England according 
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to their inspired blueprint. Thus did the England of the 
first half of the seventeenth century witness a politico-
religious movement of unparalleled power. Throughout the 
countryside ubiquitous Puritan divines spread the revolu-
tionary message. At the same time the naiscent press poured 
forth tracts, treatises and pamphlets proclaiming the Puri-
tan cause, the inundating volume of which can be ascertain-
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ed by the output of a Prynne. 
Sharpened by the prospect of an imminent realization 
of the "rule of the saints" but bottled up by the non-coop-
eration of the anglican establishment, the reforming instinct 
was diverted into a kind of massive political campaign. In 
their inspired conviction that their cause, i.e., the cause 
of the Heformation, was God's cause, Puritan preachers and 
writers were pressing to bring about the realization of that 
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divine purpose. Whether they would have been equally zeal-
ous for the gaining of souls had they been given a free hand 
to put things into eschatological order is an interesting 
matter for speculation. More pertinent is the fact that in 
the straitened circumstances of a suppressed minority their 
proselytizing efforts knew no bounds. 
V/hichcote followed Acontius in attacking this apparent-
75 ly noble aim of reforming ones less fortunate brethern. 
^ 
Whichcote saw the arrogance of those who considered themselves 
on the side of the angels in a theological schema which allow-
ed no grey area between the good and the bad to be the arch 
vice of the age. But one can understand how the regenerate 
Puritan, invested with such spiritual power and prerogatives, 
and standing over ag.änst a world of sinful blindness, would 
be tempted to condescension. Some had worse temptations and 
succumbed to the tendency of an angel of light to forego the 
rules of merely human morality in pursuit of their heavenly 
goal. Lamont has noted the prevalence of an ethic that sub-
ordinated the morality of individual actions to the ends of 
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attaining the greatly longed-for "godly rule". Whichcote 
saw it and scored the distorted values of those who made 
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religion a means rather than an end in itself. 
For all its power the Turitan movement in England did 
not last long beyond the zenith of its victory in the Civil 
War. Though they won their fight agaainst the King they lost 
the war of their ultimate objective, viz., the establish-
ment of the "godly rule". Part of the reason which brought 
the high-flying Puritans down to earth was the puncturing of 
their millenarian balloon. When their opportunity finally 
came to lay before the nation their design, the Puritan elite 
of the Westminister Assembly could do no better than fritter 
away their chance in endless debate. Disillusion set in when 
men who considered themselves privy to the will of God began 
to realize that despite their every effort the incarnation 
of that divine purpose appeared as distant as ever. With 
the failure of successive providential agents to achieve the 
requisite national reform the disenchanted saints quietly 
abandoned their eschatological hopes or joined fanatical 
groups like the Fifth Monarchy Men. William Prynne's words 
reflect the tired mood of the let-down Puritan. 
For my part, I have seen so much experience in the world, 
that I dare trust none with my own or the Kingdoms safety 
but God alone... we have seen such strange Mutabilities and 
perfidiousnesse in men of all sorts since our troubles that 
kS 
we cannot trust neither the King nor Prince, City nor Coun-
trey, this Generall nor that Generali; this Army, nor those 
that went before it, and yet our selves who are jealous one 
of another, treacherous one to another, distrustful of all. 
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Another factor which brought down the Puritan movement 
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was a weapon which Puritanism itself had provided. Along 
the way in their struggle for power it was not only the Puri­
tan who changed. If the Puritan finally caught a glimpse 
of his fallible humanity he also revealed to the "natural 
man" something of his dignity. The descending movement of 
the enthusiast's fall to earth is matched by the ascending 
movement of the many ordinary mortals who reached for the 
fire which the Puritan gods offered so liberally. Had the 
would-be rulers not become strangers to one another it re­
mains doubtful whether they would have been able to impose 
their design on a populace religiously come-of-age. The 
mushrooming divergence of opinion about the goals Puritanism 
had once taken for granted convinced Cromwell that a policy 
of religieus toleration was the only tactic that could hold 
things together. From the famous debates of his soldiers at 
Putney the contribution of one John Wildman may be taken as 
reflective of the amazing degree of theological sophistica­
tion which the ordinary Englishman had come to possess. Ac­
cording to Wildman the words of the тал who claims to speak 
for God must accord with the Word of Scripture· 
In spiritual matters he must show its conformity with scrip­
ture, though indeed it is beyond the power of the reason of 
all the men on earth to demonstrate the scriptures to be the 
scriptures written by the Spirit of God, and it must be the 
spirit of faith in a man himself that must finally make him 
believe whatsoever may be spoken in spiritual matters. The 
case is yet more difficult in civil matters; for we cannot 
find anything in the Word of God of what is fit to be done 
in civil matters. But I conceive that only is of God that 
does appear to be like unto God—to practise justice and mer­
cy, to be meek and peaceable. 80 
Under the impact of an intensive Puritan propagandizing cam­
paign, the equivalent of an extensive theological traiaing, 
the once docile masses had gained a self-awareness and power 
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of articulation which would prevent them from being imposed 
upon by anyone—-including their Puritan mentoral 
In Wildman's conclusion that "that only is of God that 
does appear to be like unto God" we see ал ordinary man's 
statement of the hermeneutic principle which the Cambridge 
Platonists would orchestrate with a rich variety of instru­
ments from the Greek and Christian traditions« viz·, the 
theme of likeness to God. Both Whichcote and Smith saw reli­
gion primarily as a life to be lived in imitation of a di­
vine pattern. In our own time when the pressure of world 
events tends to reveal the irrelevance and emptiness of mere 
formulae, the Church is rediscovering that a Christian wit­
ness in deed carries more credibility than rows of docu­
ments. A hitherto exceedingly speculative Catholic theology 
has begun to recognize the lived-out Christian life as the 
fundamental reality of the Church and the ultimate source 
of her teaching. Orthopraxis, it is being said, is the key 
to orthodoxy, or, in the words of St. John to which John 
Smith often had recourse: "If any man will doe his will, he 
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shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." 
But how could the rise of the natural man follow upon 
a message about an elect few? Haller, who has given his best 
attention to the sermons of the era rather them to the theo­
logical treatises, has convincingly shown that Puritans were 
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"Calviniste with a difference." The concepts are Calvin's 
but the accents were not· The context in which the Puritan 
preacher framed his message was that of a spiritually hungry 
populace and Puritanism's need of power. From this there came 
a Calvinism which was more than a mere recital from the Insti­
tutes or any other single work. The great concern of the 
preacher was for effectiveness in an urgent situation. Puri­
tans used their inherited Calvinism as a handy formulation but 
turned that theology of predestination into a message of hope. 
Where the sharp distinctions of Calvin's thought were up­
held there were other forces at work smoothing down the harsh-
Q-Z 
er aspects of the French reformer's influence. 
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Since the Puritans conceived of the secular as a sphere 
apart they applied the principles governing the spiritual zone 
to it only by way of analogy. As the hold of dogma weakened 
however the analogous nature of the application tended to go 
unheeded. So, for example, the doctrine of the equality of 
all believers (while implying originally their superiority 
to the non-elect) exerted a great deal of influence on the 
growth of universal egalitarianism. By a kind of osmosis, a 
new concept of man was emerging: The image of the regenerate 
man as projected by Puritan propaganda was coming to be com-
mon property of the average Englishman. The priveleges of 
freedom and self-determination attributed to the elect, preach-
ed "in season and out", overflowed the weakened dikes of the 
distinction between elect and non—elect and flooded the Eng-
lish countryside. 
Though little read in his own time Milton's polemical 
writings afford a good example of how the Puritan tendency to 
exalt the common man at the expense of those in authority re-
sulted in a backlash which ultimately undermined their own 
hopes. Indeed, more than in many of the contemporary Puri-
tan leaders momentarily bedazzled by the prospect of power, 
the Puritan millenarian dream lived pure and strong in Mil 
ton. Once an aspirant to the priesthood, Milton had come to 
despise the ways of the established Chruch, and decided to 
dedicate his talents to the Puritan cause as a kind of poet-
prophet. 
His Puritan colleagues must have wondered whose side 
he was on however when his attacks against bishops began to 
border on anti-clericalism and his arguments for the equality 
of priest with bishop, based on the doctrine of the common 
priesthood of all believers, came close to eradicating any 
distinction betwen lay and priestly castes. Milton's idea 
of the powers of the layman appeared to render ministers 
superfluous. His preachers are simply men whose charismatic 
9^ 
Rifts are recognized and approved by the people's chosen re-
presentatives· 
His belief in the transparence of the Bible was at the 
same time a faith in the capacity of the commun man to per-
ceive revealed truth. Clarity being of the essence of truth 
in Milton's conception, the more significant a truth the more 
plainly it would appear to human understanding. The Bible 
was an open book which had moreover foretold of "an extra-
ordinary effusion of God's Spirit upon every age, and sexe, 
attributing to all men, and requiring from them the ability 
of searching, trying, examining all things, and by the Spir-
85 it discerning that which is good." ^Whichcote shared this 
confidence in the clarity of truth and the capacity of the 
common man. 
It is in this perspective of the failing confidence of 
the Calvinist Puritan and the growing self-esteem of the na-
tural man that Cambridge Platonism made its appearance in the 
mid seventeenth century,- Whichcote and Smith will hitch their 
wagon to the rising star of the belief in nature and reason 
reflected in Milton's position. The breach between the realms 
of nature and grace was gradually closing. The Reformation's 
assault on human nature was faltering and the forces of nature 
were gathering for a counter-attack. In this situation Which-
cote and Smith played the role of peacemakers, seeking to re-
concile both sides. While granting nature her dignity and 
rights the Platonists would retain revelation and show how 
it perfects that natural realm. It was their conviction that 
the God of nature and the God of grace is one. 
A century after Luther and Calvin had waged war against 
nature under the banner of grace the pendulum was swinging 
back with a vengeance. As nature had been denigrated in the 
name of religion now men were beginning to discard revealed 
religion for a new religion of nature. A new revelation was 
being heralded for which no preacher was necessary. One could 
dispense with those contentious interpreters of the Bible with 
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their contradictory reports. The God of nature has left his 
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footprints throughout creation that all may know Him. Lord 
Herbert had written of a complete natural religion innately 
knowable. The cool winds of deism were stirring« That they 
were confined to the proportions of a spectacular squall and 
did not as is popularly thought become a full-blown gale is 
due in part to the moderating and mediating thought of Which-
cote and the Cambridge Platonists. It was their timely tack 
to confirm the rightness of natural religion while showing 
that it needed the truth of revelation as its completion. 
For "meer naturalists" as Whichcote called the adherents of 
natural religion the leader of the Platonists had a genuine 
sympathy. "These are persons," he said, "which a man would 
compassionate as soon as any men in the world.·· they are 
catholick; they entertain all that ever was in the world 
from God, all that hath any foundation at all from God." But 
having praised their sincerity he went on to add a gentle 
word of advice: 
You do well as far as you go; you do well to entertain 
all that God hath laid the foundation for; you do well to 
follow the light of reason; but do you think that God can do 
no more: Do you think that God did all at once? I do not 
blame these men, as all the world blames them; I do not blame 
these men, that they are very slow of faith, that they will 
not believe further than they see reason; for nothing is more 
impotent than to be light of faith.·· My exhortation is to 
these persons: be as punctual, as compleat in your moral 
righteousness, as is imaginable; the more you are so, the more 
you glorify God: yet still acknowledge the grace of God, make 
use of Christ's mediation; let all be by him recommended to 
God; let the perfume of the angel of the covenant be put to 
your righteousness. For if there were a law that could give 
life, God would not have declared himself in Christ Jesus: 
after-obedience doth not make recompence for a former ne-
glect. 8? 
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IIT. NATURK CHAMPIONED: CAMBRIDGE PLATONISM 
Foreshadowings of a new Mentality: Wm. Perkins 
Luther and Calvin knew what they were doing· Luther 
in hin passionate and Calvin in his systematic way were each 
trying to show the centrality of grace in the Christian life· 
To accomplish this purpose they felt that they must oppose 
what they considered to be the proud pretentiousness of the 
human spirit. Three quarters of a century later, in ал Eng­
land which had imbibed heavy doses of this doctrine, a very 
influential Knglish theologian gave the Reformation teaching 
a new twist. Standing midway between the origins of the Re­
formation and the age of Whichcote, William Perkins can be 
conveniently seen as a link connecting the theological de­
velopment which spans these two periods. Like the head of 
Janus, Perkins' theology looks in two directions, backwards 
to the reformers and forwards to Whichcote and the Cambridge 
Platonists. Perkins the divine championed a rigid Calvinism 
while the thought of Perkins the pastor moved along lines 
which Led away from Geneva, While the harshness of his for­
mal theology roused even his fellow Calviniste to protest 
and elicited a rebuke from the Dutchman Arminius, the more 
flexible divinity of his practical writings gained a large 
and devoted following·^ 
In "A Trestise Tending Unto a Declaration Whether a Man 
Be In the Estate of Damnation or in the Estate of Grace", 
Perkins the pastor can be observed tailoring his Calvinism 
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to fit the mood of the times. Through his mouthpiece Eu-
sebius Perkins addresses Timotheus who frankly admits to 
knowing nothing of the dramatic heights and depths of the 
Calvinist dialectic. Eusebius, who has himself experienced 
a full-blown conversion is at pains to convince his friend 
that his lack of a strong sense of either sin or grace should 
not prevent him from believing. The candid Eusebius admits 
that his own faith is "ever fought against with doubting and 
over assailed with desperation" from which disclosure 
52 
Timotheus is quick to conclude that the "flesh" in his friend 
is "like to a mighty giant" and the "spirit" is rather "like 
to a little child", a state of soul with which .he can readi-
ly identify· When the discussion then moves to the topic 
of the "means" to "strengthen the spirit" a subtle but im-
portant shift has taken place: Accomodating his' message to 
the Timotheus's of his time, Perkins has reduced 'the dimension 
of "sola fide" to a level of acceptable imperceptibility and 
turned to works as the way to make that "spark of faith" more 
real. Luther and Calvin had sung the praises of God's jus-
tifying grace; Perkins is muting that melody. In fact one 
could say that he was apologizing for a doctrine that had 
become a stumbling-block to his contemporaries. 
The novelty of Perkins' position must not be- exagger-
ated. While Luther and Calvin had denied spiritual fruit-
fulness to human effort before justification they did depict 
the human spirit as profitably active upon the reception of 
God's forgiveness. That teaching is retained in the practi-
cal writings of Perkins but a shift takes place. To those 
who could not feel the dramatic extremes of the conversion 
experience Perkins reduced the impact of justification to 
the scarcely perceptible proportions of a "mustard-eeed". 
This "some little portion of faith or repentance" thus en-
suring his orthodoxy, Perkins went on to recommend a hardy 
Christian life of active striving—not of course to obtain 
the divine favor—as the way to evince to oneself the gen-
uineness of one's election. In effect the message he preached 
amounts to affirming that everyone belonged to, or could be-
long to, the divinely favoured few. All that a man must do 
is to activate the grace which Perkins·implied was present 
and latent within. In his formal writings Perkins denied 
the least aptness of human nature for salvation but what he 
90 took away with his right hand he replaced with his left. 
While he did not fail to strictly distinguish between nature 
and supernature the movement of his practical thought tenis 
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to bypaGs Ruch distinctions in its thrust toward the common 
man of his congregations. His shift of accent from Lutheran 
faith to works while remaining within the Lutheran-Calvinist 
perspective came out as follows: 
Mark then: though as yet thou want firm and lively grace, yet 
art thou not altogether void of grace, if thou canst unfeign-
edly desire it: thy desire is the seed, conception or bud of 
that which thou wantest. Now is the springtime of the ingraft-
ed word, or the immortal seed cast into the furrows of they 
heart. Wait for a while, using the ftood means to this end 
appointed and thou shalt see the leaves, blossoms and. fruits 
will shortly follow after. 91 
Like Calvin Perkins inculcated introspection but unlike 
the reformer the Puritan divine directed his listeners·eyes 
to the light of a "spark of faith" within rather than to the 
darkness of a corrupted soul. Calvin's conviction was that 
consciousness of one's complete corruption would tear men 
away from their self-eufficiency and pride and turn them a-
rounJ to reliance on the Saviour. More than half a century 
Inter Perkins chose to dilute this bitter theological medi-
cine. Many reasons for this change could be found but un-
doubtedly one of the weightiest is the essentially demanding 
nature of the French reformer's theology. 
Not that the change occurred suddenly and definitively 
witn terkins. The old saw that says that many a divine who 
is Calvinist in his study is Arminian in the pulpit contains 
a good deal of truth. Perkins is presented as symbolic of a 
change which came about gradually. Within the confines of 
Calvinist theology Perkins was doing what many others were 
doing, viz., accentuating the positive and hopeful side of 
that theology. Though a goodly dose of the reformer's idea 
of personal wretchedness as a springboard to the love of God 
remains—that Goliath of "flesh" which threatens to crush the 
David of "spirif—it is rather by the positive means of fann-
ing to flame the spark of grace within that the Christian is 
to know God. 
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Benjamin Chicheóte: "The defender of Good Nature" 
Chicheóte's response to the free will question went be-
yond the pastoral solution of Perkins. Like the Puritan Per-
kins Whichcote inculcated a kind of "from grace to grice" 
program of the Christian life· But while the status of the 
"initial deposit" of grace is ambiguous in Perkins thought 
it is clearly situated in Whichcote's theological scheme. 
Stepping outside the confining world of Puritan divinity, 
Whichcote drew on his rich store of classical learning to come 
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up with a fresh approach to an ever burning question. In 
the preface to his edition of a selection of Whichcote's 
sermons, Lord Shaftsbury wrote admiringly of how that famous 
Cambridge divine stood apart from the prevailing currents of 
his age. Referring on the one hand to Hobbes and his follow-
ers and on the other to Puritan Calvinists Shaftsbury des-
cribed those prevailing currents as a conspiracy to deni-
grate the goodness of human nature. 
Thus, one party of men, fearing the consequences which may 
be drawn from the acknowledgement of moral and social princi-
ples in human-kind, to the proof of a Deity's existence, and, 
smother party fearing as much from thence, to the prejudice 
of revelation; each have in their turns made war (if I may 
say so) even on virtue itself: having exploded the principle 
of good nature; all enjoyment or satisfaction in acts of kind-
ness and love; all notion of happiness in temperate courses 
and moderate desires, and, in short, all virtue or foundation 
of virtue; unless that, perhaps, be called merit or virtue 
which is left remaining, when all generosity, free inclina-
tion, publiek spiritedness, and every thing else besides pri-
vate regard, is taken away. 93 
It was against this denigration of human nature that 
"the preacher of good nature" as Shaftsbury called him made 
his stand. But let us attend to Whichcote's own thoughts on 
the subject. To his mind the whole debate raged around a 
false problem. What had happened was that the "two great 
things of God" have been placed in an "odious, and in an ev-
vious competition": 
I mean, the primary and original goodness of Göd, thnt is 
the perfection of his nature, and which makes him tender and 
compassionate to us; and the other, the happy interposition, 
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mediation, and intercession of our blessed Lord and Saviour, 
which was a voluntary undertaking on man's behalf, which doth 
further procure grace, favour and acceptance. Now here is the 
thing, divide between these two; and what you attribute sole-
ly to one, you take away wholly from the other. (2, 77) 
Whichcote's response to this apparent dilemma is not to 
"oppose God's gift, as original of nature, nor his gifts of 
grace; nor put in competition the good disposition of Qod, 
and his readiness to compassionate". (2, 79) The following 
important passage may be read as an "apologia pro theologia 
sua": Head "I" for "some" and "they"» It is Whichcote him-
self who would uphold the theological significance of the 
realm of nature. 
Consider God as the author of nature, consider him also as 
the giver of grace. All that we have refers to God, upon 
one of these accounts, or other. If some attribute to him 
that as the author of nature which others do as the giver 
of grace; however it is God that is acknowledged, and God 
as original, and it doth infer an equal engagement upon us 
to God; and they do not thereby lessen, neither is it their 
intention to abate, or lessen the grace of God, or to free 
men from engagement and obligation to God; when they distin-
guish upon this account, the gifts of nature, and the gifts 
of grace; acknowledging God upon both accounts, the founder 
of intellectual natures, the invester of human nature with 
faculties, capacities and abilities; and the giver of it, 
the upholder, maintainer of it; the director of it: and 
then (applying himself to the necessity of the lapsed 
case of man) reinforcing, recovering, restoring him by a 
super-addition of grace. It is God in both cases; God 
universally that is acknowledged; in both cases acknowl-
edgment is made, and observation given to the direction 
of wisdom. (2, 75-76) 
What Whichcote is spelling out here is his radical re-
evaluation of the doctrine of creation, a doctrine obscured 
if not banished by the exaggerated version of Original Sin 
bequeathed by Augustine and inflated by the Keformation. 
Against that position Whichcote held that the realm of crea-
tion had not been completely ruined nor the light of its di-
vine origin snuffed out because of Adam's sin. Whichcote's 
creation-affirming creed, the "gospel" he so effectively 
preached is summed up in the following passage quoted at 
length because of its quintcasential character. 
They are not to be blamed or looked upon as neglecters of God's 
grace, or undervaluers of it, or to abate it in the least, 
who vigorously and with all imaginable zeal, call upon тел to 
use, employ, and improve the principles of God's creation.... 
i find that some men take offence, to hear reason spoken of out 
of a pulnit, or to hear those ^reat words of natural light, 
of principles of reason, and conscience. They are doubtless 
in a mighty mistake, for these two things are very consistent, 
as I shall shew you by and by, and there is no inconsistency 
between the grace of God, and the calling upon men carefully 
to use, improve and employ the principles of God's creation, 
and the telling men they rjhall meet with no discouragement 
from God, forasmuch as he will not leave them, till they first 
leave him. And indeed this is a very profitable work to call 
upon men to answer the principles of their creation, to fulfill 
natural light, to answer natural conscience, to be throughout 
rational in what they do; for these things have a divine foun­
dation. The opirit in man is tne candle of tbe Tord lighted 
by God, and lighting men to God. It is from God by way of 
efficiency, and to God finally. (l, 370-71) 
v/ith Chicheóte the whole setting of theology is shifted 
away frorr the noisy world of theological controversy to the 
quiet inner world of the soul. The soul is the beginning and 
end of the Christian life; God is known through it or not at 
all. \s Cassirer has pointed out, the central motif of bhich-
cote's and the Cambridge Platonists' thounht is a Plotinian 
vision of man as a kind of plastic soul which, while poten-
tially all things, has no fixed nature, its bein,^  depending 
rather on its attitude.'' Thus while man is a "compound" in 
whom "heaven and earth as it were meet" man will become that 
which he orientates himself to. On the one hand, there is a 
spiritual capacity in man which if properly used can draw him 
to godliness: "Man in repect, of his mind, is qualified to con-
verse with angels, and to attend upon God.... he is the image 
of God"; on the otner hand there is a carnal side to human 
nature which can drag man down: "Now in respect of his lower 
parts, he is apt to sink down int sensuality and brutishness 
.... like the beasts that perish." (2, I96) 
Unlike Luther's "beast" between two riders „'hichcote's 
Plotinian soul is not "dumb" but can choose its "rider". In-
deed, the stronger pull of his predominantly spiritual nature 
shows him the rirçht way. Lione is the determinism of Reforma-
tion theology: Here everyone is placed on the same footing--
tilted delicately but definitely heaven-ward. Here is neither 
hidden divine will nor irresistible transcendent forces an-
Kelic or demonic. Here "every man hath himself as he useth 
himself" and "men are more what they are used to, than what 
they are born to". (1, Ό ) Radically breaking with the pre­
vailing religious outlook, Whichcote would spare his contem­
poraries the task of witch hunting or rather would direct 
them within to the eradication of their own inner demons. 
"Godly" men have wreaked enough havoc in the world; now is 
the time for man to put the house of his own soul in order. 
Whichcote call to self-government is no easy charge as 
man has been given a troublesome body. Indeed so great is 
this task that it is understandable that man "fell" and that 
God—who knows our weakness better than we ourselves—pro­
vided for that almost inevitable event. While there can be 
no doubt but that man in Whichcote's theology is fallen man 
yet though "marred" in his principles it is an even more 
significant principle of Whichcote ' s thought that "he h.'.s 
not thereby become a stone." While acknowledging the fact 
of falleness Whichcote avoids playing upon this fact as a 
foil to a transcendent deity but prefers to stress the posi­
tive factors of the compassion of God and the remaining spi­
ritual capacity of man. 
'Whichcote refused to join the chorus of those denigra­
ting human nature. Picking up where l-uritan theology tend­
ed to leave off, i.e., with the question of the spiritual 
capacity of nature, Whichcote ansv/ered that question with a 
bold affirmative. And while his optimism about the reli­
giousness of the "natural man" goes beyond that of a tra­
ditional natural theology yet he retained a large place for 
Christian revelation in his theological constellation. 
Adopting the soul perspective of Whichcote's theology, 
John :;mith rallied to the side of his master in defense of 
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"good nature". Like Whichcote Smith has distanced himself 
from the spirit and forms of turitan divinity, and in the 
ten discourses which constitute the complete literary out-
put of his short life, the Platonic cast of Chicheóte's 
theology has received added warmth and colour. 
Kollowing Jhichcote Smith viewed the soul as Plotinian 
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and plastic but with a definite orientation God-ward. God 
has imparted that impulse to the soul because he is the per-
fectly good deity of Mato (and Christian revelation) whose 
first desire for his creation is that it share as fully as 
possible in the abundance of the divine life. And because 
God's wishes are ever measured by his wisdom that Self-commu-
nication is done in measure and degree. Thus man the self-
determining one can participate in this divine communication 
in his own self-moving way by dint of a miniature", a mi-
crocosmos, of the macrocosm of .iod's revelation in creation. 
It is by means of an inner "copie" that nrin can orientate him-
self in the world and find his way back to the "divine ori-
ginal" of all things. 
Neither did God so boundlessly enlarge the appetite of oouls 
after some All-su'ficient Good, that so they might be the more 
unspeakably tortur'd in the missing of it: but that they might 
more cert-эіпіу return to the Originali of their oeings. And 
such busie-workinf Kr.sences as the Souls of men are, could 
neither be made as dull and sensless of true Happiness as 
Stocks and Stones are, neither could they contain the whole 
summe and perfection of it within themselves: therefore they 
must also be inform'd with such Principles as might conduct 
them back again to Fini from whom they first came....And so 
we come to consider that Law embosom'd in the Souls of men 
which ties them again to their Creatour, and this is called 
the Law of Nature; which indeed is nothing else but a Para­
phrase or Comment upon the Nature of God as it copies forth 
it self in the Soul of Man.96 
Though the foil has le I't that inner "Law of Nature" less 
сЗеаг and legible than at first" Smith's acknowledgement of 
sin does not lead him to abandon the soul perspective of his 
Platonic theology. With '„'hichcote the soul remains the pri­
mary "locus theolo :icus" of Smith's thought. The supplemen­
tary revelation which sin makes necessary bears directly on 
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the needs of that sin-weakened soul· Regeneration does not 
entail the extinction of the flickering "candle" of fallen 
man's spirit but rather a snuffing up of it to full flame· 
"It is a fond imagination", Smith wrote, "that religion should 
extinguish reason; whereas religion makes it more illustrious 
and vigorous; and they that live most in the exercise of reli-
97 gion shall find their reason most enlarged." 
In his discourse "The Excellency and Nobleness of True 
Religion" which might have been subtitled "The Psychological 
Phenomenology of Grace" Smith depicted the harmonious impact 
of grace upon the soul. Grace, or "true religion" as Smith 
prefers to call the divine communicated life, comes not as 
the tumultuous force of the Calvinist conversion experience 
but rather as a restoring and healing power which "enlarges 
all the faculties of the soul." Far from doing violence to 
human nature, gr-ce gently rectified the soul's inherent pow­
ers enabling them to move easily to their proper object. Re­
pudiating a "mechanical religion" of Calvinist voluntarism 
Smith followed Whichcote in locating the springs of the know­
ledge and love of God in a divinely recreated and sustained 
dynamism within тал. 
True Religion does not consist in a meer Passive capacity, 
in a sluggish kind of doing nothing, that so God himself 
might doe all; but it consists in life and power within.··. 
Every thing as it partakes more of God, and comes nearer to 
him, so it becomes more active and lively, as making the 
nearer approaches to the Fountain of life and virtue· A 
Good man doth not only then move, when there is some power-
full impression and impulse upon him; but he hath a Spring of 
perpetual motion within. When God restores men to a new and 
divine life, he doth not make them like so many dead Instru­
ments, stringing and fitting them, which yet are able to 
yield no sound of theselves; but he puta a living Harmony 
within them. 98 
Unlike the "holy violence under compression" of the Puritan 
soul, Smith sees the state of soul under the impact of grace 
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as the serenity of a man "at peace and unity with himself·" 
But if grace adapts itself to man so must тал adapt him­
self to grace. Fallen man has "not thereby become a stone" 
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but must be "up and doing", i.e., he muet actively make use of 
the present measure of grace which an ever faithful God holds 
out. In his key discourse "Concerning the true Way or Meth­
od of attaining to Divine Knowledge" Smith lays down the lines 
his active ideal of holiness follows. 
In that discourse Smith distinguishes between a sterile 
purely intellectual quest for God and an effective method 
which begins with interior purification. Discursive know­
ledge, no matter how subtle, remains ambiguous. More signifi­
cant than what a man says is his intentionality, the spirit 
in which his words are uttered. Below the noisy surface of 
man's articulating activity is the heart of the matter and 
if that heart is not purified man's every external activity 
will bear the stain of that impurity. With Whichcote and 
Jesus Smith points back to a fundamental zone from which 
arise the good and evil "fruits" of human activity. Smith 
is pleading for the reuniting of "Truth and Goodness" in a 
vision which sees truth not in function of human ingenuity 
but as a facet of an undivided divine "Life" which stands 
in correlation to the "Soul", i.e., the whole man in his 
spiritual capability. Unless the whole man is in the pro­
cess of being purified even his loftiest speculations will 
reflect his impurity. "Agitur sequitur esse" and for Smith 
the "esse" of Christian life is a "living principle of holi­
ness within". "Such as Men themselves are, such will God 
himself seem to be." With Whichcote Smith realized that 
it is how a man holds himself with regard to the God with­
in rather than what he may hold of Him intellectually that 
is ultimately determinative of a man's image of God. 
On the other hand, Smith's harangue against "meer 
Speculation" should not be construed as a denial of the 
cognitive moment in religion. What he was opposing is 
theology done in a hair-splitting and contentious spirit 
with an eye to power or prestige. God has furnished man with 
"radical principles" of knowledge so that he is able to attain 
61 
goodness. If man will but foster those seeds of knowledge 
he will gain an ever deeper insight into divine truth. Like 
Whichcote Smith did not deny the doctrinal aspect of reli-
gion but insisted with perhaps even more vigour than his 
former tutor on the primacy of holy living. Knowledge of God 
grows only with a growth along all the fronts of virtuous liv-
ing. 
Indeed to those who will "plant their tree by the wa-
ters of life" Smith promises a lofty and intimate knowledge 
of God. Where Whichcote only intimated Smith expands po-
etically on the mystic.sl intimacy God grants to purified 
souls. Though he does not fail to append an allusion to the 
obscuring effects of the "dark Medium" of man·s embodied con-
dition yet the heights of divine knowledge availabe to man in 
his present state appear to border on the Beatific Vision it-
self. The "true Metaphysical and Contemplative man", rising 
Above his own Logical or Self-rational life, pierceth into 
the Highest life: Such a one, who by Universal Love and Holy 
affection abstracting himself from himself, endeavours the 
nearest Union with the Divine Essence that may be, uniting 
the center to the center, as Plotinus speaks; knitting his 
own centre, if he have any, unto the centre of Divine Being. 
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While such an exalted union is assigned by Smith only 
to the fourth and highest category of his division of mankind 
into ranks according to their knowledge of God yet this is no 
case of spiritual elitism. A comparison with Calvin's four-
fold division with its radical gap separating the fourth re-
generate class from the rest brings out by way of contrast 
102 the substantial continuity of Smith's classification. 
Here is difference in degree rather than in kind. Smith's 
division is not a metaphysical description of cast-iron cate-
gories but rather a rhetorical device pitched in the key of 
encouragement. In the light of his underlying vision of the 
soul, one can see that his highest category is open to all. 
Smith has espoused Whichcote's view of an harmonious continu-
ity between the realms of nature and grace. 
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As with Chicheóte Smith's gréait concern is not with the 
limitations imposed upon man by an unaccountable divine will-
Smith too had rejected the Calvinist frame of reference-
but rather with the unaccountability of the man who in spite 
of his marvelous capacity for a "higher life" wilfully ignores 
that call to sink into a self-made hell of sensuality and 
selfishness. The aim of his theology was the practical one 
of helping men to avoid that dire possibility by holding out 
to them the active and optimistic ideal of holiness of his 
distinguished master. Whicncote's rallying cry had become 
Smith's as well: "Up then and be doing; asid the Lord will be 
with us. He will not leave us nor forsake us, if we serious-
103 ly set our selves about the work." 
One of the great changes on the theological scene of 
our time has been the displacement of the negative view of 
nature of Reformation theology by a positive approach to 
that realm. This more open attitude toward the world is 
clearly reflected in the documents of Vatican II. It is a 
curious but sad fact that the barriers which stand between 
the Church and the world are more often erected by the 
Church and her theologians than arise from the world itself. 
Reacting against that negative posture, Edward Schil-
lebeeckx has called for a modification in the method of the 
so-called "correlation theology". While agreeing with its 
aim of making theology relevant to the concrete "situation" 
of contemporary man, Schillebeeckx objects to a concention 
of that situation in terms of a question to which the Chris-
tian revelation is the direct and exclusive answer. There 
is a missing link in such correlating which turns revelation 
into a kind of "deus ex machina". To reduce the realm of 
nature to a question about God is to falsify the perspectives 
of a universe buoyed up by the power of the irreversible di-
vine intention of salvation. The grace of revelation enters 
the world not as a vacuum but rather as the abundance of a 
life that God ever gives and man already knows albeit imper-
fectly, as the perfection of the Law rather than as its 
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destruction, and, in the words of Whichcote as the "restor-
ation, and further confirmation of all the principles of God's 
creation." (1, 388) 
As it should be in a world which God sustains despite 
its deflection from his purpose, there exist already human 
answers to human questions, and human solutions to human pro-
blems. To fail to see the goodness of those groping human en-
deavours is to skip over a whole dimension of God's grace, to 
slight the basic goodness of creation and the compassion of 
God. Of the transcendentalist viewpoint which tended to do 
just that, and which dominated the first half of this century 
Schillebeeckx recently wrote: 
It is difficult to see the sense of the theological approach 
that begins by saying nothing about God's creative activity 
and after establishing the meaninglessness of human history 
would suddenly avert to the doctrine of creation but then 
only within the framework of soteriology. It is certainly 
a part of the task of theology to clarify the radical finitude 
and sinfulness of the structures of human existence, but not 
less must the goodness which belongs to the world originally 
and by virtue of creation be elucidated. 10^ 
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CHAPTER 2 
NATURE IN DEFENSE OF RELIGION 
I. PLATONISTS' CONCEPT OF NATURE NOT IN TUNE WITH THE TIMES? 
Unscientific view of Nature? 
True Philosophy can never hurt sound Divinity. Chris­
tian Religion was never bred up in the Peripatetick 
Schook, but spent her best and healthfullest years 
in the more Religious Academy,, amongst the primitive 
Fathers; but the Schoolmen afterwards ravished her 
thence, and shut her up in the decayed ruines of 
Lyceum, where she served an hard servitude, and con­
tracted талу distempers: why should she not at last 
be set at liberty, and suffered to breath in a free 
air? let her alone be Mistress, and choose her Ser­
vants where she best likes; let her old loving Nurse 
the Platonick Philosophy be admitted again into her 
family; nor is there any cause to doubt but the 
Mechaniek also will be faithful to her, no less 
against the open violence of Atheïsme, than the se-
cret treachery of Enthusiasm and Superstition, as 
the excellent works of a late learned Author have 
abundantly demonstrated. (Simon Patrick, A Brief 
Account of the new Sect of Latitude-Men Together 
with some reflections upon the New Philosophy, Ібб2) 
The above phrase about "Mechaniek" philosophy has been 
underlined by this author because, while the passage is often 
quoted in works about the Cambridge Platonists, attention 
is generally drawn to the reference to "Platonick Philoso­
phy", That the Platonists made a significant use of the 
"Mechaniek" or "New Philosophy" has only recently received 
some recognition, an oversight undoubtedly due in part to 
Cassirer's influential study of the Cambridge school. 
Cassirer has characterized the work of the Cambridge 
2 
Platonists as a failure. He sees them as "isolated theorists" 
trying to "halt the wheel of time" but "condemned from the 
outset to impotence against the energy of the Puritan masses." 
Cassirer views the Platonists as hopelessly out of step with 
the forward march of the main force of the age, viz., the 
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"spirit of progress" or " рігіі of practical activity" as he 
calls it. It is this spirit wl.ich unites the puritan and the 
empiricist in their "worldly" activity while the Platonists 
concern with the world is rather impractical and mystical. 
Cassirer considers the baye of the power-thinking com­
mon to a Hobbes and a puritan revolutionary to be an absolute 
divine will. For Hobbes as for Puritanism that sovereign 
will demands strict obedience. He credits the Platonists 
with resisting this kind of command morality and attempting 
to displace it with the concept of the innate quality of 
5 
truth and morality. While he judges that their impact on 
contemporary was almost nil Cassirer has high praise for 
their thought considered "purely in its relation to ideas." 
At that nebulous level the Platonists are interesting and 
significant because of their witness to "a certain important 
line of thought" which had been submerged in the Reformation 
7 
but was to triumph again in Kant,.viz., Platonic idealism. 
The Cambridge Platonists' contribution to this Platonic cho­
rus of praise for the goodness of God and man's freedom was 
unfortunately all but drowned out by the dogmatic fury which 
surrounded them, according to Cassirer's view. 
While acknowledging the Platonists' interest in con­
temporary scientific developments and their friendly rela­
tions with certain notable men of science Cassirer's handling 
of their philosophy of nature is mainly concerned to con­
trast its unscientific quality with the new scientific stan­
ti 
dards. Lacking the basic tool of the new science, viz., 
mathematics, "they found themselves, as it were, adrift 
without rudder or compass on the swift stream of empirical 
g 
knowledge." Referring especially to More's penchant for the 
bizarre Cassirer's conclusion with regard to the meaning of 
Cambridge Platonism's relationship to the new philosophy is 
almost purely negative. 
Hence we have the strange spectacle that the Cambridge Pla­
tonists, who in the sphere of religious doctrine stood for 
the inalienable prerogative of reason, renounce and betray 
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reason just at the point where they undertake an explanation 
of nature. Though they were rational in respect to religion, 
they are mystic and cabbalistic in respect to nature. 10 
Moreover, it is precisely this incompetence in regard to sci-
ence which Cassirer sees as "the real systematic weakness of 
this school and the historical explanation of its ineffec-
tiveness in its own time." Because of their ignorance of 
and reaction against "l'esprit géométrique" Cassirer places 
ι 
the Platonists on the far side of the watershed which se-
12 parates modern from medieval philosophy. While sympathetic 
to the Platonists, Cassirer reserves most of his praise for 
Leibnitz whom he sees as being able to work from within the 
new mathematical perspective rather than merely criticizing 
it from without. Cassirer's conclusion is that of the two 
streams of ilatonism proceeding from the Renaissance it was 
the mathematical line of Kepler, Galileo and Leibnitz which 
wins the day while the mystical line of Ficino, Pico and the 
13 
Cambridge Platonists comes to a dead-end. 
While the main li'nes of his thesis appear sound, Cas-
sirer's negative observations concerning the relationship 
of the Cambridge Platonists to empiricism are not entirely 
accurate, at least not in the case of the leader of the 
school, Benjamin Whichcote. Contesting Cassirer on this 
point may seem a waste of energy since most of his remarks 
appear to center around Cudsworth and More but because he 
has chosen to generalize his conclusions to take in the whole 
school, exception must be taken. 
Surely the fact that Whichcote was not a skilled mathe­
matician does not preclude his appreciating or even utilizing 
the general approach of the new science. If one distinguishes 
as one must between the basic approach of a science and the 
conceptual or arithmetic tools which it employs, it is con-
ceiveable that a theologian like Whichcote could apply the 
new science's spirit of precision even more rigorously in 
his theologizing than a full fledged empiricist in his sci­
entific work. It is odd that Cassirer'в judgment of the 
7'+ 
Platonists does not receive the same leniency as his esti-
mation of da Vinci: "Leonardo's formulation of individual 
laws of nature may sometimes be vague and ambiguous; but he 
is always certain about the idea and the definition of the 
law of nature itself." Surely the same can be said of Which-
cote: i.e., that though his grasp of individual laws of na-
ture may have been below par, his sure feeling for the idea 
of the law of nature itself enabled him to skilfully corre-
late his theology with the underlying vision of the new sci-
ence. Fontenelle's eulogy of "l'esprit géométrique" is aptly 
applicable to the mediating theology of Benjamin Whichcote. 
L'esprit géométrique n'est pas si attaché a la géométrie, 
qu'il n'en puisse être tiré", et transportas, d'autres connois-
sances. Un ouvrage de morale, de politique, de critique, 
peut-être même d'éloquence, en sera plus beau, toutes choses 
d'ailleurs égales, s'il est fait de main de géomètre. L'ordre, 
la netteté", la précision, l'exactitude, qui rtgnent dans les 
bons livres depuis un certain temps, pourraient bien avoir 
leur première source dans cet esprit geomé'trique, qui se ré"-
pand plus que jamais, et qui en quelque facon se communi-
que de proche en proche à ceux même qui ne connoissent pas 
la géométrie. 15 
To ascertain whether the relation of Whichcote's thought 
to that new outlook was negative or positive one must begin 
by at least reviewing the main features of that world-view. 
For it was no less than that: a new way of looking at the 
world rather than merely some new information about the 
world. Bronowski has pithily described that change in out-
look as having moved "from a world of things ordered accord-
ing to their ideal natures, to a world of events running in 
16 
a steady mechanism of before and after." Man had shifted 
his gaze from an extrinsic world of ideal types to the thing 
itself seen as a self-moving, self-explanatory entity. 
The subtle difference between Aristotle and Plato on 
the point of nature's self-movement became the basis for the 
Renaissance's rejection of the Aristotelian, and endorsement 
of the Platonic view of nature. While Aristotle had agreed 
with Plato in ascribing formal and final causality to the in-
forming idea he diverged from the thought of his former master 
75 
in assigning: the efficient cause of motion also to idea or 
form, thus making motion the exclusive product of the ideal 
forms. Holding a more transcendent view of the forms, Plato 
nevertheless ascribed a certain autonomous efficient causali-
ty to material realities. His tendency to see motion in 
terms of mathematical structure was quite in keeping with 
17 the aspirations of the new philosophy. On the other hand, 
quite out of keej'ing with the new world-view, which consider-
ed movement a normal thing and the natural function of ma-
teria] bofìief., everything that moved in the Aristotelian cos-
mos required a mover. "A universe constructed on the mechan-
ics of Aristotle", Butterfield has written, "had the door 
halfway open for spirits already; it was a universe in which 
unseen hands had to be in constant operation, and sublime 
Intelligences had to roll the planetary spheres around." 
While Aristotle's universe is far from motionless yet be-
cause he conceived of perfection in terms of immutability, 
19 
rest rather than movement is the norm. 
Aristotle had conceived of the basic stuff of reality 
as composed of four distinct elements, viz., fire and air, 
earth and water, each of which possessed its own unique pro-
perties. An even more important qualitative difference in 
the makeup of things was the great distinction between the 
heavenly spheres above and the earth below. Like a kind of 
demi-urge and by virtue of their supposed perfection, these 
heavenly bodies exercised a decisive control over lower 
realms. Now the new science would replace all this myster-
ious diversity with a simple, measureable homogeneity of 
created matter. All of created being is virtually the same 
in the eyes of the new science, i.e., all is subject to the 
same laws, and object of the same intelligibility. 
A welcome implication of the new world-view were the 
apparently clear and easily comprehensible concepts it held 
out. If the details were not always fully accounted for yet 
the twin convictions engendered by the new science were the 
machine-like lawfulness of the universe and reason's ability 
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to understand and account for that order. Little wonder then 
that Aristotle and Aristotelian Scholasticism came in for some 
hard knocks: Teaching men to learn the truth about nature by 
contemplating ideal essences that tradition appeared to form 
an obstacle to the all-important business of investigating 
the "real truth" of nature*s inner structure. 
Finally, while Aristotle had been the "first great em-
piricist" yet in the framework of his cosmology matter was 
seen as an element of potentiality, non-form and unintelli-
gibility. In his world of becoming where everything is 
striving to attain its ideal form, matter constitutes the 
21 
negative aspect of potentiality, the not-yet of the to-be. 
Whichcote's reaction to the emergent immanentist view 
of nature was to accept its challenge in a radical way. Not 
for him the cheap tactic of complaining from the sidelines 
nor acquiescence in the easy alternative of preaching the kind 
of "mystery" religion a Bacon was recommending· It is with-
in the framework of a truly self-moving world that Whichcote 
elaborated his theology. Whichcote combined the teleologi-
ca! viewpoint of Arietotelianism with the structural view-
point of empiricism in a vision of a world in which every-
thing moves towards its end by dint of proportionate princi-
ples of self-movement. In Whichcote's theology, grace is of 
a persuasive rather than a coercive quality, working in and 
through rather than beside or against man*s self-moving dy-
namism. To his own question whether it is "reasonable, that 
Qod having made intelligent and voluntary agents should force 
them, and make them do either this or that; so or so; whether 
they will or no?" Whichcote's answer is an eloquent "no". 
God hath made us of natures to be otherwise dealt withal. 
God draws with the cords of a man, viz· persuasion and in-
struction; and if God draws, it is expected we should fol-
low him. God works with us, and it follows that we should 
work out the affairs of our salvation with care and dili-
gence. (1, 26-27) 
At the center of Whichcote's self-moving world is an 
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indispensable "reason". It was his bold proclamation of the 
capabilities of this spiritual power of mem which more than 
anything else upset his Puritan colleagues at Cambridge. In 
their exchange of letters Tuckney vainly tried to bring Which-
cote off from that tack by convincing him of the unquestion­
able authority of Scripture and the subservient role of rea-
22 
son. But the Puritan way of "giving God the glory" by sub­
jecting reason to the revealed Word was not Whichcote's way 
and the controversial Vice-Chancellor continued to uphold 
the cultivation rather than the subjection of reason as the 
proper method of doing homage to God. 
For to whom doth God declare, but to intelligent agents? 
What doth God give his commands to, or his counsels, but to 
the intelligent agent, and the reason of man? So that you 
see reason hath great place in religion; for reason is the 
recipient of whatsoever God declares; and those things that 
are according to the nature of God, the reason of man can 
discover. It is either the efficient or the recipient of 
all that is called religion, of all that is communicated 
from God to man. The natural knowledge of God is the product 
of reason. And if things be declared as the counsel of God's 
will and product of his pleasure, reason receives them; the 
resolutions of his will for our further direction, are pro­
posed and communicated to reason. And in both these ways we 
are taught of God.... By the former we know that God is, his 
nature, what he is: by the latter; what God would have us to 
do, and what he enjoins as fit to be done by us, in order to 
our future hanpiness. So here you see the use of mind and 
understandinp; in the way of religion. God teaches us in his 
creation, in riving us such faculties; he tenches us further, 
in the resolution of his will; because he satisfies us in 
what he doth impose upon us. (3i l83) 
Nor was i/hichcoto' s immanentist viewnoint confined only 
to human nature; the truth of reason answers to a ΌΓΪΟΓ and 
23 
objective God-^iven "truth of things". His constant insis­
tence on the objectivity of truth was aimed no doubt partly 
at the voluntanst ethic of Thomas Hobbes. The author of 
the widely read and almost equally widely denounced Leviathan 
25 
saw norality as a human creation. In Hobbes'ε bourgeois vi­
sion of human nature the basic drive of "felicity" or "con­
tinuali success in obtaining those things which a man from 
time to time desireth" corresponds to no divinely given order 
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but rather to a chaotic "State of Nature" greatly resembling 
Darwin's "nature red in tooth and claw". In that "natural! 
condition of mankind" which Hobbes describes as an all-out 
war of "every man against every man", ordinary moral stand-
ards are meaningless. 
Nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Jus-
tice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no 
common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. 
Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. 26 
To avoid the total chaos of a "condition" which he felt 
his contemporaries were incarnating on the battle fields of 
the Civil War, Hobbes's solution was the creation of an all-
powerful State. By persuading men that there was nothing 
imder their feet but a slippery slope to utter ruin Hobbes 
would drive his contemporaries forward to the solid ground 
of the State (the Leviathan) as the sure source of peace and 
security. Whichcote's answer to that pessimistic picture of 
the "homo homini lupus est" ethic was an optimistic image of 
nature in which divine truth and goodness are so vividly pre-
sent in creation that only the self-blinded cannot see. 
The idea that Whichcote and Smith as the "pre-scien-
tific members" of the Cambridge school were only peripherally 
concerned with Hobbesism is inaccurate. The concept of nature 
they employ so prominently stands in obvious contrast to 
27 that of Hobbes. "But I must do right to the maker of our 
nature" Whichcote said, "and therefore declare that 
man, if he be right, and have not abused his nature, but is 
as God brought him into the world, and hath done himself no 
wrong, is a mild, meek, gentle, calm, Ivoing creature, fitt-
ed for conversation. I am sure many are so, and have been 
so from the beginning, and grow more so; and if any find it 
otherwise, I will say he may be ashamed of himself." (^ , 375) 
And again: 
For folly and inconsideration are the causes of the great de-
pravation and apostacy of mankind. There is nothing baser 
and more unbecoming mankind, since the beauty and excellency 
of human nature consists in the perfection of reason and un-
derstanding, than to negledt the use thereof, and chuse and 
prefer the condition of beasts. Men are vicious, and act 
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like beasts, because they are wilful, careless, unreasonable, 
incopîitant, inadvertent; not considering the rules and meas-
ures of nature, and of reason; for human nature is indued with 
rational self-reflecting faculties; able to discern the es-
sential differences of good and evil, and to observe what 
things conduce to its happiness or misery. It is most na-
tural and easy for these faculties to embrace, and pursue those 
objects, which are most agreeable to them. (1, 131-32) 
And finally, a more explicit expression of Whichcote's op-
position to the author of Leviathan: "Wherefore, we may detest 
and reject that doctrine which saith, that God made man in a 
state of war." (4, 213) 
But to return to Cassirer's critique, it must be said 
that his claim that the Platonists had regressed to the ani-
mistic view of nature from which the new science was strug-
gling to free itself may be true of Henry More but is mis-
29 leading when generalized to include Whichcote and Smith. 
More's mystic extravagances constitute a distinct divergence 
from the "sober sense of religion" inculcated by Whichcote 
and his disciple. The tfhichcote-Smith cosmos is character-
ized by the machine-like orderliness so highly esteemed by 
the new science. Significantly, Whichcote's allusions to 
the "caelestial spheres" refer to their archetypical harmony 
rather than to any superiority to, or determining influx on, 
the world. That traditionally redoubtable influence has been 
reduced to the level of exemplarity: To whomever will but con-
sider, the regular motion of those heavenly bodies is an ex-
cellent lesson in harmonious converse. Additional exam-
ples of the orderliness that should mark human relationships 
are to be found in the "inferior world" of sub-human being. 
As in the case of the heavenly bodies above here too all is 
harmony and mutual accomodation. Indeed, 
the whole creation of God is mutual and beneficial: there 
is nothing that is, though it be devoid of the perfection of 
reason and understanding, but it hath, as its dowry, a dis-
position and fitness to accomod'j.te the universe, to some 
necessary use and purpose. (2, 222) 31 
Unlike the writings of More which are filled with every 
manifestation of "spirit" that came to his hearing (including 
8ο/ 
cases of witchcraft) there reigns an eloquent silence with re-
32 gard to the miraculous in the writings of Whichcote and Smith. 
Order rather than disorder is the foundation-stone of their 
apoogetic. "For a miracle a man may call in question many 
ways", Whichcote said, "but if any man produces an argument 
taken from the reason of thingst it will stay upon the under­
standing, and will convince and satisfy: and the more a man 
thinks of it, the more he will be assured." (3, 172) Which­
cote held God's power up for bewonderment only in conjunction 
with the divine wisdom as displayed, for example, in the har­
mony of creation, but more especially in the rationality with 
which God draws the disoriented human heart back into the 
sphere of truth and goodness. To Whichcote the divine power 
is a controlled passion for righteousness rather than a 
force for omnipotent and arbitrary actions. The very pin­
nacle of divine power he sees in (¿od's "general good will" 
and readiness to forgive. 
It is very true, no true majesty without goodness: yea I dare 
say it, it is the greatest act of power to commiserate and 
pardon; for other acts of power subdue things without, but 
he that doth commiserate and pardon, subdues himself, which 
is the greatest victory. General good will, and universal 
love, and charity, are the greatest, both perfections and 
acts of power. To be ready to forgive, and to be easy to be 
reconciled, are things that are grafted, not in the wilder-
ness of the world, but in the most noble and generous na-
tures. They are vinder the fullest communication of God that 
give themselves up to acts of clemency and compassion, and 
are forward to relieve, and to do good, to pardon and to 
forgive. (1, 32) 
Another important respect in which Whichcote's view 
of nature agrees with the emergent view of the new science 
and correlative with his emphasis on nature's orderliness 
is the easy intelligibility of nature. Like Descartes, 
Whichcote upheld the luminous quality of truth but unlike 
the French philosopher he did so without dividing matter 
from mind. To the leader of the Platonist school as well 
as to his disciple Smith that luminosity flows from the per-
fect harmony of a creation designed and sustained by a God 
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of reason. Having resisted the prevailing theology's em-
phasis on sin Whichcote and Smith could present nature's 
truth as still intelligible if somewhat dimmed by the fall. 
And because that truth is identical at bottom with goodness 
rather than sovereignty, it is truth-communicated rather 
than truth-mysterious. Clarity rather than mystery is the 
measure of God's revelation. There where He has most per-
fectly communicated Himself is fullness of intelligibility 
rather than height of "mystery". While the perfection of 
the Beatific Vision is impossible in man's present embodied 
and sinful condition, it is only sin that can blind man to 
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"the glorious evidence and power of divine truth". Be-
tween the proud dogmatic certainty and the increasingly 
corrosive scpeticism of the age, Whichcote stood at the 
side of the new science's humbly optimistic attitude toward 
truth.5 
To conclude this defense of Whichcote's view of nature, 
a more global view of things is in order. There is a sig-
nificant analogy between the shift from the qualitatively 
heterogeneous universe of Aristotelian-Scholasticism to 
the quantitatively homogeneous world of the new science and 
the shift in theological viewpoint from Heformation divinity 
to the thought of Benjamin Whichcote. 
In that pre-scientific model of the universe were to 
be found not only the irreducible diversity of Aristotle's 
basic elements but the larger difference between the "crys-
tal spheres" above and the realm of earth below. Creation 
was seen as a "Golden Chain", the upper reaches of which 
teemed with angels while the lower levels were viewed as 
35 the habitation of Satan and his legions. Earth was not 
the proud center of that pre-Copernican world but rather 
the lowest level of the emanative chain, hell coinciding 
precisely with the earth's center. The ordinary way to 
cope with such a world in which all movement was seen as 
the expression of a transcendent will was a matter of will 
over will, or magic. 
82 J 
\ 
Ì 
The fascinating story of the forces moving man beyond 
the confines of that world-view is only beginning to be 
37 learned. Of the known factors only a few will be mentioned 
here by way of illustrating that story. It was the unlike-
combination of a new star, a comet, a genius's determination 
to demonstrate the "music of the spheres" and the discovery 
of the telescope which helped bring the immutably perfect 
upper spheres into the orbit of our supposedly imperfect 
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and corruptible sub-lunary world. Meanwhile, at the other 
end of the chain, Bacon was launching his influential attack 
on the idea that the study of nature was a "forbidden know-
ledge". Among others, Thomas More and Montaigne had lent 
their eloquent pens to the articulation of the Renaissance's 
gentler feeling for nature but it was the aggressive Bacon 
more than anyone else who helped reclaim the demon haunted 
39 dregs of creation for science. According to Bacon, it was 
Adam1s dabbling in theology rather than in natural science 
that brought about the fall. Beside the Bible Bacon held up 
nature as the second priveleged repository of the divine re-
velation which God has set before man as a challenge to his 
ingenuity. 
While the bitter polemic against the old cosmology 
tended to outstrip the progress in the positive construction 
of an alternative nonetheless a succession of distinguished 
"new scientists" such as Gilbert and Ray chipped in the sol-
id contributions which were gradually filling in the symmet-
rical lines of a new world-view. The goal of the erratic 
course which led men away from the medieval cosmology has 
been alternately praised as the foundation of modern civili-
zation and damned as the end of the age of belief. Without 
falling into the empassioned categories of that debate one 
can describe what took place in that change of perspective 
as a shift from a qualitatively diverse to a quantitatively 
unified world. 
Science had discovered a material world in a quite special 
sense: a world of dead matter, infinite in extent and per-
meated by movement throughout, but utterly devoid of ulti-
mate qualitative differences and moved by uniform and purely 
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quantitative forces. The word •matter' had acquired a new 
sense: it was no longer the formless stuff of which every­
thing is made by the imposition upon it of form, it was the 
quantitatively organized totality of moving things. A-0 
Now the transcendental world of Calvinist theology par­
alleled that displaced world-view. As in that world where 
the operative forces were irreducibly diverse and there­
fore more or less immediately dependent on the will of Him 
who made them so, the ultimate forces in Calvinist theology 
were seen as irreducible and qualitatively different, and 
directly dependent on the divine will. There is a parallel 
too between the homogeneous universe brought about by the 
discoveries of the new science and the unified world of 
Whichcote's theological vision. As the new science levell­
ed the protruding peaks of diversity of the old cosmology 
so did Whichcote break down the mysterious livereity inherent 
to the structure of the prevailing religious outlook. 
While it is untrue to say that Whichcote's world-view 
belongs on the side of the ancients because of a fixed and 
static character, it is undeniable that he employs concepts 
peculiar to that kind of cosmology. One must distinguish 
between the matter and form of his vision. His use of the 
Neoplatonic chain of Ьеіпт is not rigid for his central link 
in that chain, viz., man, is potentially all things. It is 
this radical mobility of '.Jhichcote's image of man that levels 
the fateful diversity of Calvinist divine decrees. As in 
the new world of the new science there is nothing man can­
not know so in .Vhichcote's religious world there is vir­
tually nothing of which man is not capable. To be sure, a 
certain duality remains—there are "dangers without and with- · 
in" which would seduce man away from the pursuit of the good— 
but it is no match for the capacity of a grace-empowered human 
nature to do what it wills. But Whichcote's own words can 
best express the wide-open and defatalized character of his 
theological world-view. "Men are more what they are used to" 
he said, "than what they are born to; for custom is a second 
nature. Kvery man hath himself as he useth himself." (1, 43) 
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And from Sócrates (I believe) this characteristic quotation: 
"We have had those that have said; by my bodily temper and 
constitution I am so and so; such are my difficulties and 
temptations: yet, through the power of my mind, all these 
things are subject to my reason." (4, 2.5k) Finally, about 
the "impotency. of our nature vitiated by the fall" Whichcote 
had this to say: 
We are naturally imnotent through guilt contracted. It is 
matter of lamentable experience: and it becomes us to be 
sensible of it. But we must not so far extend it, as to 
say a man is thereby become a stone. For in the confidence 
that God is with us, we may go on, and defy the devil, and 
the whole world. (2, 350) 
An impractical approach to Nature? 
Of Cassirer's faint praise for the Cambridge men the 
most misleading of all his compliments is that by which he 
contrasts the practical spirit of puritanism and empiricism 
with the lives and thought of the Platonists described as 
one of the last schools of thought to represent "the spirit 
and ethos of pure contemplation." In the thought of Which-
cote and Smith such an orientation away from the practical 
is not verifiable. On the contrary, in the fundamental 
thrust of their theologies toward an ideal of practice these 
men were in tune with the mentality of their age. "Human 
knowledge and human power meet in one" wrote Bacon, "for where 
the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature 
to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contempla-
os 
tion is as the cause is in operation as the rule." Con-
templation, in other words, is the passive obedience to na-
ture which leads to the active domination of nature in "opera-
tion". If this subordination of contemplation to action is 
an "inversion of values" which "once and for all separates 
the modern from the medieval age" then Whichcote and Smith 
belong on the side of the moderns. But again, let us try to 
catch the authentic accents of Whichcote on this matter. 
Wherefore, if we profess religion, let us do such things, 
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by virtue of the spirit of religion, which others can neither 
do, nor counterfeit, that men may say that God is in us, of 
a truth; and let the world have evidence and experiment, that 
religion in us is reason, and signifies something, by our 
transformation, and transfiguration, and heavenly conversa­
tion; let men have experience of the fruits of our religion. 
(2, 201. My underlining.) 
Religion is not satisfied in notions; but doth indeed, 
and in reality, come to nothing, unless it be in us not only 
matter of knowledge and speculation; but doth establish in 
us a frame and temper of mind, and is productive of a holy 
and virtuous life. (^ , 190) 
Therefore give me religion...that doth attain real effects, 
such as are worthy whnt we mean by relir.ion. (3, 271 My un­
ci eri ι ninp;. ) 
Though certain passages from vVhichr.ote rmd .r,,mith read 
in isolation would appear to recommend a ilotininn other­
worldly ideal of holiness, when such excemts are seen in 
the lirçht of the Tlatonists' three-dimen.s: опл I othic that 
impression of world-flight vanishes. Wot :\a if one could 
restore the balance by weighing the two "horj 7,ontal" duties 
of rectitude toward oneself and rectitude toward one's fellow 
man against the "vertical" duty of godliness. The basic 
ground for the active and this-worldly character of their 
concept of religion is rather that the duty of knowing God 
which they inculcate is at bottom a duty of ituj tatinVJ, or 
copying out on the human level, the divine perfections. 
Because for them religion is in the first place a 
dynamic divine life, it is primarily something to be lived-
out and only secondarily something to know. "'ere I indeed 
to define Divinity", Smith wrote, "I should rather call it 
a Divine life, then a Divine science, it being something 
rather to be understood bv a Spiritual sensation, then by 
kk 
any Verbal description". To Smith, Clod "best discern'd 
by an Intellectual touch of him: we must see with our eyes, 
and hear with our ears, and our hands must handle the word 
of life, that I may express it in S. John's words." Sim­
ilarly, Whichcote would outfit the Christian with an exper­
ience of (Jod in His "moral perfections" rather than with 
God's "metanhysical perfections". These latter, such as 
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God's "omnipotency, eternity, ubiquity" men can "admire ana 
adore" but "cannot comprehend". Of the indispensable moral 
perfections, it is an experiential familiarity with the holi­
ness and faithfulness of God that forms the irreplaceable 
foundation for "gospel knowledge" and remains the immoveable 
basis of man's relationship with God. 
For if so be you do not give God credit and faith, because 
of his approved and known faithfulness to you; you are not 
in a disposition to receive from him, any gospel truth; for 
all gospel truth doth depend upon this, God's faithfulness. 
And if we be not made to know this, that God is faithful, 
or if we have not proof and assurance of his fidelity, we 
shall no more trust him, than we shall trust his creatures. 
Of such a necessity is it, to settle the moral part of reli­
gion: for the other parts of religion depend upon the reso­
lution of the divine will, and contain the promises of the 
gospel, they all depend upon this. (2, 53-5*0 
II. TUCKNEY'S CRITIQUE: WHICHCOTE^ CONCEPT OF NATURE IN 
CONFLICT WITH ORTHODOX VIEW OF GRACE 
The rational framework of Whichcote's theology 
Having vindicated Whichcote's concept of nature from 
the strictures of Cassirer and shown it to be in tune with 
the spirit of the age and therefore an apt apologetic tool, 
one must go on to confront another critique. The objections 
of Whichcote's colleague at Cambridge, the Calvinist theolo­
gian Anthony Tuckney, have to do with the orthodoxy of Which­
cote's "Moral" or "Natural!" divinity. Before investigating 
Tuckney's critique, it will be necessary to take a global 
look at the "natural" or "rational" character of Whichcote's 
thought. 
In an age of dogmatic fury ала theological scare tactics 
Whichcote's theology has the distinction of being based pri­
marily on the authority of the intrinsic credibility and con­
vincing power of truth. With no other weapon would he join 
the melee of theological controversy than the quiet voice of 
reason. Against a growing belief in power Whichcote per­
suasively presented Christian faith as an ideal of truth. 
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üietancinp himself from the authoritarian stance of Calvinist 
dogmatism and infallible Romanism Whichcote pursued the reason 
orientated anglican theology of comprehension heralded by 
k7 
Hooker. His confidence that truth will prevail without a 
policy of oppressive uniformity such as Laud was conducting is 
reflected in his image of an ideal pastor· 
We do declare, that the teachers of the church ought not to 
be dictotors, or masters of mens faith; but helpers of mens 
faith; for they are not to make religion, but to shew it. 
They do not take away the key of knowledge from the people, 
as our Saviour chargeth the Pharisees, Luke xi.52· Or as 
St. Austin (Augustine) saith, they do not command faith in 
men, upon peril of damnation, to shew their superiority, or 
to practise as governors: but they do appear in the good 
office of direction, and giving men counsel. 'Tis not pride 
of ruling and shewing power, but out of compassion to lead 
people into the way of truth, and to recover them out of error 
and mistake. (1, 178-79) 
From the testimony we have concerning Whichcote'ε life and 
character, it is fair to think that the secret of the pro­
found influence that he exercised on his contemporaries de-
8^ 
rived from ttevtgentle compassionate kind of leadership. 
Whichcote's is a preached theology which does not dwell 
on philosophical distinctions but in a rare excursus into 
metaphysics—for which he asked his auditory's indulgence— 
he aims at better clarifying truth's practical implications 
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by exposing its divine foundations. 
At bottom truth stems from a perfect correspondence of 
things with their pre-existent divine ideas. "Things are true" 
as they do exist of their principles, and as they are answer­
able to the idea of them in the divine mind pre-existent to 
them: for this is the manner of working of an intelligent 
agent, to do things according to a preconceived apprehension 
of his mind. (3, 370) 
The truth of this (ìod-given objective zone of reality which he 
calls the "truth of things" is guaranteed by an all-wise and 
omnipotent creator and can be simply taken for granted. 
Corresponding to the "truth of things" and the second 
element of the correlation which constitutes the basic struc-
ture of reality within which Whichcote frames the divine-human 
relationship is the "truth of our aTiprehensions". God has 
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seen to the metaphyscial truth of things; it is man's res-
ponsibility to conform himself in mind and conduct to that 
objective "state of things". Not so easy this, as the fol-
lowing somewhat rhetorical passage indicates. 
And here is the occasion of all the evil that breaks in upon 
mortals, that we do not conceive of things as they are, but 
that all men (except some few) either worship the idol of 
some particular imagination, or the idol of popular super-
stition; they either follow private imagination of their 
own, or general mistakes; and he is a man of a thousand, 
that can rise up and quit himself of these two idols. (3«371) 
Despite its name the "truth of our apprehensions" is 
not a purely rational kind of knowledge. As ñas been indi-
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cated Whichcote's theology is supported by a broad biblical-
ly slanted epistemology. The "truth of our apprehensions" 
is both the agreement of the mind with the "truth of things" 
and the agreement of the affections and actions—indeed of 
the whole temper and spirit of a man—with the tenor of ones 
understanding. "Our judgment and apprehension", Whichcote 
maintained, 
are to be conformable to the reality and existence of things; 
ала when our affections and actions are suitable to such a 
judgment and sense of our minds, we are then in the truth, 
and never else: the first belongs to a man's understanding, 
and that speaks hira an able man, a man of judgment, a man of 
sense and experience; and the latter speaks him a good man; 
and indeed if mens actions comply not with the sense of their 
judgments, there will be self-condemnation and no peace at 
all within.... (3, 371-72) 
At the level of "truth of our apprehensions" Whichcote 
distinguishes between a "natural" and a "moral" point of view, 
and dismisses the former with the comment that while such know­
ledge is "of great use in the life of man, and tends to the en­
larging man's understanding" yet it is "not the concernment 
of religion and conscience." Knowledge from the standpoint of 
right and wrong on the other hand is necessary rather than 
merely useful, for it is "the concernment of conscience and 
the business of religion, and is every bodies charge; for both 
a good state here, and a future good state hereafter depends 
upon it." (3» 373) Not that Whichcote would simply dismiss 
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the viewpoint of the new science; like PythaRoras and Plato 
before him, the Platonist's vision of truth as one and divine 
embraces both the religious .^ nd the scientific points of view. 
Like the Stoa however Whichcote has chosen to single out the 
religious and ethical aspect of truth in order to provide mo-
ral guidance in a time of confusion. T'hat the geometric struc-
ture of his truth—4s-religion concept is complementary rather 
than antipathetic to the truth concept of the new science 
should become obvious in the course of the present analysis. 
Once inside Whichcote's perspective on truth as moral 
there is one final distinction to be taken account of. 
There is in divinity, a distinction of truth that is of main 
and principal concernment; that is, the distinction of truth 
in respect of its emanation from God, who is the father of 
truth; for all truth is a ray, and a beam from God....Now 
God communicates himself to us two ways. In the moment of 
the creation; and thnt we call truth of the first inscrip-
tion, or the linjht of God's creation, or the principle of 
natural conscience, the true issue of reason....The second 
emanation of truth, is the truth of after-revelation. For 
such is the great goodness of God, that having fallen, he 
doth reveal to him upon what terms he will receive and par-
don sinners. (3, 120-21) 
Thus, while all truth is one and divine one can distinguish 
from the viewpoint of its "emanation" two kinds of truth, viz., 
"truth of first inscription" and "truth of after-revelation". 
òefore turning to Tuckney's critique let us look briefly at 
these two moments of truth. 
"Truth of first inscription" './hichcote describes as 
hr.ving to do with "matters fixt, unalterable, unchangeable, 
indispensible". further, these "matters" he identifies as 
three duties, viz., "to live -niously towards God; to use 
justice between man and man; and sobriety and temperance as 
to himself", which sum up the law of nature. These "matters 
fixt" designate both the religious structure of objective 
reality ала the corresponding religious structure of human 
subjectivity. Thus on the one hand objective truth is di­
vided into the three all-inclusive categories of God, self, 
and fellow man, while on the other hand the inner world of 
a "good mind" is broken down into the three correlative 
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duties of piety or righteousness toward God, sobriety or 
rectitude in respect to oneself, and justice or rectitude 
with regard to ones fellow man, 
In sharp contrast to the "truth of first inscription" 
with its necessary and immutable aspect is the "truth of 
after-revelation". Whereas the "truth of first inscriütion" 
has the nature of God or the reason of things as its rule 
and issues in "matters f ixt", the '•feruti of after-revelation" 
is measured by the will of God or of him "that hath right" 
and issues in "things that are of a mutable and alterable 
nature" which may be "discharged, and abated" by the au-
thority that imposed them. (2, 62-63) On the side of na-
tural truth is the permanence and finality of what he calls 
the "principles of everlasting righteousness":-
These are principles of everlasting righteousness, of un-
changeable truth and goodness: and of this I may say, that 
it is not a law that is subject to any power whatsoever: 
'tis a law against which there can be no exception or abate-
ment: 'tis a law of its own nature; it is that which is ac-
cording to the nature of God; and that is the law of heaven. 
(2, 62) 
"Truth of after-revelation" on the other hand is a realm of 
provisional and subordinate truth. After-revelation is that 
truth promulgated "upon the ill accident of sin, and the foul 
miscarriage of mortals, in departing from the rule of right", 
which will endure only as long ;as the realization of its pur-
pose requires. These "institutes" exist not "aeterna jura" 
but only at the pleasure of God. 
As the great institution of circumcision, which began in the 
Days of Abraham; as also the whole Mosaical dispensation. 
Nay the gospel-manifestation shall in great part expire when 
our Saviour shall deliver up his mediatory kingdom to God 
his father and become subject to God, that put all things 
under him, that God may be all in all, 1 Cor.xv. (2, 63) 
From this brief survey of the basic categories of 
Whichcote's theology one need not be a Puritan to espy the 
heavily rational inclination of our author's thought. It 
is little wonder then that his Calvinist colleagues became 
upset and that Tuckney objected to the views of his former 
student. 
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The '.-/hichcote-Tuckney debate: Nature vs. Grace? 
Tuckney and Whichcote exchanged eight letters during 
the early sixteen fifties while Whichcote was Vice-Chancellor. 
The occasion was the discomfiture of Tückney and several of 
his colleagues at the University concerning the unorthodox 
flavour of Whichcote's theology. One can be thankful for 
the preservation of the letters wherein one can see V'hich-
cote carefully defining his position in relation to the domi-
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nant Calvinist divinity. A 
Sharply questioned about the "power of reason to judge 
of matters of faith" Whichcote explicitly dealt with the dis-
tinction between faith and reason which, for the most part, 
is handled implicitly elsewhere in his writings. apparently 
referring to a discussion period following upon Whichcote's 
Commencement speech "De Certitudine et Qignitate Christian-
ae Religionis" the intrepid Tuckney accused the Vice-Chancel-
52 lor of reducing faith to the level of reason. 
But that our faith should be ultimntely resolved in rationem 
rei, ex parte objecti; and that ex parte subject!, ratio hu-
mana should be summus judex which was expressly asserted by 
you in your answer to my arguement: as I then said, it was 
new, so now I think it very strange divinity. 53 
It is not. until the third letter, after having appeared 
to concede Tuckney his objection, that "-'hichcote begnn to ex-
pose the strategy of his rational theology. Having obtained 
the admission that the object of faith is never against rea-
son Whichcote would go a step further and say that whatever 
is said to be de fide must also be accordin<? to reasoni It 
was against the "Antinomians", by which he meant Christians 
who under cover of the Lutheran principle of justification 
by faith alone were living lives of unrepentant sinfulness, 
that Whichcote aimed this strategy. He would measure the 
so-called faith of the "Antinorrians" by the touchstone of 
э down to earth rudimentary natural morality. Tf a Chris­
tian's conduct does not measure up to the necessary and if-
mutablp "truth of things" entailed in that ethic then he 
cannot be said to be a Christian. 
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While the strategy of V/hichcote's apologetic reflects 
a theological spirit distinctly different from that of Tuck-
ney, the two contestants did share a common terminology and 
an apparent area of conceptual agreement. Both distinguish­
ed between natural and revealed truth and can agree on the 
negative proposition that the sphere of faith is not con­
trary to the sphere of reason. But in the next step, i.e., 
in their positive evaluation of the faith-reason relation­
ship, their positions diverge. Tuckney believes that faith 
transcends reason; Whichcote is convinced that faith res­
tores and improves reason. Both speak of the transcendence 
of the realm of faith but each means something different by 
that term. The central issue in question then is the mean­
ing of transcendence or, as Tuckney more concretely put it: 
"Our present dispute is about the power of Reason to judge 
of matters of Faith".^ 
Tuckney's mistrust of Season 
Tuckney thought of himself as a "Steward under his Lord" 
bound "earnestly to contend for" the preservation of truth 
from the taint of reason. Behind this self-image lurks the 
deep-seated mistrust of reason which English Puritanism had 
imbibed from Reformation theology. Thus while Tuckney tact­
fully begins his argumentation by conceding the indispensa­
ble role of reason yet he goes on to so insist on the trans­
cendence of faith as to empty his concession of meaning. 
And as the Apostle speaks of "a spirit of wisdom ала reve­
lation" so we conceive that to our right understanding such 
mysteries, ex parte sub.iecti, he must be a spirit of wisdom; 
and so ratio must be divinitus illuminata: and, ex parte 
objecti, a spirit of revelation; and so objectum must be 
revelatum. And this revelation must be of the formality of 
the object, which is understood and believed; and so, by 
this illumination of the understanding and revelation of the 
object, the discerning faculties is fully regulated in its 
apprehensions of these mysteries....55 
One might well wonder what meaning the "necessity of reason 
in faith" can have when it is thus "fully regulated". In 
spite of Tuckney·s polite approval of certain of Whichcote's 
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dicta about natural theology and lumen naturale it quickly 
becomes obvious that his is the viewpoint of Reformation 
theology with its division of reality into two distinct 
realms, viz., grace and sin. However hard Chicheóte might 
try to show how "the spirit in man" and the bpirit of God 
ι 
could work together, for Tuckney the absolute power of God 
and radical sinfulness of man left little room for the oper­
ation of reason beside the workings of grace. His strong 
sense of sin made every activity on тал's part appear as 
somehow against, or in competition with, divine activity. 
As for Whichcote's favorite phrase "the spirit in man is 
the candle of the Lord" Tuckney irritably remarked that 
"that saying...so over-frequently quoted, makes nothing to 
that purpose (of designating the capacity of reason with 
regard to faith)...relating to the sea.ching of our own, 
or, as Piscator conceives, of another's heart and actions; 
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not of divine truths". Commenting on the fact that some 
interpreters of the phrase see the competence of the "spirit 
in man" extending beyond the human realm and into the divine, 
Tuckney is quick to add that they 
explain themselves to mean that Grace, which out of his love 
he reveals by his word; and infuses by his spirit: and so 
"the spirit of a man" is, as it were, naturaliter capax di-
vinae illuminationis; so being by the spirit illuminated, 
we deny not but it can perceive the things of God; which 
otherwise it cinnot: In these things especially, however 
there is a spirit in a man; yet the inspiration of the Al­
mighty gives understanding. 57 
Of all the points debated in the letters, the one per­
haps most revelatory of the deepest attitudes of both Tuck­
ney and Whichcote in the matter of faith and reason is the 
principle which IVhichcote calls the first principle of Pro­
testantism, viz., cuilibet Christiano conceditur judicium 
discretionis. The good Protestant Tuckney does not attempt 
to reject the principle; indeed he is very much at ease with 
it when contrasting it with the first principle of "Popery", 
viz., judex infallibilis visibilis in rebus fidei. "Л true 
believer should not be a brute, but have something above a 
9^  
Collier's faith" Tuckney wrote, 
implicitly to believe, whatever the Pope and his church saye: 
no, he is to be among those open minded ones, and it is a part 
of the ingenuousness of his spirit, as he is a man, especi-
ally as a Christian, to search, and with the judgment of dis-
cretion to judge, whatever the best men suggest. 58 
Brave words these, but quickly followed by an exaltation of 
the authority of Scripture that leaves reason with no other 
function than humble submission. Tuckney·s "judicium dis-
cretionis" is limited to the purely human level; before the 
absolute truth of the revealed word it enjoys no real com-
petence. Referring to a passage from Acts (Acts 17i11) 
about the open-mindedness of the Jews at Beroea who "wel-
comed the word very readily" and daily "studied the scrip-
tures to check whether it was true" the limitations of Tuck-
ney' s concept of "open-mindedness" become very clear. 
But you will please to observe, what is there said; 'they 
searched the scriptures, whether those things were so': 
by which it appears that the scriptures were the rule by 
which they judged of the doctrine delivered to them: so that 
what the scripture or divine testimony of God held out, they 
without dispute believed and judged, not it; but man's doc-
trine by it. 59 
Practically the only function Tuckney assigns to rea-
son with regard to the truths of faithis an examination of 
the testimonia of scripture, viz., the prophecies and mira-
cles. These, according to the Calvinist divine, are the pro-
per criteria for judging the truth of God's word. It is 
with these extrinsic criteria that the Christian's judicium 
discretionis can busy itself but not with the intrinsic con-
tent of the revealed truths themselves in Tuckney's scheme. 
Tuckney's final words on this subject are a recapitu-
lation of what he had publicly professed about it on the oc-
casion of the Exercise for his Doctor's Degree in divinity. 
Uhat he said then was that with regard to the "supernatural 
mysteries of faith" reason 
1. was never able to find them out at first; 2. when reveal-
ed, not able fully to comprehend them; must not be such a 
judge of them, as to arraign them at it's bar: so as, if 
they be either really above it, yea or seem to be contrary 
to it, to reject them; as, in the matter of God's decrees, 
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is too frequent with Arminians and others: or so as lastly 
to resolve them either in rationem rei« ex parte objecti; 
or in rationem nostrani, tanquam summum judicem, ex parte 
subjecti, 61 
The reference to "Arminians" who would disqualify the faith 
of Calvinists like himself on the ground that predestinary 
decrees constitute materia Deo indigna is probably aimed at 
Whichcote, and the last category, of those who exalt reason 
at the expense of the "supernatural mysteries" is clearly 
62 directed at the Vice-Chancellor. 
Whichcote defends his position 
Despite his apparent concessions Tuckney's ultimate 
argument is to relegate everything that his opponant has 
said about the capacity of the "spirit in man" to the infra-
grace level. "True", Tuckney wrote, "the understanding can-
not rightly judge otherwise, than the thing is: Veritas rei 
being regula veritatis intellectus. But our present dispute 
is about the power of Reason to judge of matters of Faith". 
That this highhanded dismissal of the "candle of the Lord" 
constituted an attack upon the very nerve center of Which-
cote' s theology is evident from the empassioned response quot-
ed here for its revelatory quality. "But our present dispute 
is about the power of Reason to judge of matters of Faith", 
Whichcote recalls his opponant's painful words, and proceeds 
to unburden himself: 
Did you ever find me leaving God out, or not acknowledging 
Him principal, original; and the creature mere vanity, divi-
dedly from him; a lie, in contradiction to him? I have de-
clared the quality and fitness of the principle, as from God, 
in the hand of God; "the candle of the Lord": Res illuminata 
illuminans. With all my heart and soul I acknowledge and 
assert (and wholly depend thereon,) the holy Spirit's super-
intendence, conduct, presence, influence, guidance, govern-
ment of man's mind, in the discerning of the things of God.. 
..I experimentally know it, I thank God, to be true; I have 
witness of it within me; it is my sufficiency, it is my 
strength, it is my security: God with me is All in All.... 
I always consider and so express, the mind of mein in conjunc-
tion with the good spirit of God. I abhor and detest from 
my soul all creature-magnifying self-sufficiency. 6k 
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In fairness to Tuckney it must be said that despite this elo­
quent protestation Whichcote was rarely as explicit as he is 
here about the "sub Deo" character of "the spirit in man"· 
In a calmer moment Whichcote will disclose the rational 
basis of this cry of faith. Tuckney's desire to reduce the 
flame of the "candle of the Lord" Whichcote sees as a tamper­
ing with the тегу foundations of the divine-human relation­
ship. In the first place such a weakening of the natural 
principle reduces man's capacity to sin and therefore his 
responsibility to repent--an argument which should have ap­
pealed to Tuckney. But Whichcote'β main objection is that 
in thus diminishing man one diminishes at the same time the 
God who created, and who saves him. While he counts it a 
"true eacriledge, to take from God; to give to the creature" 
yet I look at it, as a dishonouring God, to nullify and make 
base his works; and to think He made a sorry worthless piece, 
fit for no use when he made man. I cannot but think of a 
noble able creature; when I read ad imaginem et in similitu-
dinem Dei; or if, in statu lapso, it be as nothing then you 
vilify the restitution by Christ.... 65 
As for the "judicium discretionis" principle, Whichcote 
spells out just how the "spirit in man" is sub Deo and yet 
retains its proper form of activity. Distinguishing between 
judicare as an ^ 'authoritative act" and a "perceptive and ap­
prehensive act", Whichcote singles out the latter as the sense 
which pertains to judicium discretionis. The objective, non-
manipulable aspect of knowledge precludes the possibility that 
reason could authoritatively command truth either on the na­
tural or on the revealed level. But precisely in its inter­
action with that objective data in the apparently passive act 
of conformity with the real, the dynamism of reason comes in­
to play. The judicium of reason consists in its obedience to 
being based on its capacity to be ruled by the otherness of 
reality. 
For a judging discerning faculty is wholly regulated in its 
apprehensions a ratione objecti, sive a qualitate materiae: 
nam intellectus nullum habet libertatem circa suum objectum; 
non facit rem aliter se habere, sed percipit rem ut est; et 
concipit secundum imaginem receptam; hoc est, judicat. At-
que Veritas, a parte intellectus, consistit in conformitate 
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cum veritate rei. 66 
What Whichcote means when he insists on .jucLicimn dis-
cretionis as the right of every Christian is nothing more and 
nothing less than the task of conformity with the "truth of 
things". Such a task, in a world where men prefer to see 
things as they would like to have them rather than as they 
really are, where "all men (except some few) either worship 
the idol of some particular imagination, or the idol of popu-
lar superstition" constitutes an ideal as Christian as it is 
Platonic. 
Does Whichcote extend this exercise of judgment to 
the sphere of revealed truth itself? Did Whichcote, in other 
words, intend to include revelation within his all-embracing 
category of the real (res) thus making it subject to the scru-
tiny of reason as Tuckney feared? The answer is yes but wheth-
er Tuckney's objections are accurate remains to be seen. But 
let Whichcote answer the question in his own words. 
I do not hink, that to ingenuity and indifferency, tempers, 
which qualify to a reception from God; as carnality and de-
signing do indispose: any article of Christian faith seems 
to be materia Deo indigna; and should it, it would not be 
in a man's power to believe it as from God, while it so 
seems; though a man should struggle with himself never so 
much. A man cannot think against the reason of his mind: 
that of necessity must be satisfied. 6? 
Revelation itself is made subject to reason's rules; only 
when its truths accord with the tenor of (a good) man's mind 
can they be embraced in "belief". Then too this competence 
of reason comprises the duty—insisted upon by Whichcote, 
resisted by Tuckney~of rejecting an article of faith which 
is repugnant to its sense. 
It is that negative barring function of re»son that 
Tuckney resisted at every turn. At stake was his Calvinist 
faith in a sovereign predestinating deity. That faith is 
not opposed to reason he could cheerfully concede but when 
Whichcote moved from non contra rationem to secundem ratio-
nem thus bringing faith into a real relation with reason, 
Tuckney's creed had suddenly become extremely vulnerable. 
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No wonder then that Tuckney insisted upon the transcendence of 
faith over reason. 
But Whichcote would not allow his opponant his invocation 
of "mystery1* as the last word. Transcendence is a brightness 
which enlightens rather than blinds. Certainly God's communi-
cations to man transcend his understanding "far beyond the 
transcendency of the sun, not wrapt-up in clouds, to my sight", 
wrote Whichcote, 
but this transcendency lies in amplitudine et plenitudine ob-
jecti; non in contradictione rationis; (Nos sumus Deo et feli-
citati nostrae omnino impares;) and in this case I may be most 
illuminated, in respect of my self, when I least comprehend 
the object. Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipi-
tur; the bucket, most filled in the sea, yet least contains 
the ocean. 69 
In the fullness of revealed truth Tuckney sees the overwhelm-
ing of reason and the necessity of faith; in the same fullness 
70 Whichcote perceives the fullfilment of reason· Both men are 
right in the sense that both have logically followed their 
theological first principles, Tuckney the radical corruption 
of reason of his Puritan Calvinism, Whichcote the unlimited 
potential of reason of his Platonic and Christian divinity. 
underlying his concept of transcendence as clarity and 
the linch-pin which holds together faith and reason in Which-
cote' s vision is his idea of God. Quoting Bonaventure, Which-
cote would link together the spheres of "things necessary" 
and the provisional determinations of God's will by the di-
vine rationality: "Credendum est, voluntatem Dei, etiam in 
occultissimis, esse rationabilissimam". What is meant by 
rationality here is the goodness of one who works according 
to the "reasons of things", particularly the "ratio" of His 
weak and needy creatures. To Whichcote, divine revelation 
is not like a stone which God hurls into the world nor a 
lightning flash blinding all who behold; it is rather a.word 
addressed to fallen man sind delicately attuned to his "marred 
principles", a message adapted to man both as to content and 
communication so that it can be received and understood as 
"Good News". Addressing himself to Tuckney's dictum that 
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"Deus... in rebus fiàei supernaturalìs, rationem contemnìt" 
Whichcote distanced himself from that unbending God-figure, 
and disclosed hie concept of a God of persuasion. 
I would rather say, non vocat rationem ad consilium than con-
temnit rationis сaptum. God indeed consults not with us; but 
with his own wisdom and goodness; (we being patients and un­
der his cure;) for the invention contrivance and provision of 
remedy: yet God proposes with respect to our understandings; 
viz. what they can receive, what they are able to bear. And 
indeed, the matter which he does propose, viz. expiation of 
sin, in the blood of Christ; and our renovation by Him, into 
his divine spirit; are things grateful to man's mind: and... 
as it were, expected. 71 
Whichcote's whole active concept of holiness, i.e., 
that man is to be "up and doing" for though fallen he has 
not "thereby become a stone" is implicated in this configu­
ration of revelation. On the one side stands fallen man who, 
despite his diminished spiritual vision, can nevertheless know 
both that he is sinful and that God is compassionate; on the 
other a God whose will to save is measured by a wisdom that 
adapts that will to the lowly circumstances of man's condition. 
The very non-Calvinistic lines which follow from this are that 
man looks out for forgiveness and God extends that expected 
72 pardon in terms fitted to man's anticipation. "Of the grand 
articles of Christian faith", V/hichcote wrote, 
a man may truly say... that to one acquainted with his own 
state and condition, and considerative of God's goodness, 
the matter of those articles revealed is rather a matter 
expected, as becoming God, Godlike than either contrary to 
reason, or unworthy of God. I believe, in the true use of 
understanding, a serious and considerative mind would be apt 
to think that either God would pardon sin to penitents who 
reform absolutely or else would propose a way in which— 
and terms and conditions on which he would forgive and be 
reconciled: God being duly looked upon as the fountain and 
original of goodness. So that, when the revelation of faith 
comes; the inward sense, awakened to the entertainment there­
of, says eureka it is, as I imagined, the thing expected 
proves; Christ, the desire of all nations.... 73 
Lest this line of thought appear overly optimistic one 
should note that Whichcote accords this kind of expectation 
neither to an abstract "human nature" (he recognized no such 
entity) nor to fallen man in general, but only to those who, 
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though fallen, respond to the "light" remaining to them and 
thus rise above the pull of self-will to the level of conforra-
ity to the demands of the "truth of first inscription". On-
ly in such souls does the "candle of the Lord" shine brightly 
enough to reveal their sinful insufficiency and point the way 
to a placable God. Only in this dynamic and demanding sense 
is revelation secundem rationem. The happy hope of God's 
forgiveness rises on the horizon of reason only where there 
is truly reason, i.e., only in the "true use of understanding" 
of the man who nurtures the life of the "spirit" within. 
While the Whichcote-Tuckney correspondence ended with 
mutual expressions of respect the main reason for its termi-
nation was an escalation of feeling which could no longer be 
contained. It must be said that in these letters Whichcote 
does not always measure up to the "godly" reputation that he 
75 has generally enjoyed. Even though the currents of anti-
Whichcote feeling at the University were much stronger than 
Tuckney's politeness allows yet one feels that the Vice-
Chancellor should have been more "above it all". But in 
the letters he appears prone to take personal offense and 
76 downright touchy at times. Despite his pleas for tolerance 
the forbearence of Whichcote himself seems to wear rather 
thin on occasion. But it must be said that Tuckney, for all 
his expressions of respect, strikes a paternalistic pose in 
the letters, thus giving good reason for Whichcote's irrita-
tion. That Tuckney still thought of himself as the tutor 
and Whichcote as his pupil, an attitude which comes through 
in the several lengthy passages of advice he offers the Vice-
Chancellor, must have been painful to Whichcote. 
That the end of the correspondence marked by no means 
the end of the differences between them is evident from the 
Commencement speech delivered by Tuckney the following year 
in which the new Vice-Chancellor openly assailed Whichcote's 
theology. "Salvation is only by Christ", Tuckney began 
not by a philosophical faith; or the use of right Reason, 
or a virtuous morality, too much now-a-days admired and 
cried up. As of old, the Temple of the Lord, the Temple 
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of the Lord. So now, the Candle of the Lordt the Candle of 
the Lord. I would not have that Candle put out, I would have 
it snuffed and improved as a handmaid to faith, but not so 
(as when the Candle is set up) to shut the window, wither 
wholly to keep out, or in the least to darken the Sunshine, 
as it is with men's eyes, who can read better by a candle in 
the night, them by day-light.... Whatever Nature and Mora­
lity may be to others, yet to us let Christ be all in all. 
Nor let us be Deists, but Christians; let us not take up in 
such a Religion, as a Jew, or Turk, or Pagan, in a way of 
Nature and Reason only may rise up unto, but let us indeed 
be what we are called Christians, Christians.... Not a philo­
sophical dull Morality, but the law of the Spirit of life, 
which is in Christ Jesus... not that Candle light, but the 
Sun of righteousness, that will guide our feet into the way 
of peace. 77 
All of the fears of Tuckney, apparently quite muted in his 
exchange of letters, now pour out with a vengeance. Accord­
ing to the new Vice-Chancellor, Whichcote's theology con­
stitutes a philosophical pseudo faith and a dangerous rival 
to real Christian belief. 
Is Whichcote's notion of reason and nature antipathe­
tic to Christian faith as Tuckney claimed? The following 
section concerning the Platonist's concept of religion as 
nature or "natural religion" is presented as the first part 
of an answer to that accusation. The second and final part 
of the answer will be dealt with in the section after that, 
on Whichcote's Christology. 
102 
III. THE PRO-GRACE CHARACTER OP WHICHCOTB'S CONCEPT OF NATURE 
Natur« ля leas· of Sod 
While Tuokney'a faars that Whieheot·'· notion of naturo 
ia only loosely oonnootod with Chriat «ay b· true—that quae-
tion will be dealt with in the following chapter—yet it ia 
neoeaoary to begin by investigating the foundationa of that 
notion« To reoall the root« of the reala of nature in tfhieh-
cote'a thought« it waa aaid that trath ia divided into the 
objective "truth of thinge" and the subjective "truth of our 
appreheneiona*'· Now the "truth of thinge'· ia nothing aore 
than the conformity of created beinga with the ideas accord­
ing to which God faahioned them· One of thoae ereationa ia 
a creature whom God intended to know and love thinge aa He 
himself does. To this end. He made man true« i.e., He endowed 
him with the godlike oapaeity of knowing the truth and doing 
the right. Man waa in other worde made "in the image and 
likeness of God". 
In becoming the image of God—for it im primarily an 
ideal and a goal—the "truth of thinge** constitutes the in­
dispensable term of referenee· The aquation "imitation of 
God" does not involve a diroot relation with the deity but 
an indirect analogioal relation oft aa God ia related to His 
ideas ao should man relate to the created counterparts of 
those ideaa. More apeeifieally, aa God ahowa a perfect know­
ledge and love of thoae eternal "reaaona" in Hie creation 
and conservation of than« ao ahould man try to conform him­
self perfectly to them in hia thought and action. To ensure 
that man is able to realise this lofty end« God has made the 
"truth of thinge" and the mind of man as a pair of perfectly 
matched correlates, faahioned to fit each other like hand in 
glove. Moreover, Whichcote further intenaified the magnetic 
character of this objective-subjective harmony by placing it 
all in the context of a teleologica! universe· 
God has created a universe in notion, pulsating with 
a powerful teleologica! beat· At every level of the "great 
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chain of beinrç" is a proper end to which each species tends. 
It is "truth metaphysical" and guaranteed by God that each 
creature has been endowed with principles commensurate with 
its end. As has been pointed out, Whichcote's emphasis on 
the immanence of these principles of motion places him in 
line with the Platonic outlook adopted by the Renaissance 
and the new science· In the spirit of the age, Whichcote 
looked to the immanent makeup of things as the locus of mean-
ing. He turned to the thing itself in his search for theo-
logical significance just as the new science was seeking the 
explanations of things in their geometric structure rather 
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than in extrinsic considerations. His attempt to extend the 
emergent concept of nature to include a religious dimension 
constituted a vastly significant but little known contribu-
tion to Restoration religion. 
As has been said the truth of things is not ready-made 
but implies a "motion", metaphysical truth consisting in the 
perfect proportion between the principles of a created being 
and its divinely conceived end. Thus on the creaturely side 
of creation, truth is to be realized in via, i.e., in the 
movement of a being to its proper end. Whichcote saw the 
source of this teleologica! drive within things themselves 
and called it nature in a sense that goes back to Aristotle 
and beyond. More precisely, he adopted a traditional divi-
sion of creation according to the perfection of the principle 
of motion into the ranks of inanimates, sensitives and ratio-
nale. At the lowest level, inanimates move to their end by 
the "force of nature"; sensitives tend to their ends by the 
"guidance of sense" while man directs himself to his end by 
the "apprehension of the reason of things", (3» 91-92) The 
apologetic bearing of this teleologica! cosmology momentari--
ly shows through in Whichcote's amusing insistence on the 
idea that while there is a perfect proportionality between 
the other levels of being and their ends, God has created an 
even more perfect proportion between man and his end, "Our 
IQíf 
deformity is more", Whichcote said, "because our perfection is 
more... and we were made more sufficient to our connatural acts, 
than either sensitives or inanimates to their proper acts". 
(3, 92) 
Making allowance for that apologetic intent which will 
be dealt with more fully later, it is nonetheless evident 
that the concept of nature in question here is a lofty one. 
Its prime analogate is nothing less than the divine nature 
itself in the perfection of God's relationship with His ideas. 
In creation this "nature" reappears at a creaturely level, in-
carnated in the harmony of a universe in which each order of 
being tends unerringly to its proper end—with that one ob-
vious and apologetically convenient exception. Unique among 
the creatures in this regard is man, whose end it is to re-
produce the divine nature in a special way. Little wonder 
then that Tuckney, who subscribed to the Westminister Assembly's 
declaration that the "light of nature" is bright enough to 
render man inexcuseable in his sin but affords no positive 
knowledge of God, harboured such deep suspicions concerning 
79 Whichcote·s view of nature. 
The natural foundation of the "life of religion": 
Realizing one's "image" 
But Tuckney was wrong to relegate Whichcote's divinity 
into the "dung heap" of philosophy. Even at this "natural" 
level of his thought and independently of any consideration 
of the fall and redemption Whichcote's conception of human life 
is profoundly religious. To complete his picture of man's 
harmonious relation to the truth a phenomenological portrait 
of Whichcote'β view of human life as an orderly progression to­
ward the full realization of man's divine potential is in 
place here. Along the lines of the thought of the early Hel­
lenistic fathers Whichcote saw man's likeness to God as a 
goal towards which he is to move under the gentle guidance of 
the Spirit by way of a lifetime of gradual spiritual growth. 
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At this point, before reproducing that phenomenology, 
exception must be taken to the position of Lichtenstein who has 
designated Whichcote along with the other Platonists as contri» 
buting to the decline of the "numinous aspect of religion" which 
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took place in the England of the Restoration. That Whichcote's 
concept of the distinctly divine quality of revelation is not 
that of Puritan Calvinism with its "wholly other" God is certain. 
But'.distinction need not mean contrast. It is misleading to 
state that Whichcote belongs to the category of religious per-
sonalities known as the "once-born" meaning that he had little 
It 
understanding of the darker side of life and the necessity of 
spiritual struggle, together with a weakened sense of sin. The 
analogous character of mam's God-likeness, and the necessity of 
an unremitting quest to realize that amalogous stature are funda-
mental aspects of Whichcote's view of the divine-human relation-
ship. It is not that Whichcote failed to uphold the transcend-
ence of things divine—the God who fulfills rather than over-
whelms human reason is truly transcendent—that contributed to 
a decline of the numinous but rather the age's failure to heed 
the profoundest level of the Platonist's thought. That other 
aspects of his theology did contribute to a weakening of the 
sense of the divine is true but that fact is more of a commen-
tary on the spirit of em age sick of the excesses of a reli-
gious revolution than on the spirit of Whichcote's thelogy. 
We can begin that phenomenological portrait of the life 
of "natural" religion with Whichcote at the "age of reason" by 
which he probably meant the Stoic age of reason, viz., fourteen 
years old, a time when a young man first begins to form con-
go 
cepts of right and wrong, in the view of that philosophy. 
We are to be doing our duty to God, ourselves and others, as 
soon as we come to the use of reason and understanding; for 
motion of religion doth begin with reason; and so soon as a 
man is able to make use of reason and judgment, he ought to 
put himself upon motion of religion, for we are as capable of 
religion, as we are of reason; and indeed no man can use his 
reason as he ought but religion will be predominant with him, 
and over-rule all his motions. (1, 37) 
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Whichcote showed little enthusiasm for the dramatic inbreakings 
of the Puritan God. He emphasized the importance of a solid 
religious training early in life and faithful adherence to the 
guidelines of that education to virtue. Steady progress is the 
rule, death-bed repentance is something one must by no means 
count on. In a comparison of which Lessing made significant 
use at the other end of the Enlightenment, Whichcote likened 
the first stages of the life of religion to a teacher-student 
Q-Z 
relationship. Until he is mature enough to judge for himself 
the merits of what he is being taught the young "student" must 
trust his teacher. Whichcote stresses however the provisional 
and temporary nature of the trusting stage. 
Every man as a learner must believe, and give credit to his 
teacher, but yet let him not depend upon his teacher more them 
needs must, nor no longer than need require: for you ought not 
to think that you must be in the state of a learner all the 
days of your life. A child must believe what is told him at 
first, that this letter is so called, and that two letters put 
together spell so much; but after a while he comes to see the 
reason thereof as well as his teacher; and will not be content 
always to be in the state of a child; but will, as he ought, 
use the privilege of his nature, and the judgment of discern­
ing, and see with his own eyes. (1, 155-6) "^ 
On the other hand an implicit faith, such as that espoused by 
Catholicism and by many within the Protestant fold as well, is 
wholly unacceptable. When a man refers himself in an absolute 
and permanent way to another in that most weighty matter of 
religion this attitude of credulity can only be condemned as 
the worst form of irresponsibility. 
If the age of reason marks the dawn of the "motion of 
religion" the day of that motion lasts as long as life. Re­
ligion is not to be relegated to the death-bed nor postponed-
until old age. The prime of life when man is vigorous and well 
De­
is the time for religion. The plain fact of the matter is 
that growth in religion is no easy process but can only be 
gained slowly, gradually and over an extended period. Fitting 
oneself for eternity requires a life-time of preparation. 
For how can men get knowledge all in a moment? Ιβ the time 
of sickness a time for men to learn? when men should come to 
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practise, is that a time to be taught? when men are put upon 
the very last nick of acting. Or to get themselves released 
from long and naughty habits all on a sudden; and the faculties 
released from such inclinations; when as the prophet tells us« 
that it is next to washing the blackmoor white, for men that 
have been accustomed to do evil, to do well· So that we deal 
honestly and uprightly with men, telling them, as they expect 
to be happy hereafter, in this state to acquaint themselves 
with necessary knowledge, and to get themselves discharged 
from all naughty habits, which will not be easy to do upon a 
sick-bed; especially if men have long abused themselves, through 
ill use, custom, and practice. (1, 181) 
Whichcote's insistence on the time of life by which he meant 
the time of healthy active life as the kairos for "motion of 
religion" brings to mind one of Bonhoeffer's leading thoughts. 
Bonhoeffer turned away from existentialist philosophy's pre­
ference for peripheral situations such as anxiety and sickness 
as "loci theologici" par excellence to recommend relocating 
theology in the "center of life" where man is strong said able. 
In the first decades of this century, Reformation theologians 
made much theological hay of the rather gloomy intuitions of 
existentialists like Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre. In the 
past decade however a strong reaction has set in against this 
pessimistic line and Bonhoeffer's call for a more positive 
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approach has been heeded. 
"Motion of religion" which begins with the age of reason 
and grows with the persistent application of reason, reachea 
its mature stage when a kind of synthesis has taken place. 
Religious maturity is attained when the "reason of the thing" 
has become the "reason of the mind". The man of mature re­
ligion who has built upon the firm foundation of personal, in­
sight is the very antithesis of the "drudge", i.e., the person 
for whom religion remains a foreign entity which is carried 
about as a burden. Characteristic of mature religion is the 
spontaneity and joy of the man whose relationship to God is 
inward or personal. Nature religion is a matter of "right 
reason" or reason righted. When, by virtue of constant effort, 
the "reason of the thing" in which is found God's revealed 
truth has become the reason of теш's mind then there are no 
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longer two principles but one. When the prejudices and false 
biases which fill the mind have been emptied out and a man's 
reason is in conformity with that objective sphere of the "truth 
of things" then has "motion of religion" reached its perfect 
phase. 
In the state of religion, spirituals and naturals join and 
mingle in their subjects; so that if a man be once in a true 
state of religion, he cannot distinguish between religion and 
the reason of his mind; so that his religion is the reason of 
his mind, and the reason of his mind is his religion. They are 
not two things now; they do not go two several ways, but con-
cur and agree; they both run into one principle, they make one 
spirit, make one stream. The effects and products of his rea-
son and religion are the same, in a person that is truly rel-
igious; his reason is sanctified by his religion, and his rel-
ipion helps and makes use of his reason; so that in the subject 
it is but one thing; you may call it, if you will, religious 
reason, and reason made religious..·· Cf, 1^7) 
Summing up: Nature's kinship with divine truth 
From the "age of reason" to the age of "religious reason·?, 
this has been an account of the gradual ascent to religious 
maturity of Whichcote's concept of "natural religion". Two 
aspects of the "natural" character of this conception should 
be brought out before proceeding. First, though this image 
of (human) nature implies a different God concept than that 
theology which views God in contrast with nature, nonetheless 
the regular influence of a God is obviously involved here. Se-
condly, in the context of the persuasive tone of Whichcote's 
preached theology natural religion is depicted as natural by no 
means in the sense of an account of an existing state of affairs 
but is held up rather as an ideal to which men must be exhorted 
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to return by way of repentance for their sins. Therefore, 
Contrary to Tuckney's suspicions, what Whichcote meant by nature 
is by no means a realm devoid of deity but from both the above-
mentioned points of view, a sphere pointing profoundly to God--
to the God of creation and the God of reconciliation. 
Summing up the dialogic structure of Whichcote's vision of 
nature with regard to man, one sees on the one side the created 
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counterparts of the divine ideas, viz·, the "truth of things", 
and on the other the erected counterpart of the divine per­
sonality, viz., the "spirit in man". One sees moreover that 
these created correlates are drawn powerfully toward each 
other by the teleologica! drive which informs all of crea­
tion. Likeness calling to likeness, the human spirit moves 
toward truth with all the desire and delight of the Platonic 
soul emerging from the darkness of the cave into the light of 
its true sphere. Little wonder since it is nothing less than 
the harmony and joy which marks His relationship with uncreat­
ed Wisdom that God wants to share with his created "image". 
Truth is a-kin to man*s mind, so that you may say, as Adam 
did of Eve, thou art bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh, 
Gen.ii.23· So saith the mind of man of truth. Thou art near 
of kin to me; or as increated wisdom speaks to God, so truth 
speaks the same language to man's soul, I was with thee ал 
one brought up with thee, I was daily thy delight, Prov. viii. 
30. Truth is so near to the soul; so much the very image and 
form of it that it may be said of truth; that as the soul is 
by derivation from God so truth by communication. No sooner 
doth the truth of God come into the soul's sight, but the soul 
knows her to be her first and old acquaintance: which tho' 
they have been by some accident unhappily parted a great while; 
yet having now thro' the divine providence happily met, they 
greet one another and renew their acquaintance as those that 
were first and ancient friends. If truth doth but appear, 
the soul resigns up it self to it; nothing is more natural to 
man's soul than to receive truth from any person. (3* 17-18) 
Nature as Natural Revelation 
"Theologia naturalis?" 
At a time when the finality of the Kantian critique of 
natural theology's "proofs" of the existence of God have been 
questioned and the certainties of post-Kantian science have 
given way to doubts, the theology of a seventeenth century 
divine who saw God revealed in creation may not appear as 
objectionable as a few decades ago. What might prove objec­
tionable however, even to those open to such a line of thought, 
is the detail and clarity Whichcote ascribes to that cosmolo­
go 
gical revelation. In comparison with Reformation theology, 
the Catholic theological tradition has been consistently 
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optimistic about the apologetic value of a theologia natur-
alis. But even the most optimistic have drawn a line between 
the cosmic revelation of God and Hie revelation in sacred 
history. The First Cause to which Thomas concludes in his 
"five ways" is only identified with the Christian God by an 
act of faith. Schillebeeckx represents the traditional Cath-
olic viewpoint in this matter when he writes that without 
grace "man reaches God only in and through creation, actu-
ally as something belonging to creation; that is to say, as 
89 the absolute principle of its being." Taking his cue from 
the classical tradition, and especially from the natural 
theology of such thinkers as Cicero and Aristotle, V/hichcote 
goes beyond the readiness of the Catholic tradition to see 
God in creation with his affirmation of a cosmic revelation 
which holds out to man the possibility of a personal rela-
tionship with God. 
The content of Whichcote's natural revelation 
But what was precisely Whichcote's idea of that pri-
mordial level of truth where creation and mind are in har-
mony? Having meditated over a prolonged period on the Paul-
ine notion that God allows man to see His perfections in the 
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"visible works of His creation", Whichcote came to identify 
those revelatory works as a hierarchy of clearly defined 
configurations of creation, each with its plainly intelli-
gible moral imperative. Creation speaks to man of God and 
the words that it utters are "be sober, righteous, and god-
ly».91 
What creation calls for is a right relationship to-
ward oneself, or sobriety, right relationship toward one's 
fellow man, or righteousness, and right relationship toward 
God, or godliness. Ironically, for biblical support of this 
natural ethic Whichcote mainly relied on a text from Paul's 
epistle to Titus which Calvin had repeatedly used—though 
with a difference of emphasis deeply revelatory of the di-
go 
vergence between their theologies. Referring to Titus 2, 
11-12, Whichcote identified his ethical imperatives with the 
111 
duties of living "soberly, righteously, and godly in this 
present world" of that Pauline text. 
Sobriety he makes the first moral duty and prerequi­
site for the other two. "Religion begins at home", Whichcote 
affirmed, "it's first operation is upon our affections; he 
that governs not himself, is not capable to do his duty to 
God or man." (2, 210) Sobriety is divided into two parts, 
as it refers to the mind, and to the body. With regard to 
the mind sobriety is called modesty or humility said implies 
awareness of one*β creatureliness. Opposed to this virtue 
is the vice of arrogance or esteeming oneself "above what 
is meet." With regard to the body, sobriety means moderation 
or governing our bodies "as the mansions of our souls, and 
as tools and instruments of virtue." Opposed to temperance 
is the vice of self-indulgence which ruins health and makes 
the body an unwilling subject of the mind. 
Righteousness in the strict sense as opposed to the 
broad sense by which he sometimes designates the whole moral 
part of religion is a quality of relationship to fellow man. 
In his recommendation of this virtue Whichcote approaches 
the sublimity of the New Testament*s agape in his insistence 
on equity, the attitude of going beyond the requirements of 
legal justice and taking all of the individual circumstances 
of a case into consideration and then adding an ample meas-
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ure beyond what those circumstances demand. 
The third requisite virtue in the realm of natural 
religion is godliness, the habit which concerns itself with 
maui's duty to God. As is the case with the foregoing virtues, 
the detailed breakdown of this virtue into several parts re­
flects the clarity which Whichcote ascribed to natural reve­
lation. In a discussion of the minimum measure of knowledge 
necessary to make a man good, from which he would excuse none 
''but infants, and idiots" Whichcote already included the no­
tions that "there is a God; and that we all ought to rever­
ence, adore, and worship him." The comprehensiveness of the 
more typical longer list makes one wonder about the necessity 
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of a revelation in Christ. For such a list comprises a pro­
gram of no less than eight attitudes man owes to God, each 
of which is based on a naturally known "apprehension" of 
the deity. Because of the importance of this "program" it 
is here quoted in full« Godliness comprises these eight 
constitutive parts: 
1. Reverence and regard of the divine majesty· Now this 
depends upon great and worthy apprehensions of the divine 
excellencies and perfections, and doth express itself by 
prostration before God, sense of our inferiority and distance. 
2· Submission to him, and obedience to his commands. And 
this is founded in the relation that we stand in to him: 
this is our state, and God's due, if he be our maker. If 
he have dominion, title and property to us; then are we his 
peculiar, and we owe him all submission ала obedience. 
3« Reference of ourselves to him, and dependance upon his 
pleasure; for we are best in his hands· This doth suppose 
placing a trust, affiance and confidence in him: otherwise 
we shall never refer ourselves to him. 
4. Love and delight in him, harmony and complacence with 
him. This will make us acquiesce in him; and what is more 
lovely than the first and chiefest good? And God is the first 
and chiefest good. 
5. Thankfulness to him, for his benefits, free communication 
and influence; and this is advanced by our sense of our un-
worthines, and a sense of our incapacity to make a just re­
tribution« 
6. Since he hath been faithful to thee in all time past of 
thy life, trust him for the time to come. 
7· Since he is the center of thy soul, rest in him; for the 
center is the place of rest. 
8· Since he is thy utmost end; subordinate all things to him. 
(2, 231-32) 
As is the case with sobriety and righteousness the things of 
godliness are all part of the easily known truth of natural 
religion. We are not yet in the realm of revelation stricto 
sensul 
And when thou hast done all this, then I do assure thee, 
that thou art a godly person; and art gone beyond those hea­
then virtues that fall short of religion. And yet when thou 
hast done all, I can still assure thee, thou hast not gone 
one step beyond true reason, and hast done no more than what 
exactly becomes a moral agent; and none can give an account 
of the use of his reason, either to God or himself, if he be 
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a stranger to these instances of piety, or devotion to God. 
(2, 232) 
Innatiem? 
It must be obvious by now just how optimistic Whichcote 
was about the possibility of personal relation with God at the 
level of "nature". Despite his emphasis on the objective char­
acter of truth one wonders about the verisimilitude of such 
a transparent truth when one thinks of the opaqueness of the 
material world. Indeed« one is tempted to dismiss Whichcote's 
dicta about the incarnate locus of truth and man's task of 
conforming to it and with Cassirer to lump him with the many 
innatists of the age. 
But duty is not yet virtue nor is the desire for hap­
piness holiness. The quest character of the "image of God" 
is very real in Whichcote's thought and must be counted a 
good indication of the incarnate quality of his concept of 
truth. While Whichcote's version of natural religion is 
connatural to the human spirit, it is not innate in the sense 
that Lord Herbert's was. Whichcote made a careful distinc­
tion between the fundamental drive in тал and the "moral 
duties" of which natural religion is constituted. The de­
sire of happiness "tho· it be the foundation of duty, that 
basis...upon which the law is founded; yet it is not pro­
perly a moral duty, about which men have a liberty of acting: 
they must do so; nor can they do otherwise." (3, 329) The 
"moral duties" on the other hand, while closely connected 
with the finality of man's "natural principle" as means to 
end, are not identical with it and therefore can only be in­
duced by persuasion. 
Whichcote's view of the neutrality of the human spirit-
hardly compatible with an innatist conception of the mind--
is the terminus a quo of man's quest for the truth. The mind 
of man, Whichcote affirmed, is a "tabula rasa" awaiting the 
impressions which the aspirations of man will bring it, for 
"our souls become like in form and shape··«to that with which 
it is in conjunction," (2, 160 cf. 3, 215) 
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Qualifying the radical openness of that concept and 
a factor which gives added urgency to the quest is the bi-
polarity of human nature. In Whichcote's conception, man is 
not purely plastic but his potentiality is sharply divided 
into a spiritual and a bestial potency. In the tradition 
of the Platonic vision of man as a charioteer pulled by two 
horses, Whichcote sees man as a "compound" in whom "heaven 
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and earth as it were meet". It is this bipolanty, this 
specific difference of the Plotinian plasticity of Which­
cote's view of the soul, which makes of шал's necessity to 
pursue the truth a "test". 
And this is our trial, in this state; whether by the weight 
of body, we will suffer ourselves to be depress'd, and sink 
downward by minding earthly things, and so take our portion 
here, and fall short of God; or, whether by the reason of 
our minds, we will mount upwards, mind heavenly things, con­
verse with God by heavenly meditation, and make choice of the 
things that are most excellent, whereby we shall naturalize 
ourselves to the employment of eternity. (Jf, 25*0 
But one must not exaggerate this aspect of Whichcote's 
image of тал» "Test" as it functions in his thought does 
indicate something of the seriousness which he ascribed to 
the quest character of the spiritual life; it has little in 
common however with the Calvinist conception of the Christian 
life as a test, with its emphasis on the normality and posi­
tive significance of adversity. While seeing meaning in 
the obstacles man must overcome Whichcote prefers to accen­
tuate the positive fulfilling qualities of goodness and vir­
tue. The test image as he employs it is a pointer to the 
reality and power of evil, and a warning to be on guard 
against it. While human nature has more affinity to good 
than to evil yet the balance is delicate sind the possibility 
real that man thwart his "natural principle" and bring him­
self into ал "unnatural estate". While God has generously 
provided for him, non-use and neglect of his capacity for 
goodness can result in the dimunition and even the loss of 
his power of moral judgment. 
Thus the "test" is eminently fair: Nothing more is 
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required than that man become what he is in virtue of his 
nature. Unless he wilfully the authentic orientation of 
that nature he will connaturally move into a right rela-
tionship with himself, with God and with his fellow man. 
Connaturally, not automatically: There remains the necessity 
of activating his latent powers, of "using" and "improving" 
nature. Yet because of the proximity of the truths of na-
tural religion to the foundational truth of his being, to 
spurn such truths is the height of folly for the demands of 
natural religion are the demands of "right reason" itself. 
Natural religion was the very temper, complexion, and consti-
tution of man's soul in the moment of his creation; it was 
his natural temper, and the very disposition of his mind; it 
was as connatural to his soul, as health to any man's body; 
so that man forc'd himself, offered violence to himself and 
his principles, went against his very make and constitution, 
when he departed from God, and consented to iniquity. It 
is the same thing in moral agents, to observe and comply 
with the order and dictates of reason, as it is in inferior 
creatures, to act according to the sense and impetus of their 
natures. It is the same thing with the world of intelligent 
and voluntary agents, to do that which right reason doth de-
mand and require, as it is in sensitives, to follow the gui-
dance of their senses, or in vegetatives, to be according to 
their natures. This is concluded universally by all moral-
ists. It is as natural for a man, in respect of the princi-
ples of God's creation in him, to live in regard, reverence, 
and observance of Deity; to govern himslf according to the 
rule of sobriety and temperance, of prudence and moderation; 
to live in love, and to carry himself well in God's family; 
this, I say, is as natural for him, as for a beast to be 
guided by his senses, or for the sun to give light, the fire 
to give heat, heavy things to fall downwards, light things 
to be carried upwards. (3» 52-53) 
Making allowance for the rhetorical exaggeration by which he 
has raised the connaturality of natural religion to the level 
of man's "natural principle" one can discern here both Which-
cote's tendency to accentuate the capacity of human nature 
and the apologetic purpose behind his "natural religion" con-
ception. 
Proximate they are: The "laws" of natural religion "have 
a deeper foundation" than the Law of Mount Sinai itself. Long 
before He engraved the Ten Commandments "God made man to them, 
and wrought his law upon mens hearts" so that "the things 
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thereof are the very sense of теш's soul, ani the image of 
his mind". (3« 21) But this and other images of a substan­
tive kind are intended to express the affinity of these 
truths to human nature rather than to identify them as 
given innately. Each of the truths of natural religion has 
an objective foundation which man is to discover by using 
his God-given principles. The "reasons of things" is how­
ever so akin to "right reason" that at the mature stage of 
religious development they have become so identified that 
man "cannot distinguish between religion and the reason of 
his mind; so that his religion is the reason of his mind, 
and the reason of his mind is his religion." (A-, 1^7) This 
union is not a denial of the objective aspect of truth but 
ал overcoming of that otherness in spiritual communion. 
IV. THE PASTORAL AND APOLOGETIC CONTEXT OF WHICHCOTE'S CONCEPT 
OF NATURE, NATURAL RELIGION 
The context 
It was one of Whichcote's cardinal convictions that 
the Calvinist idea of faith was harmful. Men who are told 
that they are justified in the eyes of God without having 
contributed to that justification in any way are more liable 
to use that free forgiveness as an excuse for moral laxity 
than they are to see it as a call to prayer and mortifica-
96 tion. If God has been thus arbitrary in singling them out 
they too have a certain warrant to act arbitrarily. One of 
the chief ways in which they did so was in the exercise of 
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a "zeal" which would impose their creed upon others. Be­
hind this fanaticism Whichcote saw the visage of Calvin's 
sovereign God. It was his great concern to supplant this 
idea of God with a vision of a rational, accountable God. 
To this purpose he opposed the pardon-repentance schema 
of Calvinist theology with a repentance-pardon concept of 
98 the Christian life.' 
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The whole thrust of the rational framework of his theo­
logy is to urge repentance by showing that God's forgiveness 
can only take place in conjunction with a real change of 
heart. The way that he articulated that recommendation was 
by depicting God as a deity who acts according to reason and 
press the inference that his created "image" should do the 
same. Now to man in his "marred" state, acting rationally 
could only mean turning away from the power of sin to begin 
using his reason rightly. The strong Platonic strain in 
Whichcote's "imitation of God" theology is subordinate to 
the gospel call for repentance. 
The Apologetic Syllogism 
Major premise: God is rational 
Our method will be simply to follow Whichcote through 
the premises to the conclusion of the syllogism which runs 
like so талу girders through his discourses, viz., God is 
rational; man is the image of God; man should act rational­
ly. Having done so, a further section will show how the 
whole syllogism points up the need for repentance and the 
gospel. 
God is rational. Against the image of the double-
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willed deity of Puritanism V/hichcote depicted God as an 
eminently open and accountable being. One of the main ten­
ets of Calvin's doctrine of God was that "He dwells in 
light inaccessible." Beyond the God of the Bible there is 
an Augustinian hidden God who remains essentially unknow­
able. Whichcote forthrightly rejected this idea of a reveal­
ed and a hidden divine will, and affirmed that God has fully 
disclosed himself to man. God is not mocking man; his gos­
pel promises are to be taken at their word. He is ready to 
help all who turn to him in repentance. To maintain the no­
tion of a hidden will in God is to do him a grave injustice. 
It is the device of "crafty men" whose devious minds would 
make the deity over into their own image. 
Whichcote was concerned to de-fatalize the horizon of 
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the Christian life. This he did by showing a straight-line 
relationship between what a man does and his resultant "re-
ward". As a man sows so shall he reap. There are no eter-
ici 
nal predetermining decrees. Everything is above board and 
out in the open; the "test" has not been "rigged". Success 
depends not on fate but purely on the will of the player. 
If a man uses his God-given talent and takes advantage of 
the ever—present divine assistance he will inevitably reach 
the goal. Heaven is not a place to which the elect are trans-
ferred at the end of life; it is rather primarily a state at-
tained in this life by the man who cooperates with grace. 
Neither is hell a punishment awaiting untold multitudes of 
reprobates; it is rather a state brought on by the self-
destructive character of sin and already beginning in this 
life. 
Some think that the hellish state is the sole product of 
omnipotency and sovereignty, the effect of God's power; and 
they think of God that he useth his creatures as he will; 
giving no account of any of his matters to principles of rea-
son and righteousness. These are injurious apprehensions 
of God, and dishonourable to him, and are disclaimed by him 
every where in scripture; and God owns no such power, neither 
doth he look upon it as a privilege, nor doth he cloath him-
self with such a prerogative. (3, 106) 
Much of what Whichcote thought about God*s rationality 
can be gathered in the negative context of his exonerating 
divine behaviour from the charge of arbitrary ana unaccount-
able dealings with men. Since this wilfullness was nowhere 
more keenly felt than in the divine wrath and punishment 
Whichcote devoted considerable attention to preaching a pic-
ture of God's moderation in that area. Sin and suffering 
he ascribed for the most part to human causality. God is as 
a good parent who does all he can to prevent his child from 
sinning, and if his preventive efforts are in vain does all 
within his power to repair the damage. The divine power is 
circumscribed however by the divine rationality. Having 
created man with the desire and capacity for freedom nothing, 
not even the tragic self-violation which foolish men inflict 
upon themselves by their sins, will cause God to interfere 
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with that created mechanism of liberty. 
Thus in sin and punishment it is man and not God who 
acts irrationally, for it is man's highly unnaccountable act 
of betraying all that he knows to be right that brings on 
102 these things. To attain this pinnacle of irrationality a 
mem must not only resist the whole thrust of his being toward 
the good but he must also ignore or otherwise thwart every 
offer of divine assistance. That God does not step in and pre­
vent the evil that ensues is anything but irrational. In 
the light of the divine goodness displayed in creation and 
providence God's "anger" at the irrationality and ingratitude 
of his creature is completely justified. 
We must remember, that man by his make, is a free agent, is 
both intelligent and voluntary; and in this state a man is 
under this bar; positus in aequilibrio, else could not sin: 
he is counterpoised on the one side by that that is just and 
honest, against that that is on the other side pleasurable 
and profitable: and here is а теш's counterbalance; looking 
to God, he is well directed; looking to the allurements of 
sense, he is tempted: the delightfulness of sense is corrival 
to that which is in it's nature just and holy. Now here God 
is taking high offence, and having just indignation against 
теш'β foolish affectation and wilful choice, whom he made 
intelligent and voluntary, that he should in such em unequal 
competition, determine himself to the worst, he doth not 
hinder, but leaves him to the fruit of his own ways, and 
saith, then let it be according to thy heart's lusts, and be 
filled with thy own ways, Prov. i.31. Therefore, let not any 
man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God, for God 
cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any mem. 
But every mem is tempted when he is drawn away of his own 
hearts lust, and enticed. James і.ІЗіІ**·· (3* 300-301) 
The fatalistic phrase "it is the will of God" with which 
men shrugged their shoulders and piously assigned the cause 
of evil and suffering to an inscrubtable deity was anathema 
to Whichcote. It is the will of God that man be good and 
happy; it is the frustration of that will by wilful wicked­
ness causes evil and its concomitant misery. 
Visible not only in His restraint, the rationality 
of God is also revealed in the positive context of His mighty 
efforts to move mem to the realization of his "image"· Un­
like the God of Calvin whose grace meüces a shambles of nature 
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the God of Whichcote^s preaching remains fully responsible 
for that which he has created. Because Whichcote holds on 
to the goodness of creation and does not sacrifice it to an 
exaggerated doctrine of Original Sin all of God's subsequent 
acts toward man appear in the light of responsibility and ra-
tionality rather than as arbitrary acts of a "merciful" deity. 
God still becomes angry and is moved with pity but unlike 
the "wrath" and "mercy" of Calvin's theism these divine emo-
tions are shot through with rationality. 
As God acts at the divine level so should man behave 
on the human plane. To the world's great confusion this is 
precisely what they were doing. According to Whichcote, zeal 
and imposing of religion are characteristic activities of 
those imbued with the notion of a sovereign deity·. The ful-
crum with which he would lift this dangerous variety of di-
vine imitation to a "sober" and peaceful level was an eter-
nal and immutable rational law. Just as God always acts in 
unswerving conformity to that law of his nature so should 
man be ever observant of the Law of Nature. If it is not 
weakness but rather the very perfection of God to be thus 
observant so is it man's perfection to observe that immutable 
law. It is only foolish men who desire that which is evil 
who think that freedom must include the ability to do what 
one pleases. But they are mistaken for that eternal sphere 
of "reason" which God observes and publishes for man's ob-
servane is not right simply because it is law but is law be-
cause it is right. Thus to vary from such a law is to lose 
true freedom and fall into a vacuum of ignorance and impo-
tence. "Right gives rule to the law," Whichcote insisted, 
and the law doth declare what is right; and it is not a law, 
if it be unrighteous and unjust. This must be true of all 
human laws; for I am sure it is true of all the laws of God. 
The psalmist saith, Psal.cxix.lifS. That thy law is truth; 
that is, it is as it should be; for right is the boundary of 
power and priviledge; for it is not power, if it be not in 
conjunction with right and truth; for God declares that his 
throne is established in righteousness, Frov. xxv.5· It is 
not power to be able to do that which ought not to be done; 
for ungoverned appetite is not power but weakness. It is 
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not power to do evil, but impotency, weaknees and deformity. 
Free-will f which we so much contend for, and brag so much of, 
it is no absolute perfection, and we need not be so proud 
of it. For free-will, as it includes a power to do wrong, 
as well as right, is not to be found in God himself; and there-
fore it is no perfection in us· For this is true of God, 
that all his ways are ways of righteousness, goodness and 
truth; and there is not in him a power to do otherwise than is 
just and right. And if we were God-like, as we should be, the 
fruit of the spirit in us would be in all righteousness, good-
ness and truth, Eph.v.9· (1» 251) 
Minor premise: Man is the image of God 
To place in relief what Whichcote mesms by imitating 
God one can profitably examine his idea of the non-imitation 
of sin. Because God has made man in his image to sin is to 
act arbitrarily. To the fatalistic objection that human na-
ture is in no condition to resist the power of evil Whichcote 
used strong language to affirm that the very opposite is the 
truth of the case; indeed that man has been so generously 
endowed that to sin is the height of folly. 
We are very apt to lay all the fault upon our natures; but 
really our wills are rather to be blamed. That that undoes 
us, is our perverse wills, corrupt affections, stubborn 
hearts; and these do more harm in the world them weak heads: 
'tis not so much want of knowledge as goodness. God is a 
great deal more known in the world, than he is either ob-
served or loved. But this will be the world's condemnation, 
that where men either did know or might know, there they 
either grossly neglected themselves, or went against their 
light; that men put out the candle of God's spirit in them, 
that they may do evil without check or controul·.·· (3» 152) 
By this analysis of sin in terms of intellect and will is 
not intended any ontological or psychological dualism, the 
faculties being morally neutral. Rather does Whichcote in-
tend the basic level of man's religious being. What he is 
saying is simply that because man is an inherently religious 
being he must somehow deliberately counteract that natural 
tendency in order to get away from God and the call of his 
truth. 
Whatever form it might take, the basic character of 
sin in Whichcote's view is irresponsibility. To sin is to 
"hold the truth in unrighteousness". Of all the beings in 
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creation the sinner is the one creature who does not res­
pond, even though he has within a principle more proportion­
ate to its end than those of lesser beings which nevertheless 
move unerringly to their appointed perfection· Sinning ie 
not so much a matter of doing this or that as not doing· 
Sin is a "shift','t an aversion, a shrugging off of the dignity 
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of human nature« It has little in common with the faults, 
and failings of those who "intend God" but who occasionally 
lapse. However haltingly they are at least moving in the 
right direction. Those who hold the truth in unrighteousness 
are not moving at all. The sinner would keep in bondage the 
truth that he is made for God. Sin is, in a word, a refusal 
to grow into the God-like image for which man was made. Be­
cause of the triadic thrust of truth to sobriety, righteous­
ness and godliness, the face of sin will differ from case to 
case. But whether it be the intemperance of an ungoverned 
body, the unrighteousness of provoking one's neighbor or the 
impiety of denying God, sin is in every case and at bottom 
a deliberate ала culpable irresponsibility. 
The contrast between the demands of a clearly known di­
vine truth and the whim or arrogance of the тал who would 
deny that truth could not be greater· Sin is the funny-tragic 
prospect of man pitting his puny will against the infinite 
will of God. 
Conclusion: As God is rational so should тал be rationall 
As God is so should man be. It has not been sufficiently 
recognized that Whichcote's "rational theology" was a preach­
ed theology. For all his intellectualistic approach—about 
which Tuckney strongly complained—Whichcote's picture of 
man as image of God was painted in the colours of persua­
sion. His message was be the image of God ; seek, search out 
the truth, then put it into practice. 
Whichcote's technique is deceptively incisive: In in— 
sisting that it is literally the most natural thing in the 
world for man to be God-like, he is taking advantage of the 
growing prestige of "nature" as a persuasive force, to 
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recommend religion· He was holding up the mirror of nature 
proclaimed by the new science to show people just how unnat-
ural was sin· 
Nonetheless here was no pale philosophical deism, as 
Tuckney contended. The idea of nature is at bottom a being 
who knows the practices the truth perfectly. It is nothing 
less than God's perfect conformity to the truth that Whichcote 
sets up as the standard of human conduct. It is the weight 
of that divine model which is behind his every argument for 
moral betterment. His "natural theology" was preached in the 
key of exhortation and, though he shied away from the Keforma-
tion image of a radically corrupt human nature, the hortatory 
ring of his every discourse makes it evident that he believed 
in a fall. Occasionally, when he became explicit about the 
apologetic point of his preaching, that fallen condition was 
brought to the fore. 
It is as natural for a man, in respect of the principles of 
God's creation in him, to live in regard, reverence, and ob-
servance of Deity; to govern himself according to the rule 
of sobriety and temperance, of prudence and moderation; to 
live in love, and to carry himself well in God's family... 
as for a beast to be guided by his senses, or for the sun 
to give light, the fire to give heat, heavy things to fall 
downwards, light things to be carried upwards.-How far there-
fore are we degenerated and fallen below the state in which 
God created us; since it is so rare a thing for us to comply 
with the reason of thingsl (3,53) 10^ 
Whichcote was an astute religious psychologist. Like 
Calvin he was appealing to a basic level in human nature« 
The great difference is that whereas Calvin chose to play 
upon man's sense of guilt Whichcote directed his message to 
meoi's sense of virtue. Not that he was without awareness 
of the "shadow-side" of man. In telling his audiences of 
what they should be Whichcote was gently reminding them of 
what they now were. By holding up an image of godliness he 
was enabling men to take stock of how far below that standard 
they were living· This image of God-likeness as natural con-
tains an enormous pressure which bears down on the head of 
those who would betray their native dignity. Unlike the 
12^ 
crushing pressure of a theology which would drive mein into 
the arms of God however the force of Whichcote's persuasive 
theology is rather that of example by which man might be 
drawn to God· The whole weight of this imitation of God 
divinity is a call to repentance. Man must work out his sal­
vation in fear and trembling but he must work it out. The 
"impotency of our nature vitiated by the fall" is a matter of 
"lamentable experience: and it becomes us to be sensible of 
it", Whichcote asserted, "But"--and this is the significant 
point at which he hurled defiance at the prevailing religious 
outlook—"we must not so far extend it, as to say a man is 
thereby become a stone· For in the confidence that God is 
with us, we may go on, and defy the devil, and the whole 
world." (2, 350) 
The preaching of Benjamin Whichcote is a continuous 
appeal to a secret core of goodness which remains the basic 
truth about man despite his sin· Because he is addressing 
himself to fallen man his message of imitation of the divine 
nature is at the same time a call to repentance· For the 
fallen "image of God" repentance is an eminently rational 
course of action. In fact, in a universe which so perfectly 
mirrors the divine rationality man must repent or appear a 
very monsterl 
Thus does Whichcote's concept of nature and natural 
religion point beyond itself to the sphere of revelation. 
Because man is fallen the joy of connaturally fulfilling 
the duties of natural religion is not to be· Though some­
thing of his spiritual power remains yet without help man 
is scarcely able to carry out those fundamental dictates 
of his nature. Whichcote sees that help forthcoming from 
Christian revelation as a second special emanation of truth, 
viz., the "truth of after-revelation", the perfectly fitting 
measure taken by an ever rational God on the occasion of 
теш's deflection from His original purpose. 
That Whichcote^ natural religion thus points beyond 
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itself to the realm of divine revelation is certain; that 
it did so in a way which failed to impress his Puritein col­
leagues is also certain. They judged that the Platonist'e 
perspectives falsified the Christian message. To these 
Calviniste Whichcote's high estimation of nature and reason 
could only constitute a derogation of the glory due to God 
alone. From their point of view all of the Vice-Chancellor's 
dicta about Christ ала his saving work amounted to very lit­
tle· As Tuckney put it, here was "a kind of moral divinity 
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minted, only with a tincture of Christ added." iJust what 
was the relation between Whichcote's concept of natural 
religion and his Christology will be explored in the fol­
lowing chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WITH A TINCTURE OF CHRIST? 
I. THE SETTING: REFORMATION CHRISTOLOGY 
A certain extrinsicism 
To illuminate the originality of Whichcote's Christ-
ology a brief survey of the Reformation Christology against 
which he was reacting is in order· The aim of the survey 
will be to touch on the inner mechanism of the reformers' 
thought by which the grace of Christ in the scholastic sense 
of sanctifying grace tends to be viewed extrinsically. It 
was because Whichcote judged that extrinsicism was causing 
a widespread disregard for basic moral principles and was 
furthermore behind the rise of a "spirit of persecution'* 
raging throughout the English Church that he preached a 
new image of Christ, viz., a meek ала mild Christ of ordi­
nary morality. 
Luther and Calvin took Augustine at his word and de­
picted the effect of Adam's sin in terms of complete ruina­
tion for human nature. Having left themselves with no basis 
for grace to build on, they depicted God's saving action in 
terms of a mysterious recreation. With his strong Christ-
mysticism Luther appears to have desired a less extrinsic 
relationship between man and God than his doctrine of jus­
tification implies yet for want of a solid link to connect 
a ravaged human nature with grace he could not conceptualize 
that aspect of his thought. Believing there to be no insur­
mountable barrier between the infinite and the finite, Lu­
ther sought to present grace as a reality present and op­
erative in the lives of men. Calvin on the other hand was 
not as anxious that the triumphant Saviour be brought into 
close contact with man. Thus from the heaven to which he 
returned at the Resurrection, Christ sends the Spirit out 
aerose an infinite chasm to man but not even the power of 
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the Spirit can effect a real ontological communion between 
2 
Christ and the believer· 
Because man is powerless to do anything about them, 
his sins if they are to be forgiven must of necessity become 
"Christ's own sin, or else we shall perish forever·" The 
Christ of Luther saves man by becoming a "curse", i.e., by 
subjecting himself to the miserable conditions of a fallen 
race. While retaining the concept of Christ made "sin" for 
man, Whichcote will shift the saving power of Christ onto a 
more positive plane· The obedience of Christ, conceived of 
by the reformers in forensic terms, is transposed by Chich-
eóte into the key of rationality. Whichcote's Christology 
thereby fills in the gaps of a personally orientated but im-
perfect reformation doctrine of Christ. Luther had turned 
away from the Church's preoccupation with merit to forge a 
living theology of personal relationship with Christ. But 
hie powerful central intuition remained imperfectly expressed. 
Obviously the fruit of his own deep experience, Luther's 
vision of Christ is vivid and personal but his theological 
elaboration of the believer's relation to the Saviour is 
marred by categories which fail to do justice to the person-
al character of that vision. Christ takes away our sins— 
but how? Christ makes us holy—but how? Luther's articula-
tion of the dynamics of the believer's personal relationship 
with Christ fall below his convictions about the same. 
Working with the same Augustinian model of a radically 
corrupted human nature, Calvin invested much theological cash 
in the transforming aspect of an atemporal heaven. Calvin's 
believer lives literally out of himself and in the heavenly 
Christ. By the faith operated in them by the Spirit, be-
lievers receive benefits from the fulness of Christ's grace 
now but will be fully transformed when they join their Sa-
viour in heaven· As long as human nature remains throughly 
corrupt—and neither Luther nor Luther axe willing to com-
promise on that principle—its present recptivity is severe-
ly limited. The reformers' solution to this problem is to 
135 
offer an extrinsicist holiness in this life and the promise 
of total transformation in the hereafter. 
Not even God's love for his elect can avoid the fact 
of that corrupted condition. That is why the believer must 
live out the life of faith amid "contraries'1. Calvin de­
lighted in depicting the Christian life as a kind of negative 
divine logic in which the depth of divine love is to be meas­
ured by the amount of hardship he sends to the believer· In­
terpreted as providential trials and temptations to test and 
perfect the resolve of the elect ι these negative experiences 
were made fodder for faith. Because the reality of sin was 
seen to perdure beyond the waters of baptism the life of faith 
could not be painted in overly bright colours. If the found­
er of Protestantism chafed under the constraint of his first 
principles Calvin and succeeding generations of reformers 
made a virtue of necessity. The negative dialectic of find­
ing meaning in meaninglessness, hope in hopelessness, faith 
in doubt has become a distinctive feature of reformation 
theology. 
Typical of that position is Puritan Calvinism with its 
Second Adam Christology in which Christ is depicted as the 
one who stands in contrast to Adam in his victory over the 
devil's temptations. The Combate betweene Christ and the 
Devili, The Christian Warfare, and Christs Combate and Con­
quest are just a few of the works of that theme which gave 
influential expression to the image of Christ as the success­
fully battling soul. Together with the theme of man's pil­
grimage, this image "was the great device for presenting the 
central experience of Puritan morality, namely temptation." 
Such a theological tack with its apparently noble aim of 
urging men on to "spiritual victory" over massive obstacles 
that are sure to arise appears very sound yet by suggesting 
that the paradoxical is the normal and the contradictory the 
usual mode of God's action, and implying moreover that man 
can cope with such difficulties, seems to this author to sub-
tly appeal to the very pride that it aims at rooting out. 
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Luther and Calvin achieved their aim of placing grace 
beyond the reach of the grasping hands of man and making 
Christ the sole source of salvation but in so doing imparted 
a new meaning to the concept of salvation itself. If man 
could no longer pretend to merit grace neither was he in any 
capacity to receive it when graciously bestowed. No longer 
could salvation be depicted as a process in radical continu­
ity with creation. Luther wrote of a "little faith" proper 
to man but could hardly anchor it solidly in his dualisti-
cally divided version of human nature. While he will say 
7 
that the goal of salvation is complete liberation from sin 
more characteristic are statements in which sin in man verges 
о 
on constituting a permanent principle of human nature. Be­
cause of that near dualism Luther's concept of salvation re­
mains very much a forensic matter as is clear in his distinc­
tion of hie viewpoint on justification from that of the "pop­
ish schoolmen"· 
Christian righteousness ι therefore..«is the imputation of 
God for righteousness or unto righteousness, because of our 
faith in Christ, or for Christ's sauce. When the popish 
schoolmen hear this strange and wonderful definition, which 
is unknown to reason, they laugh at it. For they imagine 
that righteousness is a certain quality poured into the soul, 
and afterwards spread into all the parts of man.... This 
matter, as touching the words, is easy (to wit, that right­
eousness is not essentially in us, as the Papists reason out 
of Aristotle, but without us in the grace of God only and in 
his imputation; and that there is no essential substance of 
righteousness in us besides that weak faith or firstfruits 
of faith, whereby we have begun to apprehend Christ, and yet 
sin in the meantime remaineth verily in us); but in very 
deed it is no small or light matter, but very weighty and of 
great importешс . 9 
While it is certain that Luther's was no other-worldly 
theology yet the fact that sin bulks so large in his thought 
tends to edge the transforming aspect of grace almost wholly 
into a hereafter. Despite his exaltation of divine mercy, 
grace can make little headway in a world so sinful that even 
the souls of the elect axe scarcely able to resist its power. 
The Christian life is viewed as a rather grim affair of con­
stant struggle against forces which threaten to extinguish 
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the believer's tiny "spark of faith". Were it not for the 
interposition of the mediator even the believing Christian, 
technically still worthy of God's punishment, would be just-
ly condemned. Under such adverse conditions the "already" 
aspect of salvation in Luther's sense amounts to little more 
than "holding one's own". True, faith in Christ gives man 
the ability to accept being accepted by God in spite of one's 
unworthiness and thus lifts one above the fruitless law of 
"works". From that elevated viewpoint—realizing that his 
acceptance does not depend on his own efforts—the believer 
can go on to perform truly Christian works. And yet, in a 
world conceived of as a seedbed of sin and unbelief the 
thought of Luther always returns to its center of gravity, 
10 
viz., the need to believe. 
In Calvin's thought too the matter of believing is lo-
cated at the summit of Christian activity. Works follow faith 
as a kind of natural fruit but belief itself remains the cen-
tral act. The idea of a deeply rooted all-pervasive sin elab-
orated by the reformers in order to better highlight the work 
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of Christ remains part of their theological schema also af-
ter the Saviour's coming. In fact, the world appears to re-
main what it has ever been since Adaiq's sin, viz., a den of 
iniquity. The dualistic vision which divides the world into 
two camps of sinners and saints is also applicable to the 
heart of the believer.where sin remains as deeply seated as 
ever. Little wonder then that faith is presented as the sum 
of Christian life,where believing is clinging to the rock of 
12 Christ in a storm of evil. Knowing his sinful condition it 
becomes no little feat for the believer to trust that God 
can overlook such unworthiness and stoop to show his mercy 
in Christ. To be able to believe in such gratuitous goodness 
is to discover the key to salvation. On the other hand, with 
nothing to recommend himself to God sinful man can do little 
else than cling to the divine mercy, believing against belief. 
Because faith thus appears amid "contraries" one could not 
be sure that he really possessed the key to salvation. Calvin 
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had to bend his best talents to the matter of distinguish­
ing between an authentic God-given faith and an almost iden-
13 tical spurious faith. ^  Having raised faith to such a rari-
fied level it is little wonder that the question of assurance 
. . 1* became the preoccupation of the English branch of Calvinism. 
Because of a kind of theological backlash the reform­
ers* concept of grace and salvation tends to be characterized 
by an extrinsic and forensic quality. The emphasis on a uni­
versal and absolutely corrupting sin which lent apparent 
strength to their Christology from one side, worked to un­
dermine it from the other side. A two-edged sword, such a 
conception of sin wounds man for Christ but in so doing cute 
so deeply into human nature that man is left with only enough 
strength to cling to Christ's merciful hemd. As such, sal­
vation tends to mean a being saved from rather than anything 
more positive. Grace can save тел only by doing a kind of 
15 divine violence to his nature. 
Whichcote's strategy: Salvation as reconciliation 
It was against the extrinsicist view of grace and sal­
vation that marked the religious outlook of his country-men 
that Whichcote developed a Christology designed to meet what 
he considered to be the great need of his time. He was con­
vinced that the Christology of the reformers' justification 
by faith theology had become for many of his contemporaries 
the divine authorization of a disregard for ordinary stand­
ards of morality ana a spirit of zeal or persecution. In a 
disclosure to Tuckney of "the secret sense of my soul" Which­
cote told of how he felt called to oppose that false zeal. 
I dare not blaspheme free and noble spirits in religion, who 
search after truth with indifference and ingenuity: lest in 
so doing I should degenerate into a spirit of Persecution, 
in the reality of the thing; though in another guise: For a 
mistaken spirit may conceit it self to be acted by the zeal 
of God. And I have observed that in former times, some, 
whose names and memories I otherwise honour and value their 
writings have been sharp and censorious, severe and keen: 
even to the persecution of such, whom I doubt not but God 
had received. And I greatly fear, that some also, in our 
times, do so too. And I do believe that the destroying 
139 
this spirit out of the Church, ie a piece of the Reformation 
which God, in these times of changes, aims at: and I fear to 
be under the power of the anti-character to the work that God 
is about; and to stand disaffected to what God is doing in 
the world. 16 
With the same sense of what the times would bear, Which-
eote's approach to the "destroying this spirit out of the 
Church" was that of irenic indirection rather than direct con-
frontation· In a manner reminiscent of Aquinas's handling of 
certain of Augustine's ideas, Whichcote respectfully took up 
the justification Christology of the reformers but then sub-
tly reinterpreted it to fit his purpose. "I profess myself", 
he wrote to Tuckney, "as full and clear as any one in the 
world in that grand point of our acceptance with God, in and 
17 through Christ". But there is another aspect of Christ's 
work, viz., that of sanctification, which is scarcely less 
important than his expiatory work "both being the provision 
of Heaven, to make us capable of happiness; and fundamentally 
18 
necessary to our safety." Having nodded respectfully in 
the direction of the Calvinist Christology, Whichcote is 
ready to reinterpret "Orthodoxie" in terms of "Charitie". 
I confess, I cannot but marvell to see you baleine e matters 
of knowledge against principles of goodness; and seem to in-
sist on Christ less as a principle of divine nature in us 
than as a sacrifice for us....But certainly, if we consider 
difficulty or danger in relation to persons as the subjects 
or receivers of these great blessings from Heaven: then one 
is more easily understood and readily pretended while the 
other, as wholly contrary to carnality, is stuck at and great-
ly neglected. How easy to say··.Christ died for me—self-
flattery saying it, as well as faith—and I do fiduciam in 
eo collocare—the greatest sinner having least matter of 
self-confidence:—whereas the whole inordinate self rises 
up in rebellion against self-surrender into divine will and 
real transformation of man into the spirit image and nature 
of Christi And this latter being the great demonstration 
of the verity of the subject's faith of the former; it may 
seem, that the former may be best secured, by the frequent 
confirmation of and much insisting-upon the latter: the for-
mer being understood once for ever, upon a full declaration 
and thorough consideration of it...the latter being not 
otherwise to be known than by being felt: which is not, save 
as sensuality is mortified and crucified. 19 
Continuing in a more direct vein, Whichcote states that 
in an England where Christianity is "the religion of the 
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Nation, and the first point of Education, and whosoever 
sticks at it is looked at as a prodigy and monster1* to "ac­
knowledge Christ*' is as insignificant as it is easy. But 
now is the time to take a further step: "Now that Christ is 
more known and freely professed, let him also be inwardly 
felt, and secretly understood as a principle of divine life 
within us, as well as a Saviour without us." What England 
needs now, Whichcote concludes his plea, is a new image of 
Christ "especialy whereas we live in a crowd of men who in­
deed profess some zeal for that happy point of 'Justification 
by Faith' yet are sensibly degenerated into the devilish na­
ture of malice, spite, fury, envy, revenge" is nothing other 
than "the certain conjunction of sanctification, holiness, 
20 
and a divine nature" along with their justification faith. 
In the first letter before the debate about Christ be­
gan to boil over, Whichcote had attempted to mollify his op­
ponent with a distinction that would unite his Christ of ex­
piation with his own Christ of sanctification under the common 
denominator of"reconciliation". 
Christ does not save us by only doing for us without us: yea, 
we come at that which Christ has done for us with God by what 
he does for us within us. For, in order of execution it is 
as the words axe placed in the text ; Repentance, before For­
giveness of sins: Christ is to be acknowledged, as a princi­
ple of grace in us as well as an advocate for us. For the 
scripture holds forth Christ to us, under a double notion: 
1. to be felt in us, as the new man in contradiction to the 
old man: as a divine nature in contra-distinction to the de­
generate and apostate nature.·..2. to be believed on by us 
as a sacrifice for the expiation and atonement of sin; as 
an advocate and means of reconciliation between God and Man. 
And Christ does not dividedly perform these offices; one, 
and not the other. For reconciliation between God and Us, 
is not wrought, as sometimes it is said and pretended to be 
in the world, between parties mutually incensed and exasper­
ated one against another·..· 21 
But despite Whichcote's efforts to find common ground 
by identifying his concept of repentance with the preparatoria 
ad justificationem "frequently determined in the schools by 
22 
Dr. Ward" Tuckney remained uneasy about a distinction which 
appeared to accord a measure of spiritual ability to the cor­
rupt nature of unregenerate теш. Hie fears were not to be 
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quelled until he had himself rendered the threatening pro­
position harmless by reducing it to familiar Calvinist cate­
gories· To IVhichcote's use of the axiom that an unrepentant 
sinner is an unfit subject of justification to support his 
position that repentance must precede forgiveness Tuckney's 
cautious, hair-splitting reaction is typical. 
That expression of yours, of "a sinner non omnino in motu 
conversionis etc."; I do not well understand unless your 
meaning be that a sinner, qua talis, without any movings 
toward conversion etc.—if so; though, as I said before 
your αποτέλεσμα of justification, in puncto rationis, a 
renovation goes first; which does elicere actum fidei, by 
which we eure actually justified: yet in hoc motu God moves 
first; and, in so far as Justification consists in pardon 
of sin, it is very considerable; whether immediate antece- -
denter it has for it's object a sinner, as a sinner, under 
the guilt and in the state of sin; though it do not so leave 
him: and so God properly justifies the ungodly. 23 
The lines of his strategy were set. Notwithstanding 
the Tuckneys of the time Chicheóte was determined to preach 
a Christ of repentance and transformation, "a principle of 
divine life within us....the Leaven of Heaven; sent into the 
world, and given to us to leaven us into the nature of God." 
It was his hard fought conviction that the saving work of 
Christ includes the transformation of тал as one of its 
integral aspects. "Christ does not save us by only doing 
for us without us"--or, from the standpoint of the to-be-
transformed subject, the "sum and substance of the gospel", 
i.e.,"repentance from dead works, and faith in the Lord Je­
sus Christ" are in reality one and the same thing. 
To believe, there is requisite em internal disposition and 
preparation of the subject, as well as a divine promise to 
build upon.·..Repentance and faith in the gospel are indif­
ferently used: he that believeth on the Son hath eternal life, 
John 3·36. Now he doth not really believe, who doth not tru­
ly intend to do answerably. The scripture calls believing 
on Christ, receiving of him, John 1.12. If we receive him, 
then we receive him such as he is, and to such effects and 
purposes as God sent him for; now God sent him to bless us, 
in turning us from our iniquities, Acts 3.26....Faith in­
cludes an intention of new obedience. 'Tis a fair matter 
of belief, pardon of sin to them who repent; and sin not 
pardonable to impénitents; so that our satisfaction and 
reformation go together, strengthen and enliven each other. 
(3, 72-73)24 
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II. THE RECONCILING CHKIST 
A modest mediator 
To overcome a "spirit of persecution" and a disdain for 
ordinary virtues—due no doubt not only to the extrinsicist 
aspect of the reformers' theology of grace but also to a 
concomitant denigration of the Catholic "pelagian" moral sys­
tem—Whichcote preached a concept of reconciliation entailing 
the real inner transformation of man. Because God cannot be 
reconciled with man until he has laid aside his sins, justifi­
cation cannot be only a transaction between Christ and the Fa­
ther but must include a motion from the side of man. Now it 
is to elicit that motion that Whichcote's Christ comes into 
the world looking, one might add, rather like a mediator in 
a mdern-day labour dispute in comparison with the all-powerful 
Saviour of Calvinist Puritanism· 
Whichcote depicts the reconciling action of Christ as 
aimed at both parties at variance, viz., God and man. That 
he does so seems commonplace enough but constituted a radi­
cal departure from the then prevailing concept. In Calvin's 
theological schema the actual saving deed of Christ does not 
really involve a human party. Man, crippled by the fall, is 
a non-starter in the race of salvation. The "mediation" of 
Christ deals basically only with the injured deity. Media­
tion amounts to interposition with Christ standing between 
the anger of God and the object of the divine wrath. 
But for Whichcote interposition can never bring about 
reconciliation when God is involved. 
But with God there салnot be reconciliation without Our be­
coming God-like: for God's acts are not false, overly, im­
perfect; God cannot make a vaine shew; God, being perfectly 
under the power of goodnesse, cannot denie himself: because, 
if he should, he would depart from goodnesse; which is im­
possible to God. Therefore we must yeelde, be subdued to the 
rules of goodnesse, receeve stamps and impressions from God; 
and God cannot be farther pleased, than goodnesse takes 
place. They therefore deceeve and flatter themselves extream-
ly; who thinke of reconciliation with God, by meanes of a Sa­
viour, acting upon God in their behalfe ; and not also work­
ing in or upon them, to make them God-like. Nothing is more 
impossible than this; as being against the nature of God: 
which is in perfect agreement with goodnesse, and hath an 
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absolute antipathie against iniquity» unrighteousnesse and 
sin. And we cannot imagine, that God by his Will and Pleas­
ure can go against his Nature and Being« 25 
While Whichcote retained the terminology of propitiation he 
was at pains to point out that God never felt himself so 
wronged as to leave off loving his rebellious creature. 
The fact that God's love for his created "image" re­
mained steadfast means that it is man as man to whom is di­
rected the divine saving will. Though the fall has "marred 
his principles" man is till very much an actor in the drama 
of salvation. Christ "applies himself" to the human party 
not as to an object but as to a free subject. In Whichcote1s 
Christology the true notion of mediation is verified in that 
the Saviour deals with man as man, i.e., according to the 
deepest principles of a still viable human nature. 
While the Christ of Calvin effects his purpose of call­
ing the "saints" by means of the secret agency of the Spirit 
Whichcote's reconciler operates by way of a "moral motion", 
by which is meant that he acts by appeal and persuasion rather 
than by power. It is a "motion" in line with the rational 
structure of human nature. Whichcote opposed the Calvinistic 
idea of reconciliation as a powerful and mysterious divine 
action carried out without man's conscious co-operation. 
For intelligent and voluntary agents are not drawn by force, 
but fairly persuaded. Machines are drawn by wires, and ani­
mals by sense, but intelligent and voluntary agents must be 
dealt withal by persuasion and fair inducements, and in a 
way of argument. A man cannot possibly be converted without 
his own act; he must of necessity understand the reason why, 
and give his voluntary consent. It is very true, God made 
us without us; and it is as true, he will not save us with­
out ourselves. Therefore they deceive themselves that expect 
God should work upon them when they themselves work not: when 
men make application to God, then is he ready to concur with 
them; but not when men are asleep, lazy and incogitant. 
(2, $63-64 
On the other hand Christ comes not to demand an impos­
sible act of satisfaction but to persuade man to render that 
of which he is till capable, viz., an acknowledgement of his 
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apostacy and a desire for forgiveness. More теш cannot do; 
more the mediator does not ask. Respectful of both parties 
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at variance, Christ tailors his conciliating action to the ex­
act requirements of the case· He is above all a rational Sa­
viour, binding himself to the truth of the dislocated divine-
human relationship· 
For the reconciler is to deal equally; not to over-bear either 
party, but in consideration of either party, he enjoins what 
is just and fit, and what the necessity of the case will bear; 
so that the parties may come off with as little wrong as may 
be· The necessity of the case, and the right of the party, 
are the two things the reconciler considers in his endea­
vours for peace. The reconciler's work must be, to convince 
the offender of his ungratefulness, and to offer something to 
the offended to forgive....So you see, that the reconciler is 
to apply himself to the state of the case, and to act as the 
case doth require. He may be look'd upon as a hinderer of 
men*s rights, if in matters of difference, he takes upon him 
to lord it; if he doth not act fairly, and deal with both 
parties, he is an usurper. And the man that goes this way 
to work, he may chance to do more wrong to one party, it may 
be to both, them was first given, (2, 267-68) 
Whichcote's strong sense of ал objective sphere of truth or 
"reasons" which is so fundamental that it binds both God and 
man is very much in evidence here. Such delicacy on the part 
of the mediator doubtless seemed a dimunition of his dignity 
at a time when the Calvinist Christ figure was predominant but 
the age's growing sense of human dignity must have found 
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Whichcote's Christology congenial· That sense of the in­
violability of the human is the premise he invoked in order to 
buttress his case for a non-obtrusive Saviour. According to 
Whichcote, anything imposed on man does violence to his dig­
nity. "There must be free forgiveness on God's part, and in­
genuous submission on the sinner's part· What is forced upon 
us, is insignificant. If you punish a malefactor till dooms­
day, there is no satisfaction." (2, 268) Neither, he might 
28 have added, does unasked for grace satisfy. 
Thus Whichcote's mediator moves in a sphere between God 
and man, each with their own demands. That the mediator had 
to deal with an injured God who required satisfaction was 
part of the religious outlook of the age. Novel and signi­
ficant is his idea that the other party to reconciliation also 
needed satisfying. "I dare say", Whichcote proclaimed, "the 
death of Christ, according to the will of God, upon occasion 
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of sin, is as requisite and necessary in respect of our appre-
hensions, and the satisfaction of our minds, as it is any way 
in respect of God.Mv (2, 376) The unwonted claim that re-
conciliation must be "highly pleasing" not only to the offend-
ed deity but also to man must have raised many a Puritan eye-
brow. Talk of indispensable human requirements before God 
constituted a radical departure from established opinion in a 
land dominated by the Calvinist dialectic of divine trans-
29 
cendence and human wretchedness. Calvin had written much 
about the demands of Christian living and the indispensabi-
lity of clinging to the Saviour but the predestinarían frame-
work of his ethical doctrine tended to undermine the signifi-
cance of the human role in salvation. For Calvin, reconcili-
ation is an essentially divine activity, one that Christ per-
forms single-handedly. Invested with the office of redeemer 
the Son of God goes about his task with admirable efficiency. 
Man is not consulted, only saved. The idea that this boon 
should be humanly desireable is deemed irrelevant. 
To gain a clearer notion of what Christ does and is in 
Whichcote's theology it is helpful to look more closely at 
the two poles between which reconciliation takes place, viz., 
God and man. Focussing in first on God's role, one can see 
that in contrast to Calvin's ambiguity on the subject, Which-
cote is refreshingly clear on the matter of the divine rela-
tionship to fallen man. God is the "first and chiefest good-
ness" who has always loved his created "image". Though this 
divine steadfastness appears to partake at times of the aloof 
and immutable aspect of the aristotelian deity, the immanent 
and involved character of the Christian God is generally very 
much in evidence. 
Unlike the unmoved mover of Aristotle this God is the 
passionate vulnerable deity of Scripture. This God is griev-
ed by the fall but His grief is tempered by the knowledge that 
human nature was prone to fail in the first place. Not that 
the creator like some modern manufacturer who builds obsoles-
cence into his product, positively planned man's "breakdown", 
but it can be said that God laid a "very great" charge upon 
ιΐ*6 
man when He gave him the task of self-government—a task great­
er still than the calling of the angels, some of whom never-
31 theless fell· Less severe with man, Whichcote's explanation 
of the fall lends itself more readily than the Augustinian. 
version to a harmonization with the findings of modern science 
but does not completely banish the suspicion that God*β role -. 
32 is somewhat ambivalent· At any rate, Whichcote's intention 
is clear, viz., he would stress the idea that the creator's 
love for man has ever been steadfast. To buttress the bibli­
cal witness to this divine steadfastness he made abundant use 
of the Platonic theme of an ішjealous and constantly good god. 
"It cannot be conceived that the original of being, and the 
'fountain of goodness", Whichcote echoed Plato, 
should be without designs, and thoughts, intentions, and pur­
poses of doing good. It is irrational, to imagine that the 
original of all beings, and the fountain of all goodness, 
should be conceived to be at any time without intention, de­
signs, thoughts, and purposes of good. For we find that ma­
licious and mischievous dispositions, they are always hatch­
ing mischief, designing, contriving, and delighting in it, 
and love to effect it. Dispositions that are transcendently 
good, they are equally gracious, and compassionate: for that 
which is degenerate, cannot be more operative to ill pur­
poses, than that which is infinitely perfect by constitution 
be active to good purposes. (2, 91-92) 33 
Calvin's theology depicts the love of the creator turn­
ing into wrath upon the occasion of Adam's rebellion. In this 
dreadful state of affairs the primary significance of Christ 
becomes that of a priest-victim who, standing "in our place", 
offers himself as the suitable "propitiation" to divine jus­
tice. As Perkins put it, after the tortures at the hands of 
his captors Christ "became as accursed to God his Father, 
that is God poured upon him, being thus innocent, such a sea 
of his wrath as was equivalent to the sins of the whole . . 
world."^ Because God's anger is a theme of far less impor­
tance for Whichcote so is a propitiating Christ. Something 
of the idea of propitiation remains but the emphasis shifts 
to a Christ who comes to sanctify man by way of an interior 
transformation. 
Calvin's Christ reveals the wrath and the power of God. 
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Christ as the self-offering priest reveals the wrath of God, 
and Christ especially in his office of King reveals the di­
vine omnipotence. Calvin heightened the aspect of an in­
jured and angry God in order to gain maximum impact for his 
recommendation of a merciful Saviour. To that contrast Chris-
tology w/hichcote opposed his view of a Christ who enhances 
rather than derogates the goodness of the creator. Whichcote 
is at one with Calvin in affirming that Christ came because 
of sin but after that their paths diverge. To Calvin the 
fall is an ineffable offense against God requiring full satis­
faction; to Whichcote the fall is rather primarily, an impedi­
ment which prevents man from carrying out the purppse for 
which he was created. 
It is in this situation, between the changeless good­
ness of God and the changed condition of man, that Whichcote'β 
Saviour comes on the scene. Less dramatically than the Cal­
vinist Christ who virtually effects a new creation, the Pla-
tonist's reconciler seeks to lead man derailed by sin back 
on the track of the creator's original intention. Which­
cote was at pains to point out the continuity between the 
divine plan for man and the saving mission of Christ. 
Besides the many scriptural texts he invoked to support 
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this point as was his wont Whichcote resorted to rational ar­
gumentation. He utilizes a "distinction that we have in lo-
gick, that is mightily accomodate to this business", viz., of 
showing the continuity between the work of the God of nature 
and the God of grace. It is a distinction between the two 
"motive principles" that "do affect, dispose, and incline" an 
efficient cause. First, there is an interior motive principle 
which interiorly disposes the agent. Secondly, there may also 
be an external motive principle by which that inner principle 
is further activated and engaged. Whichcote's application of 
the distinction is as follows: 
I will attribute one to God, and the other to our Saviour. 
I will make the goodness of God's nature, which is his na­
tural perfection, that that doth inwardly affect, dispose 
and move him to benevolence, clemency and compassion, and 
to relieve lost creatures. This shall be the primary internal 
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impulsive motivç to God, to relieve and compassionate us. 
Then the interposition of Chrises undertaking and perform-
ance, the satisfaction that is made to the divine will, mind, 
and pleasure, by his death and passion; this shall be the ex-
ternal, impulsive cause, which doth further promote, incline 
and further engage the efficient cause. (2, 77-78) 
Quaint as this bit of "correlation theology" may sound, it is 
significant as another expression of Whichcote's attempt to 
heal the breach between nature and grace, and restore nature 
and the "God of nature" to their due stature. 
The creator's constant good-will toward his creation 
including the rebel man is a cardinal principle of Whichcote's 
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theology which derives ultimately from his concept of God· 
According to that concept, the divine intention to stand by 
creation and bring it to its ultimate fulfillment follows not 
from the fiat of the will of God but rather from the integri-
ty of the divine nature itself. God is at bottom a rational 
deity whose will and power are ever measured by His wisdom. 
All that God creates is fashioned according to the orderly 
pattern of the divine nature. Thus what He has in His wis-
dom created, God cannot but continue to will. This unvary-
ing good-will depends not on divine condescension but on the 
very makeup of created things, products of that creative wis-
dom. 
In the case of man, God has made mem "capable of him-
self", having placed him "into a relation with Himself". 
Invoking the Stoic principle that "God and nature do nothing 
in vain", Whichcote described God as rationally efficient in 
his every action, especially in his special providence toward 
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man. 
Our capacities of receiving him, God will fill; and the re-
lation he hath put us into himself, he will answer. For we 
are made in the image of God; not only upon a moral considera-
tion, but upon a natural account: as we are invested with in-
tellectual natures, and so stand in another relation to God, 
than the creaures below us. For God will comply with this 
relation; for he doth nothing in vain. He hath not laid a 
foundation that he will not pursue; for he will erect a super-
structure... .Now the philosophers tell us, that there is no 
vacuity in nature; therefore every capacity God will fill, 
and every relation God will answer: God and nature do nothing 
in vain. (2, 93-9^) 
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Not content with merely fashioning perfect "creations", 
God in his rational goodness will see his creatures through 
to their appointed ends· More than a deistic divine clock-
maker, the causality of Chicheóte'ε God extend beyond the 
first fashioning of things and through the whole gamut of 
a creature's activity. And in the case of man that divine 
determination to stand by creation is especially important 
because, although Whichcote will say that human nature is 
even more perfectly proportioned to its end than other na­
tures, in fact man is the one being whose calling exceeds 
the reach of its powers. It is this inexplicable slip-up 
of a master creator-craftsman which provides the opening for 
a divine mission which would otherwise be quite out of place. 
Paraphrasing Browning one could say that "a man's reach should 
exceed his grasp or what's a Saviour for?" In an otherwise 
faultless cosmos the inherent lack of proportion between hu­
man nature and its end—aggravated in the fall—fairly cries 
out for adjustment. The perfect rationality of Christ's 
mission is ensured by the need to bring man into line with 
the harmony of the rest of creation. 
Before proceeding to deal more directly with Whichcote's 
image of the fall and the fallen being on behalf of whom Christ 
has come one should have in mind the "natural" tenor of his 
divinity and, more specifically, the question whether his at­
tempt to soften the stern countenance of the Calvinist deity 
might not lead him to naturalize the whole matter of the fall. 
Deeply implicated as this question is in Whichcote's concep­
tion of nature to grace or of fallen man to Christ, the answer 
will be pursued in the following section. 
Whichcote'ε version of the fall leaves the love of God 
surviving Adam's affront substantially intact. Not God but 
the offender is changed as a result of Original Sin. Fallen 
man is "wounded" and "sick", his mind poisoned by "rancor and 
malignity". The original (precarious) harmony of his nature 
shattered, he is left in a state of vulnerable disarray, a 
prey to the pull of his now unruly passions. Almost extin­
guished is the light of his nature which had clearly showed 
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him the difference between riçht and wrong. Sunk in lethar-
gy and sensuality, the dim light of his once glorious reason 
subject to the sway of rumour and prejudice, man has become 
a spiritual invalid. In a word he is "out of the image of 
God, his high perfection, which he was invested with in the 
moment of his creation: he has lost his proper perfection, 
hath lost more than the whole creation can repair.·· (1, 115) 
And yet fallen man is not as badly off as some passages 
suggest. There is an interesting difference between Which-
cote's evaluation of the fallen condition in sections dealing 
with the necessity of Christ's mission and in sections con-
cerned with the danger of sin· To enhance the importance of 
Christ's mediation the good preacher Whichcote did not hesi-
tate to dramatize the need of an alienated humanity. 
For the condition that we are in, respectively to God. This 
point tells us, we are out of grace and favour, we are at a 
loss. And if we are so, it becomes us to know ourselves; so 
that we may deprecate; and we might know that· We are ex-
tremely given to self-flattery: but, none but fools would live 
in a lie. It is too general for men to give way to presump-
tion, and live greatly in a lie, and abide very little in the. 
truth, but it is not safe here, because our great concernment 
lies here. If we eure not atheists, we must go to Christ· 
This point informs us, that in respect of ourselves we are 
at a loss. We have miscarried; how can we expect to be re-
ceived? 'Tis true, we have encouragement enough by the gos-
pel: but we must go in the way of God's direction· We having 
this knowledge, it will not be hurtful; since we have the 
knowledge of atonement made by the blood of Christ· (2, 329-
30) ^3 
On the other hand, when warning his congregations against the 
danger of falling into sin (a major preoccupation of his 
preaching in spite of Lichtenstein) he would drive home the 
lesson of man's responsibility for evil and the perversion of 
sinning by emphasizing the capabilities remaining to man· 
It is not only a state of the foulest deformity, but also of 
greatest violence to be without God in the world. Man con-
tradicts his own principles, and departs from himself, when 
he falls off from God· No such monster in the world, or more 
to be marvelled at, than a man devoid of the sense of Deity; 
as men having no fear of God before their eyes, Rom. 3·18· 
(3, 181) Ulf 
Compared with one another Whichcote'β accounts of the 
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fallen state appear to conflict but when juxtaposed with Cal-
vin's descriptions of the same they suddenly become clear and 
unequivocal. Taking into account not only Calvin's exaggerat-
ed estimation of Original Sin but also his fundamental view 
of human nature which sees man as a "worm" before the majes-
ty of God one readily sees that Whichcote's esteem for the 
race is higher on both counts. The sublime metaphysical sta-
tus he assigned to human nature has been dealt with at length. 
in a previous section. At this point suffice it to recall 
that man is the "image of God" not only in virtue of poten-
tial moral achievement but inherently by way of ontological 
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dignity. As for the effects of the fall, in spite of occa-
sional Calvinistic sounding utterances, Whichcote's funda-
mental position clearly points in another direction. Basi-
cally the Platonist relegates the fall and its consequences 
to a level of secondary importance. Not heredity, not even 
the inherited sin of Adam, but rather freedom is the deter-
minative factor in human development. "Men are more what 
they are used to, than what they are born to" Whichcote liked 
to say. Furthermore, what he had primarily in mind when 
harping on sin was not Original Sin but the sin of those who 
in their freedom take complaisance in sin, pursue its pleas-
50 
ures, and adamantly refuse to forsake it. These sinful men 
are different from their fellow men~he distinguished sharply 
between "sinners" and the good but weak) precisely because 
they have chosen to be so. 
These men came into the world upon the same terms with other 
men; but they have made themselves such by abuse of them-
selves. And now they will tell you, they cannot do other-
wise; they cannot; why? because they have contracted evil 
habits, by ill use, custom, and practice; and are not willing 
to be at the pains to work them off; which through the grace 
of God, and by a little violence to themselves at the beginn-
ing, they might effect. (1, ^ 5) 51 
The consequences of the fall are further relativized when 
Whichcote points to the beginning of the "age of reason" as 
the self-evident starting point for the life of religion. 
"We are to be doing our duty to God, ourselves and others", 
he claimed, "as soon as we come to the use of reason and 
152 
understanding". Whatever the impact of Original Sin it is 
seen as not significant enough to prevent or even postpone 
the natural time for the beginning of man's religious develop­
ment. 
By thus diminishing the proportions of the fall Which-
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cote was bucking a strong Reformation position. Against the 
Puritan assertion that Original Sin radically corrupted 
human nature Whichcote held that while the fall took man "off 
from his divine original" it did not destroy the basis of 
his relationship to God· That it could not is based on the 
fact that the foundations of that divinely intended relation­
ship were laid in the deepest center of human nature at crea­
tion. Man may ignore or refuse the relationship but he cannot 
destroy it utterly without destroying himself. The perfect 
interiority of the creator's intention sets definite limits 
to the idea of a "fall". While man can fall away from a right 
use of that inner principle, unless his "apostasy" goes beyond 
that lapse by way of the self-violation of persistent person­
al sin that innate God-wardness will provide him with a "prin­
ciple of recovery" by which he can overcome the downward drag 
of Original Sin. As in the realm of nature there is a "princi­
ple of recovery" by which upheavals of wind and storm are re­
turned to calm, so in the "intellectual world" there is not 
lacking a natural principle for the recovery of spiritual 
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equlibrium. It is to that principle that Christ must apply 
if his work is to be effective. 
III. CHRIST IN THE FALL AND RESTORATION 
Foreshadowed in the Fall 
The difference between Whichcote's concept of the fall 
and that of the reformers' is not merely one of degree, as if 
his version were but a pale copy of that dominant Augustin-
ian vision. With its emphasis on the weakness of mam and the 
understanding attitdue of God, Whichcote'β view of the fall 
has much in common with what Hick has called the "Irenaean 
type of theodicy". There is a purely developmental aspect 
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of Whichcote's vision of the "life of religion" which beare 
striking resemblance to Irenaeus's view of Christian life as 
gradual spiritual growth. With Irenaeus and the Hellenistic 
Fathers Whichcote locates the fall in the moral context of 
man's potential for likeness to God rather than in the more 
metaphysical context of the Augustinian tradition's emphasis 
on man's original exalted ontological status. 
In the Platonist's conception of man's original state 
all was not simply divine gifts and grace. Мал comes from the 
creator's hands in a condition of bipolarity so that already, 
at the level of creation, there is present the stuff from which 
spiritual struggle is made necessary. Even before the snake 
made its appearance the necessity of spiritual growth and the 
basic direction it must take were clear to теш. It is in the 
created constitution of human nature rather than in sin that 
Whichcote primarily perceives the structure of the moral life 
and the subsequent structure of salvation. Original Sin is a 
complicating factor but does not substantially alter the fact 
or fundamental direction of man's "natural11 moral imperative· 
Paraphrasing the famous phrase from Ecclesiastes Which» 
cote affirmed that "man is vanity" and distinguished three 
kinds of "vanity", the first two belonging to the natural im­
perfection of man, the third the result of the "unnatural" fac­
tor of sin. Wè are concerned here with the first two varie-
ties, constituting as they do the foundation of the Platonists' 
image of man. First then, man is vain in a "negative sense": 
Because he is short of divine perfection. For a creature is 
primary to nothing, he hath no absolute being; for he comes 
into being at God's call, continues in being by his mainte-
nance and allowance, and must leave this being at his appoint-
ment. He is subject to God's pleasure, so is vain in a nega-
tive sense; in no moment of his life is he independent, neither 
for existence, nor in execution: for in God, we live, and move, 
and have our being, Acts xvii.28. (1, 11Ό 
Secondly, man is vain in a "comparative sense", i.e., "short 
in perfection of some of his fellow-creatures, short of ange­
lical perfection." (1, 115) What Whichcote has in mind here 
is the immaterial character of the angelic nature as is evi­
dent in his saying about the probability of the fall: "We 
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have a greater province to administer, than even the angels 
themselves; they not having so gross a body as we have, nor 
expos'd to so much evil as we are." Cf, 171) 
It is under the second rubric of man*β vanity in a com­
parative sense that Whichcote elaborates on the less edifying 
side of his Platonic image of теш, thereby laying down the 
lines not only for the kind of fall to which теш will succumb 
but also for the kind of Saviour and salvation suitable to the 
remedying of such a lapsed condition· From the viewpoint of 
the immateriality of the angels and of glorified man Which­
cote affirms that "man is here in his infancy." While certain 
expressions would lead one to think that this is meant dual-
istically, i.e., in reference to теш's "materiated" condition 
as, for example, when he says that "in this body, the very 
reason of our mind is materiated, and the very sentiments of 
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our souls (to use the common phrase) do taste of the cask", 
closer study reveals that he has in mind a more nuanced Paul­
ine kind of duality in which the whole man is looked at either 
from the viewpoint of his vulnerability to sin, or of his high 
spiritual potential. The point of comparison in these refer­
ences is not another part of the same man but man in another 
state, viz., the state of glory. It is in the light of the 
lightsome "bodies" of that condition that he described the 
weakness of the "bodies" of our "state of humiliation". Note 
that it is both the bodily and intellectual sides of man which 
know that weakness in the earthly phase of human existence. 
Our bodies shall then be made fit instruments for our souls, 
whereas now, as the philosopher tells us, the body is an im­
pediment to the mind and to all divine contemplation. Our 
minds are confined in the body: In this tabernacle (saith 
the apostle) we groan being burdened; this is the voice of 
all spiritually awakened souls 'Let us take our flight to 
heaven and see in the light of God's countenance, and forsake 
this low and dirty world, for here souls are hindered as to 
their highest operations of mind, and understanding, and the 
largeness of their wills and affections'. (Plato, apolo­
gia Socratis) (1, 292) 
But Whichcote sees more to the fall than mere natural 
weakness. True to his first principles he would not make 
fallen man into a "stone" and thereby "make base".the work 
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of the creator, and yet neither would he so naturalize the 
fall as to eliminate the element of sin and guilt. Man is 
not only negatively and comparatively but also privatively 
imperfect, "'Tis our misery to be deprived, but 'tis our 
madness to be deceived, befooled; otherwise we affect to know 
things justly as they are; why are we not willing to know our­
selves?" (1, 1l8) Guilt has aggravated the natural weakness 
of the human condition. 
The merit of Whichcote's moderation in the matter of 
Original Sin is that while retaining the guilt dimension of 
the fall he has connected it up congruously with a credible 
ontology of human nature and therefore with the doctrine of 
creation. It is one thing to fall from the exalted righteous­
ness of the reformers' Augustinian Adam and quite another to 
fall away from the'right use of one's capacity for righteous­
ness. That which constitutes salvation in Whichcote's Greek 
slanted outlook is not primarily the recovery of a lost super­
natural status but the recovery of the right use of the power 
to attain such a status. The fall did not bring the truth of 
things crashing down. They remain immoveable, the eterna jura 
of creation. The fall was a fall of man away from his ability 
to live in right relationship to that immutable truth, away 
from the power of "seeing things steadily, and whole" and into 
a Platonic cave of illusion and imagination. More precisely, 
Whichcote identified that diminished power of spiritual dis­
cernment with a principle, the product of a synthesis of bib­
lical, Neoplatonic and Stoic elements, which he called the 
"Candle of the Lord", the "Light of Nature", or simply "Hea-
son", by which man is connaturally able to move into right 
relationship with himself, with God ала with his fellow man. 
Not only the leniency of the Irenaean view but also the 
Platonic-Stoic influence is evident in Whichcote's account of 
the "apostasy" of man. Before: 
God considers that we are but finite and fallible, and consist 
of different materials; a divine and heavenly spirit; and a 
gross body. He knows that we have a great government, the rul­
ing of sundry appetites; and must subordinate all the motions 
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of sense, to the dictates of reason and understanding; which 
is the greatest performance in the world. Yet, this human 
nature is put upon.... (**, 171) 
After: 
This is the calamity of us mortals; not that which is true, 
solid, real and substantial doth always take place; but that 
which is imaginary doth take too great place in the life of 
man: not that which is honest, right and good; but that which 
is pleasing and profitable: or rather, not things of the mind, 
but matters of sense, do prevail upon many men· (1, 283) 
Moral divinity with a tincture of Christ? In the radi-
cal gap which separates Whichcote's view of the fall from 
that of the reformers and in the inevitable divergence in 
the concept of ealvation--indeed of the whole Christian life— 
that such a difference implies, one begins to understand both 
why Tuckney posed this objection and also why the Platonist's 
answer failed to satisfy him. As so often is the case in 
theological debate, widely different sets of presuppositions 
were in play. Tuckney's Augustinian-Reformation theology of 
the fall and redemption with its strong emphasis on the low-
liness of man and the power of grace was the framework—con-
sidered by the Calvinist as the revealed Word of God—in which 
he criticized ihichcote's conception of the relation between 
nature and grace. Whichcote, on the other hand, had drawn 
heavily on other traditions in his aim of overcoming those 
pervasive Augustinian presuppositions and of reconstructing 
Christology along lines which related to the needs of his age. 
Logically enough, Tuckney's conception of the person 
and work of Christ stand in close connection with his first 
principles; likewise Whichcote's view of Christ is concep-
tualized in terms consonant with his very different theolo-
gical framework, viz., an Irenaean-like theology of the Chris-
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tian life as growth into the "image of God", irfhlohoote trans-
posed Christ's saving work into the Greek key of man's develop-
ment into the divine image for which he was made. As such, 
and in striking contrast with the violent character of the op-
eration of the Calvinist Spirit of God, the Spirit of Which-
cote' s theology is a Spirit working with, and within, the 
"spirit in man". 
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Every age has its own Christ figure or figures: The 
Enlightenment help up Christ as the wise teacher of eternal 
truths and our own time sees the politicization of Christ, and 
also the mystical Christ for those who have turned away from 
society to the way of meditation and harmony with nature. 
Whichcote was laying the theoretical foundation of a new image 
of Christ for the new age which was about to break in the Eng-
land of the Restoration. Having noted the bad effects of the 
notion of a Christ turned away from man to God, Whichcote 
would bring the Saviour back into a more direct relationship 
with man and the cause of an everyday, humane morality. 
To achieve this he placed his Christology in a setting 
that has essential reference to man and "natural morality", 
viz., in the category of "truth of after-revelation" with its 
58 
total subordination to the "truth of first inscription". The 
will of God is the ultimate rule of the truth realm to which 
Christ's work belongs and because the divine will is ever in 
perfect harmony with the divine mind, the created expression 
of that will-revelation will accord fully with the truth com-
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mumcation of the divine mind. ' The perfect harmony of God's 
inner life is the ultimate ground of the rational and concili-
atory character of Christ's work. 
The ultimate expression of a series of "after-revelations" 
granted to men since the fall,, the Christ of the "gospel-mani-
festation" likewise brings no new revelation in the sense of 
additional truths. There is but one truth and that is in-
divisible: The "truth of first inscription" has been immove-
ably set in the very marrow of creation. Christ belongs to 
the level of "truth of after-revelation", i.e., those provi-
sions decreed by God in view of the disrupted state of the or-
iginal revelation, in order to restore man to a harmonious re-
lation with that primordial truth. Christ reveals only in 
the sense that all that he does points to that original and 
enduring realm of truth. Indeed the whole thrust of Which-
cote' s Christology is back to the gro-md of "natural moral-
ity". Commenting on Ephesians 2.10 which states that "we 
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are created in Christ Jesus to good works, whereunto we were 
before appointed'* Whichcote discloses his vision of the es-
sentially moral and reiterative character of the gospel. 
When appointed? viz. in the moment of creation, when God made 
the spirit in man, the candle of the Lord. So that man, by 
a natural faculty, did see what things are according to the 
nature of God; holy, pure, righteous and good: from these we 
are departed, by the defection; but by Christ Jesus we are 
again restored to all those good works, to which we were be-
fore appointed. So that the knowledge of Christ doth undo 
the whole work of the devil, the works of deformity, opposi-
tion and contradiction to the principles of God's creation, 
to the light of this candle of the -bord put into us, in the 
moment that he made us. This is a full place, and shews 
that a Christian is a restored man, according to the very 
plat-form of the primitive institution. He is created over 
again in Christ Jesus; and the workmanship of God is recover-
ed, and restored; and the workmanship of the devil is undone, 
and destroyed. (2, 132) 
Thus is the role of Christ not to provide a new code but a 
new principle by which man is enabled to carry out the ir-
replaceable code of creation. To explicitate and confirm 
that relationship of Christ to creation Whichcote resorted to 
his favourite Titus text as a kind of exegesis of the fore-
going passage. 
See also that notable place to Titus, which place we may re-
fer to, as a summary of all necessary divinity, viz. the grace 
of God'that bringeth ealvation, hath appeared-to all men, 
teaching us, that denying ungodliness and worldly.-lusts^,we 
should live soberly, righteously and godly in this present 
world, Titus 2.11-12. Here are the main foundations of chris-
tian religion; all that is necessary is comprised in these 
two words. The first is this, that every one doth own and 
acknowledge his hope of salvation to be from the grace of 
God; not having our own righteousness: for we are justified 
freely by his grace, and 'tis the grace of Jod that bringeth 
ealvation. Secondly, this grace that bringeth salvation, 
teacheth us to deny ungodliness, and worldly lusts; and to 
live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world. 
(2, 132-33) 
Christ is the ^race of God which brings ealvation, i.e., which 
illuminates the three-fold duty which constitutes the original 
and enduring call to holiness. Christ fits into this scheme 
not as instituting a new code but primarily as an inner prin-
ciple of spiritual vision. 
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Smith seconded Whichcote's moral and reiterative con-
ception of the gospel, likewise seeing Christ as a kind of 
divine will-power. Agreeing with his master that there was 
sufficient knowledge of God in the world but that the will 
to holiness was lacking. Smith depicted Christ's significance 
in terms of a "Godlike pattern of purity"· 
Divine Truth is better understood, as it unfolds, itself in 
the purity of mens hearts and lives, then in all those subtil 
Niceties into which curious Wits may lay it forth. And there-
fore our Saviour, who is the great Master of it, would not, 
while he WHS here on earth, draw it up into any System or Body, 
nor would his Disciples after him; He would not lay it out to 
us in any Canons or Articles of Belief, not being indeed so 
careful to stock sind enrich the World with Opinions and No-
tions, as with true Piety, and a Godlike pattern of purity, 
as the best way to thrive in all spiritual understanding. 
His main scope was to promote an Holy life, as the best and 
most compendious way to a right Belief. He hangs all true 
acquaintance with Divinity upon the doing Gods will, If any 
man will doe his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether 
it be of God. 61 
Moral divinity with a tincture of Christ? Besides plac-
ing the weight of his Christology squarely behind the promo-
tion of the virtues of natural religion, Whichcote showed a 
sympathy and an optimism with regard to the lot of the "hea-
then" multitudes beyond the pale of the church remarkable for 
62 his age. Much to ïuckney's irritation, he even went so far 
as to cite instances of virtue from that non-Christian world 
as examples for Christians to imitate. Whichcote was of the 
opinion that God would be just in his judgment of that great 
ungospelled world—he reckoned that it constituted nineteen-
twentieths of the then known world—judging it according to 
the norms of the natural religion which men can carry out un-
less they have abused their nature. In reply to Tuckney's 
advice that he should "not so much nor so often handle such 
texts, as are examinable by ratio rei" Whichcote reaffirmed 
the natural basis on which the "heathen" world would be judged. 
Are not such truths of high importance, of clearest evidence 
and assurance, knowable lumine innato et naturali, quorum non 
potest esse ignorantia invincibilis? whereas de Christo there 
may be ignorantia invincibilis; which, as necessary as the 
knowledge of Christ is to Salvation, neminem damnat; the ne-
glect and contradiction whereof damnes, where Christ doth 
1бО 
not—the knowledge and observance whereof necessary, where 
Christ comes to save. 65 
Little wonder that Whichcote was the object of a whis­
pering campaign. Here was ample matter for the consterna­
tion of any serious Puritan: Christ's work seen as the rein­
forcement of a natural religion which already stands man in 
good stead with God. According to Whichcote, man cam excape 
damnation without the help of Christ. Why then should those 
to whom the gospel is addressed bother to accept its demands? 
What difference does it make? It was questions like these 
that Whichcote's preaching was raising, questions which sound 
curiously like those being asked in our own age. From a Puri­
tan's Calvinist perspective which Christ in his substitution-
ary capacity fairly fills, the Platonist's Christ of recon­
ciliation was seen as a mere "tincture", a shadow of the real 
Christ. 
In his refusal to denigrate nature for the sake of re­
vealed truth Whichcote appeared to be levelling revelation. 
"Religion", he said (referring to revealed religion), "it 
brings us to God, stays us with God, and makes us to end in 
him. The law of nature makes it the common condition of creat­
ed beings, to live, to move and to have being in God; but it 
is religion that gives sense and feeling of it", (¿f, 300) 
While the natural man could look for and even expect divine 
pardon, revelation afforded the apparently modest advantage 
of assurance. 
And that which the scripture doth over and above reveal, is 
this; it gives a man assurance, that God is placable and re-
concileable; and also declares to us, in what way, and upon 
what terms, we may be confident, that God will pardon sin, 
and receive a sinner to mercy, viz. upon his repentance and 
faith, and returning to his duty. (1, 389) 6? 
But this brand of assurance had little in common with 
the concept of assurance which Barrett attacked. To Which-
cote 'β man of faith, belief in the gospel of God's forgive­
ness is the beginning rather than the end of the Christian 
life. By it he is charged even more strenuously than his 
non-Christian fellow man with the same fundamental duties, 
l6l 
viz., rectitude toward himself, God and his fellow теш· If 
God will not judge by what he has not given in the case of 
the natural man he will certainly take into account the "gos­
pel privileges" in his judgment of those who have heard its 
message. 
The gospel privileges are not to give protection to sinners 
but are cities of refuge for penitents.·..spiritual dainties 
are not to intoxicate the head with conceit, but to establish 
and make a healthy constitution of soul: and what is that, 
but to make a man ingenuous toward God, and in religion, ra­
tional and intelligent? (3, 157-58) 68 
It was with that responsibility side of the coin of "gospel 
privileges" in mind that Whichcote was wont to vent his anger 
at those who were misusing the "justification by faith" form­
ula of the reformers to empty Christ's message of its moral 
content. "How unaccountable are they", he warned, "who 
have turned the doctrine of the gospel, or the grace of God 
into lascivioueness...have given such an explication of the 
grace of the gospel, as to set men at liberty as to morals, 
that is, to make void the law through faith....For the law 
of God's creation is no way damnified, but restored and se­
cured by the doctrine of the gospel; yet these excuse them­
selves from strict morality, and conscientious living, which 
the better sort of heathens thought themselves obliged unto. 
(3, 105-106) 
But if the hearer of the gospel is doubly charged with 
righteousness he need not fear for the ideal of holiness of 
Whichcote's theology is the health, strength and harmony of 
a restored and "elevated" human nature. To a religious out­
look that looked askance at nature such an ideal could only 
be branded an infra-Christian "moral divinity" and the Christ 
whose Spirit is seen as the operative giver of this "natural" 
freedom as a "tincture" or mere shadow of the real Christ. 
Pale as it might appear to the Puritein eye, the religious 
ideal Whichcote so eloquently and effectively preached was 
none other than the authentic "man alive in Christ" morality 
of the deepest layer of the Christian tradition. Perhaps a 
no more fitting conclusion to this study can be found than to 
quote at length from a passage in which Whichcote gives typi­
cally powerful and beautiful expression to that ideal. 
69 Heligion puts the soul in a right posture towards God; for 
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we are thereby renewed in the Spirit of our minde. The soul 
of man to God is as the flower of the sun; it opens at its 
approach, and shuts when it withdraws. Religion in the mind 
is as a byas upon the spirit, inclines it in all its motions; 
tho* sometimes it be jogged and interrupted, yet it comes to 
itself. It is a rule within, a law written in man's heart; 
it is the government of his spirit. We say men shew their 
spirit by their carriage, behaviour and words; ала it is true. 
The good man is an instrument in tune: excite a good man, 
give him an occasion, you shall have from him savory speeches 
out of his mouth, and good actions in his life. Religion con­
tains and comprehends in it all good qualities and disposi­
tions of mind; it doth take in all the virtues that human na­
ture is capable of, which are the qualifications and ornaments 
thereof, and which are the mind's instruments for good actions. 
Religion is rational, accountable, and intelligible: the dif­
ference is not more sensible between a man that is weak and 
strong, a man that is sick and in health, than between a man 
that is truly religious, and one falsly so. You may observe 
it, if you put them upon action. So a man that is truly reli­
gious, if you put him in motion, he will acquit and approve 
himself so: if he be false in his religion, you will see it 
by his failing and miscarriage of life. (4, 10^-105) 
Despiseable to the antipodal outlook of Puritan Cal­
vinism, the„6light advantage that Whichcote attached to gos­
pel faith has a peculiarly modern air ала appeal about it. 
Not that Chicheóte had fully worked out a theology of the 
Church as the sacrament of the world such as has emerged in 
our post Vatican II era but the elements of that vision are 
there and the thrust of his thought is moving in that direc-
tion. 
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CHAPTER k 
THE PLATONISTS· PATRIMONY 
Hoopes was right in applying Brown's account of Jeremy 
Taylor's view of reason to that of the Cambridge Platonists, 
i.e., that it is "not a narrow ratiocinative faculty, nor... 
a faculty at all, but the whole personality—thought, will, 
A 
feeling—illumined by the Holy Spirit." Reason to Whichcote 
and Smith is an intellectual eye by which man both grasps 
reality and directs his life according to its demands· Like 
the "eye" to which Jesus referred as the "lamp of the body", 
that intellectual eye must be sound if its user is to be "fill-
2 
ed with light". It was on that deep level of the source of 
spiritual vision that the two Platonists lavished their best 
attention. "V/e find", Whichcote affirmed, "that it is in vain 
for anyone, to attempt to purge the stream, unless he first 
cleanse the fountain. You mu.t begin at the spring-head. The 
heart is the principle of action. Life begins there; and mo-
tion is from thence." (4, 220) 
Both Whichcote and Smith recognized a kind of knowledge 
that operates at a deeper level than the nominal knowledge 
of what they called "Orthodoxie", viz., the level of know-
ledge which accompanies deed. They perceived that mere in-
tellectual knowledge was the product rather than the cause 
of one's conduct. "That idea which men generally have of God", 
Smith wrote, "is nothing else but the picture of their own 
complexion: that archetypall notion of him which hath the au-
premacie in their mindes, is none else but such an one as hath 
been shaped out according to some pattern of themselves". In 
a land where Christianity was "the religion of the Nation, 
and the first point of Education" and still men were killing 
each other in the name of Christ, the Platonists' strategy 
was to appeal to a deeper, prior layer of knowledge, viz., 
"natural" knowledge. While the new science was proclaiming 
the marvelous order of nature in the external world, the 
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Platonists invited their contemporaries to look within to 
the harmony of the inner world of human nature. "Let a mem 
look within himself", Whichcote said, 
let him awaken and excite his naturals; use, employ, and im­
prove his faculties, he shall come to know what is good, just, 
fit and right. With the good God's assistance (who is uni­
versally to be acknowledged) we may come to see, know, under­
stand and do. (3, 3^6) 
This call to seek religious certainty in a. natural inner truth 
became the first principle not only of deism but also of ortho­
dox Knglish theology of the succeeding age. Even the subse­
quent reaction against rational theology remained true to that 
principle and owes much to the Platonists» reorientation of the 
if 
hermeneutic principle to a sphere of inner certainties. 
For all its scope and competence reason in /hichcote's 
view is no vaive prometheanisra. His preaching of a reason 
strong and connaturally related to truth is rather a persua­
sive by which he would recommend repentance and "imitatio 
Christi". That "inner eye" must be purified before it can 
rise to .the heights of its divine potential, as Smith liked 
to point out. 
Divinity indeed is a true efflux from the eternal light, 
which, like the sunbeams, does not only enlighten but heat 
and enliven; therefore our Saviour hath, in his beatitudes, 
connected purity of heart with the beatifical vision (Mt. 
5·8)· And as the eye cannot behold the sun, unless it be 
Godlike and hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of 
the divine nature. 5 
In other words, man does not enjoy "peaceful possession" of 
his Socratic soul. A constant struggle to dispell the mists 
of prejudice ала overcome the pull of sensuality is the con­
dition sine qua non of the effective operation of that power 
of spiritual response. Whichcote combined the Socratic dis­
cipline of self-examination and the Stoic ideal of self-govern­
ment with the meekness inculcated by Jesus as the first and 
fundamental virtue of the Christian life· There is a "funda­
mental knowledge" shared by all men, but to maintain and deep­
en that knowledge man must retain a supple and open spirit 
that obediently responds to the dictates of objective reality 
without succumbing to the spirit of self-will that v/ould bend 
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truth to suit its own purposes. "Meekness must accompany all 
motions in religion, or else 'tis passion, or a man's own in­
terest." (k% 226-27) 
But having pointed out the lowly and dependent side of 
reason the Platonists went on to proclaim its consequent 
strength and competence. To the one who seeks truth "with 
a free judgment, and a sanctified mind" Smith promised an 
abundant knowledge: 
He thus seeks, shall find; he shall live in Truth, and that 
shall live in him; it shall be like a stream of living wa­
ters issuing out of his own Soul.... 7 
To those who submit to the discipline of inner purification, 
who endeavour to "shut the eyes of sense, and open...that oth­
er eye of the soul" a knowledge of God will be theirs that 
surpasses the discursive knowledge of "Orthodoxie" as vision 
transcends faith. 
But how sweet and delicious that truth is which holy and 
Heaven-born souls feed upon in their mysterious converse 
with God....Before, we laid hold on him only with a strug­
gling, agonistical and contentious reason, hotly combating 
with difficulties sind sharp contests of diverse opinions, 
and laboring in itself, in its deductions of one thing from 
smother; we shall then fasten our minds upon him with such 
a "serene understanding", such an intellectual calmness and 
serenity as will present us with a blissful, steady and in­
variable sight of him. 8 
Whichcote was less poetic but not less optimistic about the 
Johannine experiential knowledge proper to the purified soul. 
"Of holy things, men of holy hearts and lives, speak with 
great assurance of truth", he argued, for there is "not only 
the ability of these mens parts...but there is the natural­
ness of the subject to their state ana temper, especially of 
the acquaintance they have with it, and the experience they 
have of it: and God's blessing over and above." (2, 19) 
The recent rediscovery of the Cambridge Platonists has 
made it clear that the roots of the rationalist religious out­
look that dominated most of eighteenth century England lie at 
a deeper level than the Restoration and the thought of Locke. 
It is the Platonists themselves who stand at the very foun-
taiqhead of the new religious mentality of the "age of rea-
9 
son'.'. The myriad links both personal and intellectual which 
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connect the Cambridge divines with the mind-moulders of the 
English Enlightenment have now been carefully traced and do-
cumented. 
In his provocative study of the Platonist Henry More 
Lichtenstein has argued that the Platonists have generally 
enjoyed a "good press" and that the ensuing development of 
theology, which he characterizes as a deterioration, has been 
attributed to the Cambridge men only indirectly and as a die-
11 tortion of their authentic thought. Lichtenstein himself 
is concerned to show the the emerging religious rationalism 
is not so much the result of a distortion as of an expli-
cation and elaboration of very real tendencies in the Pla-
12 tonist theology. While one admires the sincerety with which 
Lichtenstein goes about "setting the record straight" yet 
it is not merely because of the Platonists' good reputation 
that one must challenge such a contention· 
First of all, Lichtenstein1s pessimistic evaluation of 
the religion of Restoration and eighteenth century England 
as "a century and a half in which religion is generally noted 
for neither profundity in thought nor vitality in feeling, 
an era in which the vitiation of religion's intellectual ele-
ment coincided with a marked decline in the quality of reli-
gious sentiment" is, as he himself admits, somewhat debate-
13 
able. The present writer is more inclined to agree with 
Cassirer's judgment that the roots of the Enlightenment's 
religious faith lie deeper than it's many apparently anti-
14 
religious elements indicate. The popular picture of En-
lightenment religion, too heavily influenced by the colour-
ful controntation of the philosophes with an intransigent 
Catholic establishment, fails to give enough weight to the 
quieter revolution that was taking place in England and Ger-
many. While it is true that the social consciousnesa of de-
15 ism was far more preached than practiced yet, if as Qoethe 
said, the brilliance and vitality of an age are a measure of 
its faith then the religion of post-Restoration England with 
its remarkable flowering of culture could hardly have been 
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as shallow as Lichtenstein thinks. 
For this was a period when the star of Kngland fairly 
burst on the heavens of Europe, filling rival nations with 
admiration. Not even an eclipsed France could suppress her 
esteem: 
The English think deeply; in that their mind is one with 
their character; delving deeply into things, and rich in ex-^g 
perience they extend far and wide the empire of the sciences. 
Newton, Locke, Berkeley, Addison, Bentley are but a few of 
the imposing figures crowding the canvas of this English re-
naissance. The sphere of letters shared the quickened cli-
mate, bringing forth such illustrious authors and poets as 
Dryden, Gay, Pope and Swift. The pride that causes Gosse*s 
exaggeration is understandable. 
Iu 1702 Queen Anne ascended the throne, and her brief reign 
is identified with a brilliant revival in English letters, 
in the hands of a group of men of the highest accomplishment 
and originality·...Between 1711 and 171^ a perfect galaxy of 
important works in prose and verse burst almost simultaneous-
ly from the London presses. It was as though a cloud which 
had long obscured the heavens had been swept away by a wind, 
which, in so doing, had revealed a splendid constellation. 
In 1702, no country in civilized Europe was in a more melan-
choly condition of intellectual emptiness than England; in 
1712, not France itself could compare with us for copious and 
vivid production...«The little volume of dialogues which 
Berkeley issued under the title of Hylas and Jrhilonous belongs 
to the annus mirabilis 1713i when Pope, Swift, Arbuthnot, Ad-
dison, Steele, were all at the brilliant apex of their genius, 
and when England had suddenly combined to present such a ga-
laxy of literary talent as was to be matched, or even approach-
ed, nowhere on the continent of Europe. 17 
It is well enough known and documented but must be men-
tioned in passing that this blossoming of learning and letters 
in England was to emanate far beyond her shores and exercise 
a key role in the development of the French and German Enlight-
enments. That the impulse behind the tremendous changes in 
French thought in the vital years leading up to the revolu-
tion was for an important part of English origin is undeni-
able. But that one effect of that influence would be a ter-
rible clash with the established Chnrch does not contradict 
the fact of the religious character of that impulse. It was 
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a case of one kind of religion opposing another, viz., the 
supernaturalistic religion of the Catholic Church against the 
new rationalist brand of religion and vice versa· Les philo­
sophes were condemning one theology in the name of another 
rather than simply calling for the abolition of all religion 
іЯ 
as is commonly thought. 
The power of those thought waves emanating from England 
were to affect Germany as well. In fact, they proved so strong 
as to displace France as the priveleged tutor of the Teutons. 
Long after the original impulse had spent itself on its native 
shores it was just beginning to work its way deep into the 
19 
German mind. In the thought of that epitome of the Aufklä-
rung, Gotthold Lessing, one cam clearly discern the marks of 
the English influence. In its positive application of the 
new theology the Aufklarung's stance toward institutional re-
ligion was more according to the English pattern than the 
philosophes scorn for organized religion. 
Originating in England the theology of the Enlightenment 
marks the dawn of a new age of religion in which religious 
faith is no longer seen as the product of absolute authori-
ties—either of Church or Scripture—but of personal convic-
tion. Kant's account of the spirit of the Enlightenment ap-
plies to its attitude toward relgion as well. 
Enlightenment is man's exodus from his self-incurred tutelage. 
Tutelage is the inability to use one's understanding without 
the guidance of another person. This tutelage is self-incurred 
if its cause lies not in any weakness of the understanding, 
but in indecision and lack of courage to use the mind without 
the guidance of another. 'Dare to know' (sapere aude)l. Have 
the courage to use your own understanding; this is the motto 
of the Enlightenment. 19 
Cassirer has shown that Kant's summation of the meaning 
of the Enlightenment was a correct one. Behind the trans-
formation of religion and the daring initiatives in all fields 
was a whole new concept of reason. Reason was seen as free 
20 from absolute authorities and forging its own convictions. 
The great movement of linli^htenment thought was away from the 
bonds of apriori deductive systems to the open road of induc-
tive reasoning. The hitherto determining transcendental:truths 
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were left behind—but not abandonedI—as man set out by way of 
21 
patient inquiry to find the truth for himself. 
To the observer who clings to a "law and order" kind of 
religious ideal in which a hierarchical conception of revela-
tion provides a neat compartment for everyone and everything, 
the Enlightenment spectacle of burgeoning free-thought and 
open attack on traditional dogma must appear as a period of 
regrettable regression. If one the other hemd one is con-
vinced that the only solid foundation for religious certain-
ty is within, then the apparent antinomious and anti-religious 
phenomena of the Enlightenment can be positively evaluated 
as the necessary shaking off of the last coils of absolute 
religious authorities and the beginnings of a long and pain-
ful quest to re-found religious conviction on the pillars of 
reason. To this observer, who shares that latter positive 
opinion, the enlightenment appears as the threshold of a new 
age. The adolescent Christianity of the Middle Ages has un-
dergone a crisis—almost a century of religious wars and per-
secutions— and emerged as the young adult whose faith is 
founded henceforth on personal conviction. 
One can deplore the fact that for the greater part of 
the Enlightenment that "personal conviction" was more ra-
tionalistic than fully personal, and that the affective and 
voluntary side of man was neglected, yet in comparison with 
the overall advance from an authoritarian to a personal her-
menéutica! principle that temporary one-eidedness is of sec-
ondary importance. 
It is to that ideal of an inner and personal religion 
that Whichcote and his disciple Smith mightily contributed. 
Too much ink has been wasted lamenting the fact that the new 
age was unable to grasp the fullness of the Platonists' sub-
lime vision of reason; surely of far greater significance is 
22 the import of the transmission that actually did take place. 
It is true that of their multi-dimensional view of religious 
reason only one side took root in the minds of their spiritual 
descendente, viz., the competence and quasi-autonomy of reason 
17^ 
in the realm of religion, and yet the momentous significance 
of that bequeathal has not received due recognition· The 
exaggerated rationalism of the infamous but relatively unim-
portant speculations of deism has diverted attention from 
the moderate and balanced rationalism of mainstream English 
theology of the Restoration. At the dawning of a new age is 
is understandable that there would be exaggerations and abu* 
ses. After centuries of submission to absolute religious au-
thorities man had suddenly discovered that hie opinion count-
ed for something; that he had the right, indeed the duty, of 
seeking out the truth for himself· If seen in this light the 
rational "religion without tears" of Locke and the deists could 
be viewed more positively than it usually is as the first over-
confident step of the emancipated mem of the Enlightenment. 
It is understandable that at the dawn of a new age in 
which man first realized something of the limitations of ex-
ternal authorities and of the scope of his individual dignity 
that he would show a certain reckless boldness toward the re ' -
eoorees of religious authority that formerly held him in the 
bonde of tutelage. Moreover, after a long dark night of reli-
gious war it is not surprising that a certain coolness to-
ward religion characterizes the new day. What is surprising 
is that the built-up resentment and anti-religious sentiment 
did not result in an atheistic or areligious age. That that 
was not the case is due largely to the conciliatory efforts 
of the Cambridge Flatonists. At a time when English religion 
was poised on the edge of the precipice of deoline they rallied 
a nation around a new conception of the Christian faith. "The 
Church had been quite extinct," wrote the contemporary observer 
Bishop Burnet, "had not a new set of men of a different stamp, 
who had their education chiefly in Cambridge, under Dr. Which-
cote, Cudworth, Wilkins, Worthington, and More, rose up and 
become a great ornament to it." When sectarian feuding had 
brought the truths of revelation into discredit and doubt, 
Whichcote and his disciples made them credible again. They 
opened up the emerging concept of nature to include a 
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religious dimension, thereby helping to forge the vieion of 
'•the holy alliance between science and religion" which sus-
2k tained the faith of Enlightenment England. 
Though all too little of the mortified and receptive 
side of the Platonists' rich notion of reason is evident in 
the rational divinity that came to dominate eighteenth cen-
tury England yet the main thrust of their thought, i.e., to-
ward a religion both personal and practical, was received and 
carried forward. 
Lichtenstein however has depicted that ensuing theolo-
gical outlook as a regressive form of religion and reluctant-
ly but definitely pointed the finger of accusation at the 
25 Cambridge Platonists. Disagreeing with Tulloch's positive 
judgment of the period, he sees the rational religion of 
the age as neither rational nor religious. In his view, 
the concept of reason central to the new outlook does not 
really participate in the game of religion but stands rather 
on the sidelines as one who makes the rules and referees. 
Religion itself he sees as having become mere morality, cut 
off from its requisite theoretical roots. This "dehydration" 
of religion he traces to the Platonists' "democratic" or 
anti-intellectual attitude by which they taught that the es-
sential truths of religion are few in number and easy to un-
derstand, and to their corresponding emphasis on practical 
27 
morality. 
It is curious that the same school which has been char-
acterized as representing an ethos of pure contemplation 
should be accused of contributing to the loss of the contem-
plative spirit in the religious outlook of their descendents. 
It is the present writer's opinion that neither of these af-
firmations are entirely accurate. While Cassirer's recogni-
tion of the contemplative aspect of the Platonists' thought 
fails to give sufficient weight to the practical thrust of 
28 
their theologies, to Lichtenstein·s Plotinian concept of reli-
gion the thought of the Cambridge men is one-sidedly moral and 29 practical. Having dealt with Cassirer's view the criticism 
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of Lichtenatein must be briefly challenged by questioning the 
sharp distinction which he makes between the theoretical and 
practical aspects of religion· 
Modern day probings into the human body (medicine) and 
shou (psychology, psychiatry) bear concerted witness to the 
psychosomatic unity of man· Moreover, the philosophy of lan­
guage has confirmed this emergent image of man with its evi­
dence of the essential interdependance of thought and language. 
Мал is a being who thinks and acts in concert. The Cartesian 
concept of man has long since been banished: the lines between 
body and spirit, thought and action, have become much more 
fluid them was formerly thought to be the case. Whichcote 
anticipated much modern thinking on this subject with his 
oft repeated conviction that the theoretical and practical 
aspects of morality are a naturally inseparable unity. 
Doubtless there is such a thing as thoughtless action. 
Furthermore, there appear to be people who are engaged in a 
line of action for which they can offer only a minimal theo­
retical. justification. But it is obvious to this writer that 
Çhe'-rule- is rather that action is thought-in-action and that 
a life-style gives, in virtue of its consistency, evidence 
of a solid if implicit theoretical moment. If ahlife-style 
is practically religious it can be safely surmised that the 
theory is not far behind. 
Lichtenstein identifies the theoretical element of reli-
gion with it.'js doctrinal aspect whereas Whichcote and Smith 
thought of the theoretical in terms of a prior intuitional-
moral truth. While it is true that they minimized the im-
portance of the doctrinal level of religion, it is also true 
that their concept of that prior inner knowledge is the lofty 
ideal of purity of soul that Jesus proclaimed in the Sermon on 
the Mount. Only to those who are true to that primordial inner 
truth will further insight into things divine be granted. The 
transcendent element that Lichtenstein misses in the theology 
of Whichcote is very much present but in a vision of the sov-
ereignty of good rather than the good of sovereignty. 
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A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
It was the determined efforts of followers and friends 
moreво than the desire of the author himself which explains 
how the nearly one hundred discourses of Whichcote found their 
way to the printer. That this great preacher's sermons were 
edited by competent and conscientious men is posterity's good 
fortune· Though the original manuscripts eure not extant and 
it is therefore impossible to determine the extent to which 
the edited versions fulfill the author's intentions, yet there 
is good reason to think that they are a faithful reproduction 
of Whichcote's thought. Besides evidence of the care and de­
votion with which the editors pursued their task from the tes-
timony of themselves and others there is the main evidence 
of the internal stylistic and doctrinal consistency of the 
discourses themselves. Among the several editions of Which­
cote' β discourses there are only negligible variations. In 
chronological order, they were published as follows: Select 
Sermons (1698) and Twelve Sermons« a second edition of the 
same selection (1721), edited and with a preface by the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury; Several Discourses« three volumes, edit­
ed by Dr. Jeffery (London: 1701); Several Discourses, edited 
by the eminent divine Samuel Clarke (London: 1707); The Ser­
mons of Benjamin Whichcote, edited by William Wishart, in 
four volumes (Edinburgh: 17^2); and The Works of the Learned 
Benjamin Whichcote, D.D., in four volumes by an unknown edi­
tor (Aberdeen: 1751)· 
Whichcote entrusted his papers to his nephew, Mr. Ben­
jamin Whichcote, who in turn passed them on to Dr. Jeffery, 
an admirer who had "the highest veneration for the deseased 
author" and the skills necessary to "qualify him to be a dili-
2 
gent, faithful and judicious editor." Jeffery's charge—to 
prevent publications which might misrepresent the thought of 
Whichcote—was carried out perhaps too cautiously. He was 
highly displeased when Clarke published a volume of the late 
author's sermons from material transcribed by John Smith, 
l80 
sermons which he had himself hesitated to publish even though 
he was almost certain of their authenticity. Wishart's edition 
was published because the Shaftesbury edition was out of print 
and scarce. Finally, the most popular edition of the discourses 
was published in 1751« in Aberdeen, Scotland. The editor, who 
made use of Shaftsbury's famous preface, desired to remain anon­
ymous. This diligent editor added only a brief note assuring 
the reader that he had made a careful comparison of all pre­
vious publications of the sermons in his preparation of a com­
plete edition. It is indeed so that these four volumes con­
tain all of the ninty-eight sermons generally considered gen­
uine« and that the text is as good as any and better than most, 
which is perhaps the reason that there have been published no 
further editions of the discourses. 
Of the remaining works of Whichcote, the moral and reli­
gious aphorisms went through four editions, as follows: Moral 
and Religious Aphorisms« ed. John Jeffery (Norwich: 1703); Mor­
al and Religious Aphorisms...published in MDCCIII, by Dr Jef-
fery. Now re-published, with very large additions, by Samuel 
Salter (London: 1753)? Select Aphorisms« Christian Tract Soci­
ety, No. XXVIII, Vol. Ill (London: 182I); and Aphorisms, edit­
ed by Dean Inge (London: 1930). The aphorisms are the best 
of the consistently quoteable Dr. Whichcote's sayings, drawn 
from his sermons with a view to providing a compact and at­
tractive digest of his thought. Jeffery'β publication of one 
thousand aphorisms together with a preface is a selection from 
the nearly five thousand which he had culled from Whichcote's 
papers. Salter used the Jeffery collection and another unnamed 
collection in the compilation of his edition of one thousand 
two hundred aphorisms, in 1753. 
The important Whichcote-Tuckney Letters are undoubtedly 
genuine, being extant in the Sloane Manuscripts in the British 
Museum. Salter's edition of the Letters, appended to his edi­
tion of the Aphorisms, is a transcription of a copy of the Let­
ters emended by Jeffery, which Salter has only slightly altered. 
Finally, there is the question of the purportedly 
I8l 
authentic еарорс це аΔόγματα; or, Some Select Notions publish­
ed two years alter Whichcote's death, in l685t by an editor 
who called himself Fhilanthropus. The editor thought of him­
self as a "pupil and particular friend" of the author and was 
determined to see something of his thought in print. When 
nothing of Whichcote had been published two years after his 
death, Fhilanthropus could wait no longer and had the Select 
k 
Notions printed and dedicated to the deceased author. In 
spite of the editor's testimony however the book is not a 
faithful representation of Whichcote's thought. It is pos­
sible that the Puritan hue of the Select Notions mirrors the 
author's thought in the early years at Cambridge before he 
broke with Calvinism yet it seems more probable that the ad­
miration of the editor exceeded his comprehension of the mas-Ί 
ter's teaching and that the Select Notions is simply a well-
meaning misrepresentation of Whichcote's thought. 
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STELLINGEN 
1. Whichcote'e extension of the proportions of the locus theo-
logicue from the sphere of doctrine to that of Truth was of 
decisive influence in overcoming the spirit of persecution that 
marked Puritan Calvinism and in establishing the spirit of 
toleration which characterized post-Restoration England· 
2· Tuckney's inference that Whichcote'e theology was "a kind 
of moral divinity ··· only with a tincture of Christ" reflects 
his Calvinistic bias and fails to do justice to the deeply 
Christian quality of the Flatonist's thought. 
3· Based on a too narrow view of both the Platonists', and the 
New Philosophy's vision of nature, Cassirer's contention that 
the Cambridge Platonists, "who in the sphere of religious doc­
trine stood for the inalienable prerogative of reason, re­
nounce and betray reason just at the point where they under­
take an explanation of nature" is seriously misleading. 
E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, p. 131· 
k. Subject to strong qualification is Cassirer'β characteri­
zation of the Cambridge Platonist viewpoint as purely contem­
plative and not in tune with the practical outlook of the age. 
E. Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, p. 50. 
5« Lichtenstein's censure of the Tulloch view of rational 
theology and therefore indirectly of Tulloch's beloved Gam-
bridge Platonists involves a misapprehension of Tulloch's 
viewpoint and a highly questionable concept of the place of 
reason in the Christian life. 
A. Lichtenstein, Henry Ноге: The Rational Theology of a Cam­
bridge Platonist, pp. 200-14. 
6. Robert's characterization of Whichcote'e concept of the 
Fall as Augustinian is misleading because it is true only 
superficially, or terminologically. 
J.D. Roberts, From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Cen­
tury England, pp. 123-2*»·. 
7. The thesis of Lichtenstein that the lose of the "numinous*1 
dimension in the religion of post-Restoration England is due 
largely to the influence of the Cambridge Platonists is based 
on an objectionable interpretation of their thought. 
A. Lichtenstein, Henry Hore; The Rational Theology of a Cam-
bridge Platonist« pp. 173-93· 
8. Because it has become not only irrelevant to the modern 
problematic but also a potential obstacle to faith the tra-
ditional Catholic theologia naturalis needs a prefound review. 
9* Neglected by a one-sided history of science, The Cambridge 
Platonists' theory of "plastic nature" with its elaboration and 
application by Ray deserves wider recognition. 
10. The theology underpinning the aim of certain Christian 
organizations to stamp out the habit of cursing could be pro-
fitably reviewed. 
11. A theology which would exalt grace by stressing the uni-
versality and power of sin is in danger of undermining its 
proper foundation. 
12. Speaking about God (theology), which is not based upon 
speaking to God (prayer), is merely a form of gossip. 
13. With reference to the "wholly other" God of tranecenden-
talist theologies, it must be said that a concept of "other-
ness" drawn from beyond the incarnational sphere of Christian 
revelation can have little in common with the Christian mystery. 
I1*. The common notion that the religion of the English "age 
of reason" was a shallow rationalism more or less equivalent 
to deism is a "popular misconception" in need of rectification. 
15. The possible connection between the widespread Dutch 
custom of bicycle riding and the fact that Dutchmen are one 
of the tallest peoples in the world is worthy of scientific 
investigation in view of the fact that tall people are always 
looked up to. 


